Een systeemtheoretische beschouwing over democratie

Samenvatting

A study of whether democracy in organizations is feasible. The "Iron Law" of R. Michels (ZR SOZIOLOGIE DES PARTEIWESENS IN DER MODERNEN DEMOKRATIE [The Sociology of Parties in Modern Democracy], Stuttgart, Federal Republic of Germany, 1925) was based on the assumptions of the inevitability of apathy & of centralization in the organization. So why do men organize? Because organizations fill one or more of their needs. M. Olson distinguishes 2 types of participation that are according to their needs: contractual & collective action (THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, Cambridge, Mass: 1965). Different types of motivations result in such different types of organizations as A. Touraine's (SOCIOLOGIE DE L'ACTION, [Sociology of Action], Paris, France: 1965) coercive, instrumental, integrational, & representative types, while A. Etzioni's typology ("A Basis for Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations," 1969, no other publication information available) defines them as coercive, utilitarian, & normative. The theory of adaptive decision-making systems enables us to analyze both the interrelation between the 2 assumptions of apathy & centralization, & the dependency of the centralization-thesis on environmental circumstances. Using the "simple-complex" dimension of both individual & organizational decision-making, a paradigm of "democracy possibilities" is construed, which distinguishes between 4 types of situations. R. Michels' analysis is supported but is applicable only to 1 of these 4 possibilities. 3 other situations promise greater democracy. 4 Diagrams. Modified HA.