

## Pillarization (verzuiling) and political parties

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Since approximately 20 years Dutch sociologists deal with the problem of the society's pillarization.<sup>1</sup> Three scientific traditions can easily be distinguished in this discussion, each characterizing a different point of interest and analysis regarding the problem.

The first tradition is marked by the empirical studies of J. P. Kruijt.<sup>2</sup> He was primarily interested in a comprehensive and exact survey of socio-structural data.<sup>3</sup> Kruijts studies were the starting point of the entire discussion.

A second tradition is represented by those studies oriented towards the sociology of religion and towards historical questions; they dealt primarily with the denominational pillars. The authors (first of all Goddijn<sup>4</sup>, Hendriks<sup>5</sup> and Thurlings<sup>6</sup>) were interested in analyzing the origins of the denominational pillars and in describing their historical development.

The third tradition is oriented towards political questions. The negative effects of a pillarized societal structure on the political process have been studied as well as the change of the democratic institutional system caused by this pillarization (Daalder<sup>7</sup>). Others took interest in questions concerning the political stability of pillarized societies (Lijphart, Huysse<sup>8</sup>).

This categorization clearly shows that the socio-structural and the religious-sociological traditions are dealing with the phenomenon of pillarization itself, while the political science tradition deals with the effects of pillarization, i.e. with the institutional ossification of the political system resulting from the society's pillarization.

As de Clercq<sup>9</sup> had already observed, the concept of pillarization contains simultaneously a dynamic element and a static one. For the sake of conceptual clarity it seems necessary, to distinguish the societal process of pillarization (restructuring of associations and organizations) from the political effects of this phenomenon.<sup>10</sup> The dynamic process of pillarization (verzuiling) thus must be strictly distinguished from the political and institutional measures taken by the elites in order to remedy the effects of pillarization that endanger stability (verzuildheid, consociational democracy).

This distinction gives rise to a problem:

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How did the process of pillarization start and what factors determined its dynamics?

In the following notes an attempt will be made to answer this question. The first step will be to confront the existing explanations of the origin of pillarization with the historical facts, in order to arrive at a clarification of the factors causing the emergence and development of pillarization.

The second step will be to suggest a new definition of the concept of pillarization; the old one is still considered unsatisfactory. At the same time the logic and internal dynamics of the process of *verzuiling* will be discussed.

### Reflections on the origin of pillarization<sup>12</sup>

The factors determining the origin of pillarization have first of all been analysed by those authors representing the religious-sociological tradition in the discussion. There exist two different explanations regarding the origins of pillarization. The first<sup>13</sup> was developed from the example of the Catholic pillar in the Netherlands, but was later transferred to apply to the Socialist and Protestant pillars too. The authors put forward the following arguments:

The Catholics (Protestants, Socialists) were a repressed minority, discriminated against because of their religion or ideology. About 1850 they began to unite more closely and they organized themselves in opposition to the injustice done to them and against continual discrimination. This resulted in competing movements, which in the course of time grew into the solid polarized structures of pillarization. In this way, pillarization is the structural effect of a triple emancipation movement. Therefore, in the following this hypothesis shall be called the emancipation-hypothesis.

The other hypothesis<sup>14</sup> was also developed from the example of the Catholic pillar. It was never explicitly applied to the Protestant pillar, though it may be possible to do so in terms of content. In its current form the hypothesis is by definition not applicable to the Socialists. The hypothesis runs as follows: the denominations created a network of organisations to protect the purity of their faith and their churches' autonomy against the ideas of Enlightenment, Liberalism and Rationalism.

According to this hypothesis pillarization is a consequence of the churches' retreat into a ghetto in order to defend their own integrity against surroundings hostile to religion. This hypothesis shall be called preservation hypothesis.

Both hypotheses<sup>15</sup> lay equal claim to giving a satisfactory explanation for the origins of pillarization. They can justify this claim only if they are able to explain sensibly the causes leading to the creation of pillarization in the Netherlands with its concrete formation into a Catholic, Protestant and a Socialist

pillar.<sup>16</sup> Essentially three questions make the shortcomings of both hypotheses quite clear:

- 1 – Can they explain, why pillarization arose in the second half of the 19th century – not earlier and not later?
- 2 – Can they explain the behaviour, specifically the coalition-behaviour of the pillars?
- 3 – Who are the 'architects'<sup>17</sup> of the pillars, i.e. the central agents who desired and created pillarization?

*re Question 1* – There must be a reason, why the process of pillarization in the Netherlands began around 1870. But both hypotheses have great difficulty in trying to explain this date of origin.

