De aanwending van begrippen

Samenvatting

The way in which scientists conceive of sense perception is discussed. It is shown that, contrary to the assertions of positivist methodology, even the most 'concrete' concepts can never be reduced to, or linked to, an exhaustive & limited number of sense perceptions. A concept always serves as the norm for organizing old as well as novel perceptions, in ways that are intersubjectively acceptable. In the case of concepts that are in frequent use, the application of this norm has become a routine matter; accordingly, the application of such observational categories to sense perceptions proceeds smoothly, unless there are express motives for doubt. In that case, as in the case of less common concepts, doubts concerning the correctness of the determination may be removed by relating these concepts (illata) to observational categories. In addition to the illata & to the observational categories, there are also theoretical concepts. These are subject to doubts on two counts: the norm for their application has not yet crystallized & the relationships between theoretical concepts & other varieties of concepts are unclear. However, the many problems theoretical concepts set in the way of their application to perceptions have positive consequences for the experimental freedom of researchers who aim at the projection of an adequate picture of reality by relating concepts to perceptions. 3 Figures. Modified HA.