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## SNEEVLIET AND THE EARLY YEARS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The formative years of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long remained one of the most obscure periods in the recent past of China. There remain many puzzles about why and how the alliances, between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, came about in the early 1920s.

For the last four years I have been studying the establishment and first years of the CCP, at the same paying attention to the foundation and first years of the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging (ISDV), which was later to become the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). In this connexion I have been specially interested in outlining the origins of that strategy whereby Communist Party members entered a nationalist mass movement and tried to capture it from within. (1)

For years before the Communist International (Comintern) came to discuss the question of co-operation with bourgeois-democratic nationalism in July 1920, the ISDV had practised such co-operation with loosely-organized mass movement in the Dutch East Indies, the Sarekat Islam (SI). ISDV members had not only entered the SI without giving up their membership, but SI members were also drawn into the ISDV while retaining their membership of the SI. (2) With amazing speed ISDV members had penetrated the innermost councils of the SI. (3) It was the initiator of this strategy in the Indies, Sneevliet (also known as Maring), who defended and promoted the same strategy of penetration at the Second Congress of the Comintern in July 1920 in Moscow and Petrograd (4) and who eventually introduced it into China. I have called this tactic the "Sneevlietian strategy" after its initiator. The early history of the CCP becomes more understandable if the origin, acceptance by the Com-

intern and final implementation in China of this strategy are taken into account. In all three stages, the Dutch revolutionary Marxist, H.J.F.M. Sneevliet, played a significant role.

It has only recently been recognized that Henk Sneevliet played a major role in determining the future orientation of the Chinese Revolution (5), but there have still been virtually no attempts to reconstruct his activities in Soviet Russia and China. Confusion as to the real identity of Sneevliet ( alias Maring, Marling, Mareng, Ma-lin, Sleveland, Sun-t'o, Gni Kong-chin, Dr. Simon, Mr. Philip, Brouwer, Andresen, Joh. van Son etc.) may have contributed to the difficulty in retracing his steps. He had been active in the Dutch trade union movement before he came to the East Indies. There, in May 1914, he took the initiative of establishing the ISDV (6). On 5 December 1918, the Dutch East Indies authorities ordered Sneevliet's expulsion. (7) His meteoric career in the Comintern, from a virtually unknown Dutch East Indies Marxist to Secretary of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions and Executive member of the Comintern, started in July 1920, when he attended the Second Congress of the Comintern in Moscow and Petrograd as a representative of the ISDV-SI (8). It was there that Lenin met Sneevliet for the first time (9).

It was, as we shall see, in the China of 1921-23 that Sneevliet initiated the formal establishment of the CCP, founded the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Federation and almost singlehandedly brought about the famous and controversial KMT/CCP alliance. In fact, he not only persuaded the leadership of the Comintern to adopt his policies, but also the KMT of Sun Yat-sen, the young CCP and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia (Narkomindel).

### The Formal Foundation of the Chinese Communist Party.

It seems to me significant

that the essence of Lenin's united front tactic reflects the ISDV-SI example of 1916. Another indication of Lenin's familiarity with, acceptance and endorsement of "Sneevlietian strategy" is in fact that he subsequently sent Sneevliet to China. Reportedly at Lenin's recommendation, Sneevliet became the representative of the Comintern in China, his task being to find out if it would be desirable to establish there an office of the Comintern (10). At the same time, however, he was asked to establish contacts and to report on the socio-political situation in China, Japan, Korea, the Dutch East Indies, Indo-China and the Philippines (11). Although he was appointed in August 1920, he only left for China in April 1921 (12). On 3 June 1921, Sneevliet arrived in Shanghai and immediately started to busy himself with Comintern business (13). One of his first acts was to send a CCP delegation to the Third Congress of the Comintern. To this end he dispatched the very young Chang T'ai-lei and Yang Ho-te to Moscow (14). Relations were established with the Russian representatives in Peking and with the Irkutsk Bureau of the Comintern. From them Sneevliet learned that no real Communist organizational work had been accomplished (15). He had, in Shanghai, to start from the very beginning (16).