Those who agree with the emancipation-hypothesis should be able to explain, why the interest in emancipation led to pillarization only at this date. The discrimination against the Catholics goes back to the 80 Years War (1566-1648). At the end of the 18th century legal discrimination was eliminated. Goddijn cannot explain 1870 as date of origin by his emancipation-hypothesis; nevertheless in order to make it sound reasonable, he points to the general striving for organisation during the 19th century. The date thus results from a combination of the wish for emancipation on the one hand, and the broad wish for organisation on the other.<sup>18</sup> Clearly this explanation only shifts the problem to a new question – why the common striving for organization gained importance around 1870 in the Netherlands. A more fundamental objection seems to be that with this explanation the original emancipation-hypothesis is considerably modified. Pillarization consequently does not now stem from a wish for emancipation, but from a coincidence of the wish for emancipation and the common striving for organization. Thus the problem of explaining the date of origin remains insoluble for the original emancipation-hypothesis. It can only be solved by adding another hypothesis which indeed alters the perspective entirely: the striving for organization can no longer be deduced from the activities of the Catholic population alone, but at best from an analysis of broad social trends.

The shortcomings of the preservation-hypothesis are similar: ideas hostile to religion, Enlightenment and Rationalism are considerably older than pillarization. The fight for an autonomous Catholic hierarchy (1853) can be interpreted as an attempt by the Catholics to protect their identity, yet it has nothing so far to do with pillarization. The first elements of pillarization emerged in connection with the school-controversy. And even this controversy should have been started when the first liberal school-act was passed in 1806, or at the latest in 1857, when an act of education was passed. In 1806 the Catholics did not defend themselves at all and in 1857 half of the Catholic par-

liamentarians even voted for the bill.<sup>19</sup> Only after the coalition with the Liberals had ended, after the school-controversy had gained violence and led to a coalition with the Protestants – i.e. after 1860 – the first elements of pillarization emerged. Why, it must be asked, did the striving for preservation of identity, manifested in the school-controversy, lead to pillarization; why did the similar striving for identity, showing in the struggle for an autonomous hierarchy fail to do so? Why did the striving for identity become virulent precisely in this phase of school-history, and did it fail to stir in connection with other developments, equally portentous from the point of view of discrimination against the denominational school? Assuming the preservation hypothesis to be right, the date of origin of pillarization would seem to be determined by chance and cannot be explained.

*re Question 2* – Between 1848 and 1914 only two variants of coalitions existed. First the Catholics and the Liberals formed a front against the Protestants. After 1860 a stable coalition between Catholics and Protestants on the one hand (the denominational 'right') and Liberals and Socialists on the other hand (the nondenominational 'left') was formed.

According to the emancipation-hypothesis the fights by the suppressed groups against their suppressors should have influenced their coalition behaviour. The coalition of the suppressed Catholics and the suppressing Liberals as well as the strict refusal of cooperation between both – according to the hypothesis equally discriminated – denominational parties on the one hand and the Socialists on the other, invalidate this assumption. In fact the promising coalition of the three emancipation-movements with their overwhelming majority never came into being. Clearly emancipation – however it may be defined – was not the highest and certainly not the only goal of the three movements. The preservation-hypothesis is quite useful for an explanation of the Protestant-Catholic coalition. The coalition between Catholics and Liberals however can hardly be explained. If the struggle for an autonomous Catholic hierarchy (1853) can still be interpreted as a fight for identity, the coalition itself lasted nevertheless much longer than this incident. Is it reasonable to assume that a religious community, feeling itself threatened by ideas hostile to its religion, should protect itself by a coalition with exactly the fiercest supporters of these ideas?

*re Question 3* – The question as to the central agents in the process of creating pillarization has never been explicitly asked. The analyses only contain vague statements (the orthodox Protestants, the Catholic part of the population) or emphasize the activities of individual leaders.

The emancipation-hypothesis leads to the question whether the Catholics as a

whole are indeed interested in emancipation. It is known that the Catholics had to be made aware of their suppression at first, which was no easy task.<sup>20</sup> But who was interested in raising the Catholics from their lethargy and who started the challenging task of mobilization? Since the emancipation of a suppressed minority is a political goal, it can be assumed that the politically active part of the Catholic (Protestant) population group was the subject of these attempts. If the question concerning the architects of the pillars had been pursued, probably the emerging political parties would quite soon have been recognized behind the veil of the emancipation-hypothesis.<sup>21</sup>

With regard to the preservation-hypothesis it can at first be assumed that mainly members of the clergy had a fundamental interest in protecting the members of their church from influences hostile to their belief, i.e. that the clergy wanted to protect the integrity of their church. Indeed, especially at the beginning, the leading positions in the denominational movements were held by representatives of the clergy like Abraham Kuyper of the orthodox Protestants and H. J. A. M. Schaeapman of the Catholics. But this does not really answer the question as to the architects of the pillars. The formation of the Socialist pillar can not be explained by this hypothesis. Systematically pursued this would lead us to the assumption that the entire effects of pillarization on the formation of political and social structures stem from the pastoral interests of the clergy. And additionally the parties and unions are only executive organs of the wishes and ideas resulting from these pastoral interests. This assumption can only be avoided by stressing the responsibility of still other agents with different interests in the process of pillarization. But this could mean going further than the preservation-hypothesis itself does.

