Intuitions, intentions, and the moral wrongness of hostile design: A reply to Robert Rosenberger

Abstract

Certain designs of urban environments are said to exclude the unhoused from urban spaces, or at least to attempt to deter them from using these spaces. Perhaps the most influential critic of these types of design – which have been termed hostile design – is Robert Rosenberger. This paper argues that some of the central views presented by Rosenberger to support his ethical critique of hostile design in his recent work, while being inspiring and important, are also problematic. Specifically, we argue that the ethical methodology he employs, and which is based on our moral intuitions, faces several problems. Moreover, we suggest that it is unclear what role ‘intentions’ play in his work, and that the most likely interpretations all have considerable drawbacks. Lastly, we contend that the scope of his moral critique of hostile design is opaque because it is not clear what moral weight he ascribes to the putative wrong of employing hostile design, and that this makes the practical applicability of his views limited. The paper concludes that while it is important that hostile design is subjected to rigorous ethical scrutiny, more work is needed to build a robust ethical case against it.