Although most historians claim that Sneevliet did not attend the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in July 1921, there is considerable evidence that he not only attended, but actually initiated the formal establishment of the CCP. At this time he first travelled to Peking and had several talks with Li Ta-chao and Chang Kuo-t'ao. He suggested to them that a national Party members' conference should be organized to establish the CCP. The Peking Party members agreed to this suggestion (17). In the meantime the representative of the Red International Labour Union, Fremberg, had arrived, while a representative from the Comintern Irkutsk Bureau, M. Nikolsky, had come down from Moscow (18). Sneevliet, Nikolsky and Chang Kuo-t'ao now travelled to Shanghai to discuss the matter with Li Han-chün. All the Party members

of the Shanghai branch enthusiastically endorsed Sneevliet's plan. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who at that time was in Canton, was also informed about the Congress (19).

Sneevliet played a central role at this First National Congress of the CCP. Although the Manifesto resulting from the Congress was never published, it is known that Sneevliet lectured the delegates on the constitution and there seems no doubt that he informed the delegates about his strategy (20). However, it would not be correct to suggest that the CCP decided to collaborate with the KMT at this stage. When the inexperienced Chinese Communists, in orthodox Marxist fashion, attempted to adopt an anti-KMT policy, Sneevliet advised them not to adopt such a resolution (21) and thus left the door open for a future alliance of the CCP with the KMT (22). He was even more successful when it came to persuading the newly established CCP to join the Comintern (23). This decision, as we shall see later, had far-reaching consequences as far as the Chinese people were concerned, for it not only aligned the CCP with the international communist movement, but also afforded the Kremlin a fresh passage of entry into China.

After the First National Congress of the CCP in July 1921, Sneevliet remained in Shanghai and it was here that the Secretariat of the Chinese Labour Federation was established under his direction in August 1921 (24). This Secretariat was to become responsible for most of the important labour struggles in China in the 1920s.

#### Sneevliet's First Meetings with Dr Sun Yat-sen

In December 1921, Sneevliet set out to visit Dr Sun Yat-sen at his headquarters in Kweilin. Chang T'ai-lei served as his interpreter. In the course of their conversation Sneevliet came to the conclusion that the KMT had definite socialist leanings, even though Sun Yat-sen based his principles on traditional Chinese philosophy (25). Sun had a special interest in Soviet



Russia's New Economic Policy. He was gratified to hear that Soviet Russia had embarked on a policy which was in line with his Principle of the People's Livelihood (26). In all, Sneevliet stayed for more than a week at Dr Sun's headquarters. Their meeting proved to be an historic one. Sneevliet had successfully convinced Sun Yat-sen that Russian Communist practice in fact resembled the KMT's Programme of Industrialization (27). Besides expressing general interest in Sneevliet's proposals, Sun informed him that a Chinese-Soviet Russian alliance could be effected after his campaign against the Northern warlord Wu P'ei-fu; for the moment, informal contact would be established with Soviet Russia (28). Sun also declared his willingness to send one of his most capable men on a mission to the Kremlin (29). Other proposals put forward by Sneevliet, such as the reorganization of the Party and the establishment of a military academy, were duly put into effect a few years later.

Following his first meetings with Sun Yat-sen, Sneevliet travelled to Canton. In this city he was impressed by the seamen's strike (30), which made him think more highly of Sun's socialism (31). In Canton he had also the opportunity of meeting General Ch'en Chiung-ming (32). Although Sneevliet understood that General Wu P'ei-fu's power was in effect much stronger than Ch'en Chiung-ming's, he realized too that Wu did not know very much about politics (33). Ch'en Chiung-ming, on the other hand, was highly critical of the KMT. He believed that the unification of China would be virtually impossible. It was General Ch'en's idea to confine the nationalist movement to Kwangtung - a sort of Chinese Stalin, developing the idea of nationalism in one province. To achieve this he was considering the setting up of a new socialist party. In fact, the General appeared to be very keen on some kind of agreement with Soviet Russia and asked Sneevliet for Russian military advisers to reorganize the army. He also suggested that a delegation

be sent to Moscow, and finally said that a Comintern Bureau could be set up in Canton (34). At the time Sneevliet was convinced that the shaky friendship between Ch'en Chiung-ming and Sun Yat-sen in Kwantung Province afforded the only reasonable opportunity for organizing the masses (35).