These three problems — the question as to the origin, the coalition-behaviour and the central agents — can be solved without difficulties, if the process of democratization is taken into account. All attempts to mobilize the population in the second half of the 19th century were directly connected with the striving to institutionalize democratic procedures and to found political parties. The date of origin of pillarization (c. 1870) can be explained if it is borne in mind that the responsibility of the government before parliament was institutionalized in the Netherlands in 1868.<sup>22</sup> In this way the formation of the government became directly dependent on elections and the distribution of mandates in the second chamber arising from these elections. In this situation it became necessary to found political parties and to endow them with an explicit and formal organisation in order to win members and voters.

The coalition behaviour of the parties can be similarly explained: it was orientated neither towards the 'discrimination'-structures as the emancipation-hypothesis suggests, nor towards the denominational structures as the preservation-hypothesis maintains. Rather it is oriented towards the cleavage struc-

tures manifested in the dominant conflicts of that time. After 1848 the building of a Catholic hierarchy was first dominant, later the school-controversy. The coalitions were a result of these conflicts. Even after 1890, when the Socialist movement rapidly gained strength and brought the controversy on social problems to a head, the overpowering school-controversy lost none of its importance. The social problems were reflected only by conflicts between the wings of the traditional parties (Protestants, Liberals, Catholics) and by the refusal of the Socialists to form an official government coalition with the Liberals.<sup>23</sup>

Consequently, the central agents in the process of pillarization were the political parties, attempting to mobilize members and voters. There existed a broad though not total coincidence of interest between the churches and the denominational parties. The parties' attempts to mobilize followers were supported and even actively carried out by the churches. The example of the Socialist movement shows that the help of the churches was not fundamentally necessary. (More correctly: the support of the parties by existing and independent large organization-systems) The mobilization activities of one party were fully sufficient to create pillarization.

So pillarization is the effect of the specific mobilization activities of the Dutch political parties. Numerous examples in other countries prove that the mobilization campaigns by political parties do not necessarily lead to pillarization. The reason for this development in the Netherlands must accordingly be found in the specific mode in which the Dutch parties carried on their mobilization campaigns. The central theme of the disputes around 1870<sup>24</sup> was the school-controversy. The transformation of this conflict into the political agitation of the parties should thus explain the formation of the pillars.

This conflict on the school system going on between the churches and the secular state can be found in other countries too. The school-controversy actually centered around the state's financial aid for denominational schools.<sup>25</sup> The denominational parties however interpreted the problem differently. They fought for the 'freedom of the school'.<sup>26</sup> In their eyes the Liberals wanted to impede the free exercise of religion. A direct connection was drawn between the school-controversy and the age-old discrimination against Catholics (or the Protestant 'lowly people' – 'kleine Luyden').<sup>27</sup> So a politically explosive combination of religious belief, social dissatisfaction and the school-controversy was created. This resulted – mainly because of the support of the churches – in a coercion-like pressure to be loyal to the denominational parties. In this way the religious beliefs of the church members on the one hand and their party-preference on the other could immediately be linked. Each support for the political enemy simultaneously meant betraying one's own belief.

This procedure of the political parties had far-reaching consequences. A par-

ty defining itself merely as the representative of a certain, clearly distinguishable part of the population, automatically refrains from addressing itself to potential voters not belonging to this part of the population. It sets drastic limits to its potential voter-reservoir. This self-chosen restraint only seems sensible if there is a likelihood of compensating for this loss of possible voters by an eventually total absorption of the chosen group. To this end the parties not only claimed to be the only representatives of this part of the population.<sup>28</sup> They moreover tried to integrate their followers as totally as possible into their sphere of influence, mainly by creating a system of organizations and associations that corresponded to the various party lines. The result was a fairly complete exclusiveness and absorption of all members of the group in question. The pillars thus created were defined by their belief or ideology and deliberately closed to non-members.

At this stage it becomes clear, that the Socialist pillar is oriented along the same lines as the denominational pillars. The Socialists too had a clearly defined reservoir of followers — the workers. They had a common ideology; they closed their front against dissenting ideologies; they created a broad network of organizations and associations into which they tried to integrate all social activities of their followers. They used the same ideologically based exclusiveness and the same totality of absorbing their followers as the denominational parties did. The only difference was that they could not take over an existing network of church associations — they had to create everything from scratch.

So the Dutch parties, deciding to recruit their followers exclusively from an ideologically clearly defined group, had to anticipate two consequences — a desirable and an undesirable one: By pillarization they could ensure a long-lasting, nearly blind loyalty but on the other hand they had to accept a strict limitation of their sphere of influence, because all members of different religious or ideological groups were by definitionem beyond reach.

