

## Summaries

### **A Prototype Anti-School**

by M. Punch

In England, between the world wars, the independent, progressive boarding school promised a new form of school and a new type of person who would ferment social and political change. The author critically examines these claims with a case study of Dartington Hall School and its former pupils. In particular the gap between the ideal of individual freedom and institutional reality is examined. The radical progressive school is looked at in terms of expressive totality, charismatic leadership, pupil self-government, the norms and values of the pupil society, and boundary maintenance.

Some conclusions about the functioning of such an 'anti-school' are related to the contemporary free school movement. The ambivalences and dilemmas of the progressives' attempt to institutionalize freedom for the child are looked at sociologically as are some consequences for former pupils.

### **Truth and Habermas' Paradigm of a Critical Social Science**

by A. Brand

Habermas considers psycho-analysis to be paradigmatic for a critical social science because it is oriented towards 'emancipation' but is, at the same time, 'strictly scientific'. It is, however, impossible to find in Habermas' work an adequate rejoinder to the criticisms (made by Nagel, Popper, Scriven and others) of this allegedly scientific character of psycho-analysis. This article shows that Habermas' theory of truth and his concept of the ideal speech situation cannot be used to refute these criticisms. Habermas' consensus-theory of truth collapses under a self-imposed obligation i.e. of finding a consensus-independent criterion for the distinction between a true and a false consensus. Ironically, Habermas, when faced with this difficulty, advises us to consider the peculiar characteristics of psycho-analytical discourse as being indicative for a methodological guideline which can show us the way out of this problem. But since questions of validity are bound up, for Habermas, with his distinction between action and discourse and with his concept of the ideal speech situation, and since neither this distinction nor this concept are strictly applicable to his form of discourse, we are left (even if we discuss matters in Habermas' own terms) with very fundamental doubts regarding the scientific character of results which can be reached in 'critical social science'.