#### The First Hangchow Plenum of the CCP

After his trip to South China Sneevliet travelled to Peking and conferred there with Alexander Paikes, the Soviet envoy (36). He submitted two preliminary reports on the Chinese question and asked Paikes to forward them to Moscow. The first document contained his recommendations to the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) concerning the CCP and the KMT. The second document was for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia (Narkomindel). Sneevliet's main proposal to Narkomindel was the appointment of a Soviet Russian envoy to South China. These recommendations, as we shall see, were duly implemented by the Russians in the famous Sun Yat-sen-Joffe entente of 26 January 1923 and by the appointment of Michael Borodin as permanent representative of the Soviet Russian Government in Canton in September of the same year (37).

Sneevliet left Peking for Shanghai on 29 March 1922 and, as soon as he arrived, arranged for a series of conferences with the leadership of the CCP and the KMT. His talks with the Central Committee of the KMT resulted in an assurance that they would allow the Chinese Communists to make Communist propaganda within the KMT (38). For the CCP these talks resulted in the as yet unreported First Hangchow Plenum held at the West Lake in Hangchow. The leading participants at this conference were Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Mao Tse-tung and Sneevliet (39). It was at this Plenum that the Dutchman urged the adoption of "Sneevlietian strategy." He proposed that the Chinese Communists "abandon their exclusive


position towards the Kuomintang and develop political activities inside that party. . . ." (40). Sneevliet felt that the KMT's loose form of organization made it very easy to advance the idea of mass activity. This type of co-operation was derived directly from his successful experience in Java. The Chinese present did not initially approve of his idea, but after some hesitation Sneevliet's recommendations were accepted (41).

The Central Committee of the CCP started to implement these new policies immediately. It was decided to convene the Second National Congress of the CCP to consider the political future of the party. In addition the Central Committee decided to convene the First National Labour Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps (42). At this stage Sneevliet concluded his


first mission to China and decided to return to Moscow to report the ECCI and the Kremlin leadership. He left Shanghai on 23 April 1922, on the SS Kashima Maru (43).

Sneevliet's report to the Executive Committee of the Comintern of July 1922

Travelling via Singapore, Marseilles, Berlin and Reval, Sneevliet arrived in Moscow during the second week of July (44). On 17 July 1922 he presented the ECCI with a lengthy and detailed report on the Chinese situation in which he said that distinct social classes had not yet come into existence in China and therefore such classes could not be said to have political significance. It was the foreign powers, Sneevliet pointed out, which controlled Chinese politics and since North and



Professor Ch'en Tu-hsiu, de eigenlijke vader van de CCP rond 1922. Later ontslagen als Secretaris-Generaal van de CCP.



Henk Sneevliet houdt een rede voor het Winterpaleis te Petrograd; achter hem staat Trotzki die de rede in het Russisch vertaalt. De gebeurtenis vond naar alle waarschijnlijkheid in 1920 plaats.



Central China were dominated by the militarist cliques, the only opening for a Communist movement appeared to be in the South where Dr Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang was in power. This national-revolutionary movement had established excellent relations with the young Chinese labour movement. Having endorsed the KMT as the "national-revolutionary movement" as outlined in the "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions," Sneevliet went one step further and presented the Comintern leadership with the theoretical foundations for his own unorthodox strategy. He bluntly asserted that the KMT was not a party of the bourgeoisie, but a "bloc of various classes." The class structure of the KMT consisted of the following elements:

1. Leading intellectuals, mostly men who took part in the 1911 revolution.
2. "Die Einwanderer," the overseas Chinese capitalist bourgeois elements.
3. The soldiers of the southern army.
4. The workers. (45)

This startling interpretation of Marxism did not seem to baffle the Comintern leadership. On the contrary, they simply translated Sneevliet's unorthodox theory into somewhat more orthodox language, dividing up the KMT into intelligentsia, liberal democratic bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and the workers (46). In this manner Sneevliet's "bloc of various classes" came to be canonized by the leadership of the Comintern, leaving Marx's concept of parties as organs of single, indivisible class interest to be thrown overboard without even a struggling splash. Further analysis of this amazing new theory shows that the peasants and the local bourgeoisie had been omitted without being, in fact, ignored. As far as the bourgeoisie was concerned, Sneevliet had differentiated between the local Chinese bourgeoisie and the so-called "Einwanderer," the overseas Chinese capitalist bourgeoisie. The former, according to Sneevliet, had

"set up enterprises together with foreign capitalists and were naturally open to foreign influence". (47) He pointed out that the overseas Chinese were in quite a different position. "They had the opportunity of collecting large amounts of capital during the crises and were willing supporters of the radical intelligentsia of South China". Sneevliet was convinced that it had been these men who had made the KMT financially feasible. (48) He emphasized that these "big capitalists" had not actively participated in the life of the Party and had not developed any kind of political activity amongst themselves. (49) Thus "Die Einwanderer" could be nominated as silent partners in the national revolution whereas the local bourgeoisie were to be placed in the same category as the "foreign capitalists."