Certainly the parties were pushed into their particular mode of mobilizing followers by the school-controversy, which was so important at the time the parties were founded. But the parties themselves contributed substantially to giving this controversy its importance. It appears very much as if the parties decided to choose pillarization after checking the costs and benefits of mobilizing ideologically defined groups. They compared the disadvantages of limiting their sphere of influence with the big advantages: if a realistic chance could be expected to gain a majority, pillarization would be the best strategy possible for gaining both: majority and loyal voters. Indeed, all three parties — the Catholics, orthodox Protestants and Socialists — seem to have reckoned with this possibility. The Catholics expected to gain a majority among the population in a surprisingly short time because of their high fertility rate. They dreamed of the 'Catholic Netherlands' and of an unchallenged political supe-

riority.<sup>30</sup> The orthodox Protestants clearly wanted to gain as many voters as possible from liberal Protestantism. They at least explicitly strived for the Protestant's dominance and for a structuring of social life according to their religious beliefs.<sup>31</sup> The Socialists assumed that the workers would help them to gain a majority at the polls, as they likewise hoped in other countries too.<sup>32</sup> All three of the parties could reasonably count on winning the majority because of the considerable overlapping of the categorial groups (for example among the Catholic and Protestant workers). The condition was that they succeeded in mobilizing totally their specific reservoirs. The course of events however showed that the parties considerably overestimated their possibilities of such total mobilization. Only the Catholic were able to win over nearly the whole Catholic part of the population.<sup>33</sup> They profited mostly from the support of the organizationally united Catholic church. The Socialists and especially the Protestants were less successful. So it is no surprise that the 'doorbraak' – a refrainment from pillarization – was explicitly justified by the disappointment of hopes for a majority.<sup>34</sup>

Pillarization in the Netherlands is linked so closely to the origin and the behaviour of the political parties, that each attempt to explain it without reference to these parties must necessarily lead to contradictions. Pillarization is not the consequence of struggles for emancipation or for protecting the identity of the churches only, it is mainly an effect of the mobilization activities of the Dutch political parties, focussing on religious and ideologically defined groups and arguments, during a time of specific conflicts.

### The concept of pillarization

Any attempt to define the concept has to take into consideration that pillarization is a political process with farreaching structural effects. The endeavours of the parties to tie their followers closely to the party is a dynamic process. The connection between the party and the categorial group has to be continually renewed. This task can be made easier if the parties create a basis of organizations independent of the current political issues. With their help they can eliminate political influences from outside, so they do not reach the voters. Within such a system this is possible, because all social activities occur at least with the silent approval of the party. The differentiation of the party system is thus experienced more or less strongly on all social levels because the organizational basis is tied closely to the party. Every party has its own trade union along with other associations<sup>35</sup>; it has the run of an entire organizational system; it even determines loose social connections (visits etc.) of families as well as friendship patterns.<sup>36</sup> Since the denominational parties in the Netherlands arose out of the school-controversy, a threefold school-system emerged. On-



ly the economic sphere and several indivisible institutions like the army remained outside the parties' influence and were not divided.

The parties' striving for pillarization can simply be described as a desire to protect the already recruited and potential members and followers from the influence of the other parties. Their goal was the absorption of even the seemingly unpolitical spheres of social life. The protection of their followers from dissenting political influences and the securing of political loyalty could here similarly be attained and even more effectively than in explicitly political clubs.

Pillarization can now be defined as the process of the political mobilization of ideological or religious defined groups by political parties by the rather complete concentration of social activities among the members within the particular categorial group.

Pillarization aims at linking the social coordinates of the individual directly with the loyalty towards a certain political party. This leads to the justifiable assumption that in this way a long-lasting loyalty can be obtained independently of the individual's political conviction and of current political issues. Under these conditions a change in party-preference would simultaneously have an impact on all social relationships and on the value hierarchy of the individual. A change of party preference also becomes a change of orientation in all social relationships away from the original context towards those persons and groups related to the now preferred party.

