Truth and Habermas' Paradigm of a Critical Social Science

Samenvatting

Habermas considers psychoanalysis to be paradigmatic for a critical social science because it is oriented toward "emancipation" & is simultaneously "strictly scientific." It is impossible to find in Habermas's work an adequate rejoinder to the criticisms (made by E. Nagel, K. Popper, M. Scriven, & others) of psychoanalysis' allegedly scientific character. It is shown that Habermas's theory of truth & his concept of ideal speech situations cannot be used to refute these criticisms. Habermas's consensus theory of truth collapses under a self-imposed obligation, ie, that of finding a consensus-independent criterion for the distinction between a true & a false consensus. Ironically, Habermas considers the particular characteristics of the psychoanalytical discourse, to be indicative of a methodological guideline which can solve this problem. But since questions of validity are tied, for Habermas, to his distinction between action & discourse & to his concept of the ideal speech situation, & since neither distinction nor concept is strictly applicable to the psychoanalytic discourse, fundamental doubts regarding the scientific character of results which can be reached in "criticial social science" remain. Modified HA.