The peasant problem had not really escaped Sneevliet's attention. He had come to recognize that the peasants were China's real population. (50) They had been left out of his "bloc of various classes" for the simple reason that the peasantry were not supporters of the KMT. This was not an expression of their opposition to Dr Sun Yat-sen's Party, but rather showed their "complete indifference". This indifference, Sneevliet pointed out, was the result of their "very peculiar position". (51) Because of the importance of the peasant question, presenting as it does the essential problem of the Chinese Revolution, his words bear quoting at length:

The large masses of the Chinese population are peasants, who although poor are nearly all small proprietors. In the interior any connection with the capitalist outer-world hardly exists. Class-struggle, as had been the case with the Russian peasants and with the East-Indies peasants, does not exist for the Chinese peasantry. The high taxes which the Indies and Korean peasants has to pay are unknown. The peasant masses are therefore completely indifferent and have as yet no political importance. They endure passively the various civil wars between the warlords. These wars are part of the normal life


of the young Chinese Republic.  
(52)

These remarks are of special interest because they appear to be the first specific statement on China's peasant problem by an influential Comintern representative. Sneevliet had recognized that the hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants would be of the utmost importance in determining the course of the Chinese Revolution. However, at this stage, even the ever-resourceful Dutchman failed to come up with an agrarian programme for them. Marx and Lenin's "revolutionary vanguard" still remained the urban proletariat, although the peasants masses loomed formidably on the Chinese horizon. Within a year the balance was to shift in favour of the peasants and Sneevliet was to order the CCP to make the peasant question the central point of their policy.

After his "class analysis", Sneevliet discussed the young CCP. This entire question was handled in a very straightforward manner and his remarks are worth quoting:

... due to their ignorance of the situation our comrades have not been able to get into close contact with the working masses; they lead a sectarian existence and justify their aloofness from political questions on the alleged grounds of illegality. The youth of China, especially the students, are particularly susceptible to the ideas of socialism and they, too, have not got beyond studies of Marxism to practical socialist work. (53)

A rather devastating verdict by the representative of the Comintern. After his biting criticism of the young



HENK SNEEVLIET (+ 1920)

CCP, Sneevliet felt confident enough to turn to the more practical side of the question. At this stage he told the ECCI about the first Hangchow Plenum of the CCP in April 1922 :

I have suggested that our comrades should abandon their exclusive attitude towards the KMT and should develop political activities within the KMT, where contact could much more easily be made with the workers and the soldiers of the South. The small group should not be forced to give up



its independence - on the contrary, the comrades should together consider which tactic they are to follow within the KMT. (54)

It is interesting to note that Sneevliet specially stressed the independent character of the CCP. There was no question of confusing class organization and curbing the independent policy of the Party. The Chinese Communists were to enter the KMT as individuals and use its loose form of organization to seize control of it from within. (55)

Sneevliet did not hide the fact that the Chinese Communists were opposed to his strategy. "Our comrades did not approve of this idea," (56) he confessed, but he was so convinced of the rightness of his policies that he did not think it necessary to explain why the Chinese Communists had objected to his proposals. The latter had already had their share of his biting criticism and on this occasion he merely observed that they would not have much of a future if they did not enter the KMT (57). Sneevliet's attitude was uncompromising. Take it or leave it: either you endorse my strategy or else the Chinese Communist movement is doomed. A gross exaggeration maybe, but it worked. He convinced the ECCI of his views on the Chinese situation and thus, on the second day of their consultative session, on 18 July 1922, the ECCI formally decided to implement Sneevliet's recommendations on China. The Chinese Communists were instructed to move their headquarters to Canton and to carry out their work in close contact with Sneevliet (58). Sneevliet had good reason to be satisfied: his recommendations had been endorsed and he had received a full mandate for a new mission to China.