Parsons has pointed out that primary groups stabilize the political attitudes of the individual and that they are of great importance for the ties to political parties.<sup>38</sup> The integration of the individual into cliques, associations and organizations of all kinds has far-reaching consequences. Under the extreme conditions of pillarization — that is a practically total segmentation of society with strong pressure towards conformity and a large social distance between the pillars — the supporting function of the associations and organizations of the different parties becomes more and more extreme. According to Duverger, their importance is derived from the fact that they can absorb those, unwilling to join the party because they do not entirely agree with the party's program, but who nevertheless have a positive attitude towards it. On the other hand an organization system enforces the integration of members into the party by absorbing cultural and other non-political activities and integrates the families of members.<sup>39</sup> Under the conditions of pillarization their aims shift from enforcing absorption of party-members to absorption of a 1 1 voters. The recruitment of potential party members becomes comparatively unimportant. Now each potential voter, i.e. everyone belonging to a specific categorial group, is to be approached and organizationally tied to the party. The single voter has practically no choice between different party programs, but only be-

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tween already existing social groupings wanting to win over not only his political preference but even all his social activities. The choice is already predetermined by the ideological or religious convictions of the individual and by his social connections. Concrete programs of parties play quite a subordinate role in this process of decision. In any attempt to formalize this shift towards the extreme, two differences emerge when compared with not pillarized party systems. The aim is the unquestioned absorption of members of categorial groups and an intensification of this absorption; so a recruiting and integrating instrument for members became a coercion instrument for voters. Moreover, the parties' interest in being elected by as many voters as possible is formulated differently. By absorbing the entire social personality, the parties practically succeed in formulating an obligation to vote, or expressed in negative terms, a prohibition to support other parties under threat of heavy sanctions.

Since the election-act itself cannot be sufficiently controlled by the parties, they try to make the securing of loyalty more general and to extend it to everyday-behaviour. An unpolitical activity like the participation in meetings of an expressive association takes on a strictly political accent because the association itself is explicitly connected with a certain party. Whoever refuses the loyalty demanded, can expect great social pressure. He either has to accept the political orientation of the association and thus participate in its activities, or must refuse the orientation and refrain from participation. Compromises are not allowed. The securing of loyalty to a certain party in this way is not only expected to be given on election day — as it is in other party-systems — but is more generalized and multiplied in constantly recurring situations of everyday life.

The concrete formulation of political programs or election-platforms loses its importance if associations, organizations and the social environment in total play such a fundamental role in the determination of the election-outcomes. In extreme cases they even prove to be irrelevant for the outcome, but only with one restriction: the party must have succeeded in directly linking its program to those demands and interests maintained to be fundamental by the ideological or religious group. Otherwise it must fear election-losses and protests. Within the denominational parties — in the Netherlands especially within the KVP—extreme variations of political convictions from left to right have often existed. The extreme wings could always easily achieve legitimation by referring to the prevalent interests of the denominationally defined part of the population. This was similar in the working class movement, where a broad variety of more or less revolutionary or revisionistic groupings appealed to the interests of the workers. The formulation of policy is thus not strictly determined by reference to a categorial group. The area for formu-

lation of political alternatives remains mostly a broad one.

The problem facing a party is less how to formulate its political program but more how to transmit this program to the voters. It will only find the voter's support, if it can make them believe, that it represents the voter's very own interests.<sup>40</sup> Pillarized parties have solved this problem of transmission by creating institutional and organizational ties. They claim to be the representatives of a certain group on all levels, to be their sole agents and they try to institutionalize this claim by organizationally linking themselves to the network of associations. If the parties succeed, the problem of transmission is already solved: the party no longer refers to the categorial group, it is rather a part of it and even becomes the categorial group itself. To this end however it must appear to be the executive organ of this group, its instrument or the parliamentary representative of its interests.

In summary, pillarization is a polarization-segmentation of the societal structure, purposely strengthened or even created by the political parties for strategic aims.

Thus it was not pillarization that created the political parties, but the political parties gave rise to the process of pillarization.

Ideas like these occurred in the Belgian discussion on pillarization since considerable time. It was referred to as 'partijpolitieke verzuildheid'<sup>41</sup> though it occurred primarily in connection with the recent situation.

This concept means that pillarization does not aim at safeguarding the political survival of denominational or ideological groups, but rather that it aims at holding the power positions of political parties. Ideologies serve as mere means for justifying this. Apparently these observations do not only fit the current situation but they even lead to fundamental conclusions regarding pillarization as a whole.

Further considerations complete this concept: Lijphart has tried to determine the size of the pillars.<sup>42</sup> Comparing the figures reported by him with the statistics of denominations on one hand and those of party-preference on the other hand, the following table (see next page) can be drawn.

Regarding this table it seems more sensible indeed to determine the size of the pillars simply by party preference. There is close identity of party-preference and size of the respective pillar, whereas there exist considerable differences between the percentage of denominations and size of the respective pillar. This supports strongly the proposition to regard pillarization in the Netherlands — and Belgium as well — as a party-political phenomenon, but not as a denominational one. To explain the differences in the size of the pillars and the size of the denominational groups, a further proposition was additionally used<sup>43</sup>: part of the church-members, first of all those alienated from the church should be counted in at the 'neutral' pillar (socialist-liberal), i.e., the orthodox church-

