

## Summaries

### **Understanding Wittgenstein: some brief remarks**

by D. L. Philips

This essay contains some 'preliminary' remarks about the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It begins by briefly describing the differences, and similarities, in the two phases of Wittgenstein's work in philosophy. This is followed by a short discussion of his 'method', with an emphasis on the therapeutic quality of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Finally, the last portion of the essay is concerned with Wittgenstein's viewpoint as regards 'relativism'. It is argued that Wittgenstein was not a relativist and that, in fact, his ideas are extremely useful in finding a middle way between the relativist and absolutist extremes.

### **Commentary and discussion**

by A. de Ruijter, H. Tromp, A. J. F. Köbben and A. Blok

The commentaries of De Ruijter, Tromp and Köbben review the text of Professor Anton Bloks inaugural lecture on 'Wittgenstein en Elias; een methodische richtlijn voor de antropologie' (Wittgenstein and Elias; a methodological design for anthropology). Van Gorcum, Assen, 1975, 77 pages. In it, Blok contends that both nominalism and essentialism lead us astray and he tries to guide us along a new track that avoids the pitfalls of both. He does so by using Wittgenstein's notion of 'family likenesses'. The comments are sceptical, still Blok in his reply, insists.

### **Sociology as a science and the sociology of science**

by W. van Rossum

In this article, Derek L. Philips' *Abandoning Method* is reviewed from a sociology-of-science perspective. After discussing the Wittgensteinian theory of knowledge assumptions in the book, our conclusion is that Philips' main argument, that sociologists could improve their work by abandoning method, and, consequently, should define their work in terms of 'playful' activities, seems unjustified in the light of these assumptions.