This had not been a meek rapport containing the usual tentative proposals to be left for due consideration by the Comintern leadership. Not a vestige of uncertainty was to be found in the whole document. Sneevliet's mandate had, after all, been no more than that of observer. The Comintern leadership had wanted to know about the opportunities for the

movement in the Far East. Their only specific instruction had been to investigate whether it would be desirable and possible to found a Bureau of the Comintern in the Far East. But there was nobody in Moscow with any knowledge at all on the Chinese situation and he had acted accordingly, with boldness and imagination. Not only had Sneevliet set out a complete set of proposals for the future orientation of the Chinese Revolution, but he had also, in fact, implemented these proposals before they were given official approval by the leaders in Moscow. Prior to this, some misguided officials of Narkomindel, the Comintern Irkutsk Bureau and the Government of the Far Eastern Republic had been propagating an alliance with the northern warlord Wu P'ei-fu (59) Sneevliet's report led to a radical change in policy towards this general.

#### The Second Hangchow Plenum of the CCP.

Back in China the Central Committee of the CCP was busy implementing Sneevliet's proposals. Following the first Hangchow Plenum of April 1922 the Central Committee, on 15 June 1922, adopted their "First Manifesto of the CCP on the current situation" (60). The Chinese Communists, although still critical of Sun Yat-sen's Party, now called for joint action with the KMT. At the same time they adopted Sneevliet's anti-warlord policy (61). A month later the Second Congress of the CCP endorsed the "First Manifesto of the CCP on the current situation" and it was decided to forward the document to Dr Sun Yat-sen and other KMT leaders as an expression of Communist desire for co-operation with the KMT (62).

Sneevliet returned to China again in early August 1922. His strategy had by then been officially endorsed by the Comintern leadership and since the Chinese Communists had been reluctant, at the First Hangchow Plenum of April 1922, to accept his unorthodox proposals, he seemed anxious to bring the remainder of the recalcitrant Chinese Communist leaders into the fold. With this as his main purpose, he convened the Second Hangchow Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP on 17 August 1922 (63). Besides Sneevliet

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, Ts'ai Ho-shen, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Kao Chün-yu and Chang T'ai-lei attended the conference (64). After two days of debate the Chinese Communists accepted Sneevliet's recommendations yet again (65).

Sneevliet's Second Meeting with Dr Sun Yat-sen and the Sun-Joffe Entente.

The Second meeting between Sneevliet and Sun Yat-sen took place on 25 August 1922 in the French concession in Shanghai (66). Although Sun expressed deep disappointment about General Ch'en Chiung-ming's rebellion, he seemed to Sneevliet as buoyant as ever. Sun informed Sneevliet that he now regarded a closer relationship with Soviet Russia as abso-



De jonge Mao Tse-tung. Volgens Bing was het door toedoen van Sneevliet, dat Mao tijdens het Derde Congres van de CCP (juni 1923) tot lid werd benoemd van het Centraal Committee.



lutely necessary (67). In the course of their conversation Sneevliet urged Sun not to try to recapture Canton by purely military means, but to start a campaign of mass propaganda with Shanghai as base. (68). Sneevliet informed Sun about his visit to Moscow and told him that the Comintern leaders had advised the Chinese Communists to join the KMT. The precedent for dual membership had been set and Sun also seems to have accepted Sneevliet's advice on the reorganization of the KMT (70).

← Dr. Sun Yat-sen, de vader van de Chinese Revolutie, rond 1923, toen Sneevliet hem enkele malen bezocht. Sneevliet had (te?) grote bewondering voor diens streven. Sneevliet heeft er toe bijgedragen, dat de Kuomintang zich tot de Sowjet-Unie keerde om steun.



Sneevliet's second mission to China was made under the auspices of both the Comintern and Narkomindel, for out of his talks with the Comintern leader Karl Radek, the idea emerged that he should accompany the famous Soviet diplomat Abraham A Joff to China (71). The latter was very interested in Sneevliet's ideas and also seemed to be in favour of friendly relations with the KMT of Dr Sun Yat-sen (72). Joffe, intimate friend of the still powerful Trotsky, was particularly interested in Dr Sun's views on the Chinese Eastern Railway (73). While the Soviet Union was officially in the course of negotiations with the Chinese Government in Peking and while governments and press throughout the world focused their attention on Joffe's presence in that city, more important but entirely secret negotiations were being conducted between Narkomindel and Dr Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai. Sneevliet travelled resolutely back and forth between Shanghai and Peking (74). After five months of secret negotiations he succeeded in working out an agreement between Soviet Russia and the KMT. Joffe then decided to come to Shanghai and conclude the agreement. Thus it happened that, on 26 January 1923, the famous Soviet diplomat and the father of the Chinese Revolution concluded their historic entente. Within a year, advisers, arms and money began to arrive to implement the agreement. The attention of the Soviet Union had been sharply diverted in the direction of the KMT of Dr Sun Yat-sen. The Russian and Chinese revolutionaries had set out on a new course, and the consequences of this were to be felt in the entire world.