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### *The pillars in the Netherland (in %)*

|            | church membership 1960             | size of the pillar 1960 (estimated) | II. Chamber election 1959       |
|------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Catholic   | 40,4                               | 34                                  | 31,6                            |
| protestant | 37,6<br>(28,3 Herv.<br>9,3 Geref.) | 21                                  | 20,4<br>(CHU, ARP,<br>SGP, GVP) |
| socialist  | 18,4<br>without denomination       | 32                                  | 30,3<br>(PvdA)                  |
| liberal    |                                    | 13                                  | 12,2<br>(VVD)                   |

Drawn from: A. Lijphart, *Verzuiling*, p. 29-30, third column added.

members constitute the denominational pillars whereas the liberal-minded church-members and dissidents belong to the secular pillar. This proposition, intended to support the assumed linkage between denomination and size of pillar, shall be discussed in the following. The table on the next page distinguishes orthodox and liberal church-members along the common criterion of church attendance.<sup>44</sup>

According to this table 22 % of the orthodox members of the Hervormde Kerk vote for PvdA and 7 % for VVD. To which pillar do these protestants belong? Counting them in at the protestant pillar means, that it must be explained why a considerable part of the protestant pillar votes for a party, which is struggling against this pillar for more than 100 years.

If however the protestants are counted in at the secular pillar – which actually seems more reasonable – the reversed problem emerges: why is this group of protestants attached to the secular block in spite of the fact that they are orthodox protestants?

The same consideration is true for the 52 % of the unorthodox catholics. Their religious indifference attaches them to the secular pillar, but according to their party preference they belong to the denominational pillar.<sup>45</sup>

So apparently, though it is often said explicitly that the pillars are based on ideological-religious/denominational origins, implicitly persons and groups are accorded to the pillars in terms of their party-preference. Obviously the only reliable statistical point of reference for the determination of the size of the pillars is party-preference. A pillar can be described as 'an integrated environment in which the lives of the members are encased within ideologically linked activities'.<sup>46</sup> Lipset thus defines the 'parties of integration' described by

*The Netherlands 1956*

| Party<br>Choice (%) | Catholic Moderate Calvinist Protestant |     |     |     |     |     | No.<br>Religion<br>no |
|---------------------|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------------------|
|                     | Church Attendance                      |     |     |     |     |     |                       |
|                     | yes                                    | no  | yes | no  | yes | no  |                       |
| KVP                 | 99                                     | 52  | —   | —   | —   | —   | 1                     |
| PvdA                | 3                                      | 30  | 22  | 51  | 2   | 27  | 75                    |
| ARP                 | —                                      | 6   | 17  | 6   | 90  | 63  | —                     |
| CHU                 | —                                      | —   | 45  | 19  | 3   | —   | —                     |
| VVD                 | —                                      | 9   | 7   | 18  | —   | —   | 11                    |
| Other               | 2                                      | 3   | 9   | 6   | 5   | 10  | 13                    |
| Total]              | 99                                     | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100                   |
| N                   | 329                                    | 33  | 134 | 236 | 101 | 22  | 218                   |

From: Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 245.

S. Neumann. Both concepts are interchangeable. Pillarization is the process of the development of such an integrated environment. This interchange is more than a mere play with words. It makes clear that everyone dealing with pillarization is dealing with the sociology of political parties.

## Notes

- 1 In: *Sociologisch Jaarboek 11* (1957) and *Sociologische Gids 3* (1956) and *Socialisme en Democratie 14* (1957).
- 2 J. P. Kruijt, *Levensbeschouwing en groepssolidariteit in Nederland*. In: *Sociologisch Jaarboek 11* (1957), p. 29-73; J. P. Kruijt, *Sociologische beschouwingen over zuilen en verzuiling*. In: *Socialisme en Democratie 12* (1957), p. 11-30; J. P. Kruijt, *Verzuiling*. Zaandijk 1959; J. P. Kruijt, *The Influence of Denominationalism on Social Life and Organizational Pattcius*. In: *Archives de Sociologie des Religions 4* (1959), p. 105-111; J. P. Kruijt, *Verzuiling in Nederland: blijvende structuur of aflopende episode?* In: J. J. Gielen (ed.), *Pacificatie en de zuilen*. Meppel 1965, p. 9-32. J. P. Kruijt, W. Goddijn, *Verzuiling en ontzuiling als sociologisch process*. In: A. N. J. den Hollander e.a., *Drift en koers*. Assen 1962, p. 105-125.
- 3 See also: J. A. van Kemenade, *De Katholieken en hun onderwijs*. Meppel 1968; G. W. Marsman, *De katholieke dagbladpers in sociologisch perspectief*. Assen 1967; J. Gadourek, *A Dutch Community*. Leiden 1956.
- 4 W. Goddijn, *Katholieke minderheid en protestantse dominant*. Assen 1957; W. Goddijn, *Catholic Minorities and Social Integration*. In: *Social Compass 7* (1970) p. 161-176.
- 5 J. Hendriks, *De emancipatie der Gereformeerden*. Alphen 1971.
- 6 J. M. G. Thurlings, *De wankele zuil*. Nijmegen-Amersfoort 1971; J. M. G. Thurlings, *The Case of Dutch Pluralism: A Contribution to the Theory of Pluralistic Society*. In: *Sociologica Neerlandica 7* (1971), p. 118-136.
- 7 H. Daalder, *Nederland: het politieke stelsel*. In: L. van der Land (ed.), *Reperitorium van de sociale wetenschappen*. Vol. I. Amsterdam 1958, p. 213-128;

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- H. Daalder, *Leiding en lijdelijkheid in de Nederlandse politiek*. Assen 1964; H. Daalder, The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society. In: R. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven-London 1966, p. 199-236; H. Daalder, Parties: Elites and Political Development in Western Europe. In: J. LaPalombara, M. Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton 1966, p. 43-77.
- 8 A. Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*. Berkeley-Los Angeles 1968; A. Lijphart, Consociational Democracy. In: *World Politics* 21 (1968/69), p. 207-225; A. Lijphart, Typologies of Democratic Systems. In: A. Lijphart (ed.), *Politics in Europe*. Englewood Cliffs 1969, p. 46-80; L. Huysse, *Passiviteit, pacificatie en verzuiling in de Belgische politiek*. Antwerpen 1970.
- 9 B. J. de Clercq, *Kritiek van de verzuiling*. Lier 1968, p. 55-56.
- 10 See detailed explications in: R. Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der strukturellen Versäulung der Gesellschaft in den Niederlanden und in Österreich*. Meisenheim 1975, p. 9-61. See also the different conceptualization in: de Clercq, *Kritiek van de verzuiling*, p. 55-56, 70.
- 11 J. P. Kruijt, W. Goddijn, Versäulung und Entsäulung als soziale Prozesse. In: J. Matthes (ed.), *Soziologie und Gesellschaft in den Niederlanden*. Nieuwied-Berlin 1965, p. 115-149, here p. 146; Huysse, *Passiviteit, pacificatie en verzuiling in de Belgische politiek*, p. 137, 208.
- 12 The whole passage refers to the deliberations in: Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration*, p. 229-249, 264-332.
- 13 W. Goddijn, *Katholieke minderheid en protestantse dominant*; J. Hendriks, *De emancipatie der Gereformeerden*; H. Verwey-Jonker, *De emancipatiebewegingen*: A. N. J. den Hollander e.a., *Drift en koers*. Assen 1962, p. 105-125: Verwey-Jonker mentions three emancipation movements — the catholics, the protestant and the socialist movement. The fourth movement — the women's emancipation — is of no interest in this context.
- 14 J. M. G. Thurlings, *De wankele zuil. Nederlandse katholieken tussen assimilatie en pluralisme*. Nijmegen-Amersfoort 1971.
- 15 There have been several attempts to combine both hypotheses. This combination of two causal hypotheses with claim to exclusiveness leads to logical problems and does not add anything new. This is why these attempts can be neglected in the following passages. Examples for such a combination are: J. A. van Kemenade, *De katholieken en hun onderwijs. Een sociologisch onderzoek naar de betekenis van katholiek onderwijs onder ouders en docenten*. Meppel 1968, p. 58-67; M. Matthijssen, *De intellectuele emancipatie der Katholieken. Historische en sociographische analyse van het Nederlands Katholiek middelbaar onderwijs*. Assen 1958, p. 27-30.
- 16 There is no consent on the number of the pillars. See: A. Lijphart, *Verzuiling*. In: A. Hoogerwerf (ed.), *Verkenningen in de politiek* II, Alphen aan den Rijn 1971, p. 24-37; R. Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration*, p. 96-99.
- 17 This term is used by: J. M. G. Thurlings, *De wankele zuil*, p. 37.
- 18 W. Goddijn, *Katholieke minderheid en protestantse dominant*, p. 32-45, 54-57, 62.
- 19 A. Strang, *Een historische verhandeling over de liberale politiek in het lager onderwijs van 1848 tot 1920*. Utrecht 1930, p. 19 f.
- 20 W. Goddijn, *Katholieke minderheid en protestantse dominant*, p. 53; H. Verwey-Jonker, *De emancipatiebewegingen*, p. 115.

- 21 Already in the discussion of the date of origin it became clear, that the emancipation-hypothesis, properly thought out in all its consequences, would have led to an analysis of political conditions. The striving for organisation in the 19th century cannot be separated from political developments.
- 22 G. Geissmann, *Politische Struktur und Regierungssystem in den Niederlanden*, Vol. 4 *Kölner Schriften zur Politischen Wissenschaft*. Frankfurt/Main-Bonn 1964, p. 16-18.
- 23 It is striking, that authors who speak of coalitions always refer to party-coalitions. Obviously no coalitions existed other than these. And if the pillars formed their coalitions always according to the will of the political parties then this is an important hint as to the central role of the parties in the process of pillarization.
- 24 'The formation of the political parties cannot be understood without the school-controversy'. J. P. Kruijt, *De openbare school; historische achtergronden en . . . de toekomst*. In: *Pädagogische Studien*, 37 (1960), p. 531-546, here p. 536. The shift from the age-old antagonism between Protestants and Catholics to the antagonism between the denominational parties and the Liberal state in the years around 1860 is an excellent example for the dependence of political power-constellations on a strategic conflict-manipulation. See: R. Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration*, p. 270-274.
- 25 In 1857 the state denied financial aid to the denominational schools, since such payments were allegedly against the constitution. See: A. Strang, *Eene historische Verhandeling over de liberale politiek in het lager onderwijs van 1848 tot 1920*, p. 19 f.
- 26 See: J. P. Kruijt, *De openbare school*, passim.
- 27 Here it becomes clear, that the authors of the emancipationhypothesis and of the preservation hypothesis simply use the parties' arguments for the explanation of pillarization. So it seems to be merely a reification of political arguments. From here stem the problems of these hypotheses.
- 28 As illustrated by the ARP and the CHU this claim can be raised very well by two closely cooperating parties.
- 29 The decision to pillarize may be justified by other reasons two: if a party wants to keep their loyal voters and wants to avoid losses. This seems to have been the reason why the KVP returned to pillarization in 1954.
- 30 See: W. Goddijn, *Catholic Minorities and Social Integration*. In: *Social Compass* 7 (1960), p. 161-176, here p. 169; F. van Heek, *Het geboorteniveau der Nederlandse rooms-katholieken, Een demografisch-sociologische studie van een geemancipeerde minderheidsgroep*. Leiden 1954, here p. 150f.
- 31 J. Hendriks, *De emancipatie der Gereformeerden*. S. 120.
- 32 When the Socialists gave up pillarization in 1939 ('doorbraak') they explicitly justified this step by the disappointed hopes of winning a majority in this way. They did not succeed in mobilizing all the workers. Since the Catholic or Protestant workers were rather tied to their denominational party, the Socialists could only win these workers if the pillars were dissolved. By starting to reduce their own pillarization, they wanted to initiate this process and win more voters. See: H. Daalder, *The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented society*. In: R. A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven-London 1966, p. 199-236, here p. 212.
- 33 This calculation was false, however, since the higher fertility was compensated

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- for by those who quit the church. See: F. van Heek, *Het geboortenniveau der Nederlandse rooms-katholieken*, p. 151f.
- 34 H. Daalder, *The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society*, p. 212.
- 35 See: A. Lijphart, *Verzuiling*; This delegation of the same task to different organizations, that runs counter to effectivity, is called 'vertical integration' by R. König. See: R. König, *Grundformen der Gesellschaft: die Gemeinde*, Hamburg 1958, p. 128.
- 36 See especially: R. Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration*, p. 122-124 and the writings cited there.
- 37 This definition is explained in: R. Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration*, p. 39-51.
- 38 T. Parsons, Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System. In: E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior*, Glencoe 1959, p. 80-120.
- 39 M. Duverger, *Die politischen Parteien*, Tübingen 1959, p. 68f, 123-126.
- 40 Conflicts of the wings of the denominational parties could be solved this way. The Catholic Party for instance eliminated the entire left (liberal) wing around 1860 by holding a very harsh position against the liberal school-policy.
- 41 L. Huysse, *Passiviteit, pacificatie en verzuiling in de Belgische politiek*, p. 202-207, 221-222. See also J. Meynaud, J. Ladriere, F. Perin, *La decision politique en Belgique*. Paris 1965 quoted there.
- 42 A. Lijphart, *Verzuiling*. In: A. Hoogerwerf (ed.), *Verkenningen in de politiek*. Vol. II. Alphen 1971, p. 24-37, here p. 29-30.
- 43 Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*. p. 30. He himself calls this proposition 'not altogether unquestionable'.
- 44 S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*. Garden City-New York 1960, p. 245.
- 45 These figures of course are not sufficient for a statistical prove. It was important here only to show the contradictions resulting from the assumption of religious determinants of the pillars.
- 46 Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 85; S. Neuman, *Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties*. In: S. Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties*. Chicago 1956, p. 395-421, here p. 404-405. See also: S. Neumann, *Die deutschen Parteien: Wesen und Wandel nach dem Kriege*. Berlin 1932. The proposition referred to here is not new. Lipset states it implicitly in: Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 83-87; S. M. Lipset, S. Rokkan, *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction*. In: S. M. Lipset, S. Rokkan (ed.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York 1967, p. 1-64, here p. 15-18.