#### Sneevliet's Second and Third Missions to Moscow.

In the winter of 1922-23 Sneevliet once more returned to Moscow to report to the Comintern leadership on the successful completion of his mission and to discuss the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway with the leaders in the Kremlin (75). On 10 January 1923, Sneevliet reported to the ECCI (76). The Comintern

leadership not only ordered the Chinese Communists to remain within the KMT, but also adopted Sneevliet's anti-warlord policy. The KMT was now declared the only serious national-revolutionary group in China, while the Chinese Communists were advised to persuade the KMT to unite forces with Soviet Russia (77). On 12 January 1923, the ECCI appointed Sneevliet as the third member of the Far Eastern Bureau in Vladivostok in reward for his services. Finally, it expressed the wish that "Sneevlietian strategy" should now also be endorsed by a National Congress of the CCP (78).

Upon his return to Peking, Sneevliet took immediate action to settle once and for all the question of his strategy. In this case, he first called a meeting of the Peking branch of the CCP in the Soviet Embassy. In a thunderous speech lasting two hours he called any remaining dissidents to the fold (79). It was at this point that the "February Seventh" incident occurred. On 7 February 1923, the strike of the railroad workers on the Peking-Hankow line was bloodily suppressed by General Wu P'ei-fu's troops. This act of repression was highly embarrassing to Narkomindel and some people in the Comintern for they had, to various degrees, continued supporting Wu Chihli clique and had even encouraged the Peking branch of the CCP in making a deal with this "liberal democrat" (80). Sneevliet had repeatedly warned against the Northern militarist cliques and stressed that the CCP should concentrate their efforts on the South (81). Evidently annoyed by the fact that they disregarded his advice, Sneevliet sarcastically pointed out that their 'liberal democrat' war-lord had felt no scruples about using gunfire as the best method to educate the Chinese worker (82).

Intending to embarrass the Comintern leadership still further, Sneevliet now instructed the unsuspecting Chang Kuo-t'ao to travel to Moscow to report on the dreadful massacre (83). Next he suggested that the Chinese Communists should shift the seat of the Central Committee to Shanghai and go underground (84). Towards the end of February, the Central Committee members of the CCP left for Shanghai and it was decided

at this time that the Third Hangchow Plenum should be convened at the West Lake.(85). Although not much is known about the proceedings of this Plenum, it is evident that the Comintern order of 10 January 1923 was discussed. Shortly after the Third Plenum Sneevliet travelled once again to Moscow to report to the Comintern leadership. On this occasion the ECCI set up a special committee led by Bukharin and invited Sneevliet to submit his recommendations on the Chinese situation. It was on the basis of Sneevliet's report that the Comintern leadership issued the famous 13-point directive of May 1923 to the forthcoming Third National Congress of the CCP(86). It was with this document in this pocket that Sneevliet left to Moscow once again on his final mission to China.

The Comintern order is of special interest since it appears to be the first comprehensive statement on the role of the peasantry in the Chinese Revolution. In it the "peasant problem" is boldly asserted to be the central question of the entire policy of the CCP and in reading it one is led to believe that the poor peasantry has become the vanguard in the revolution. Undoubtedly the recognition of the importance of the peasantry was something of a landmark in the development of Chinese Marxism. It was not at this point, however, that the ECCI decided to adopt the Chinese peasantry as the leading class force in the revolution. On the contrary, the ECCI was quite definite in specifying that the leadership was to remain in the hands of the proletariat. Apart from drawing up an agrarian programme, the additional importance of the document lies in its reassertion of "Sneevlietian strategy". Finally the Comintern directed to the CCP to demand the convocation of a KMT congress at which the question of creating a broad national democratic movement was to be the main point of discussion(87).

#### Sneevliet's Last Mission to China: The Third Congress of the CCP and the First National Congress of the KMT

By the time Sneevliet returned to Shanghai, Sun Yat-sen had completed the basic structural reorganization of the KMT(88). After a short stay in Shanghai, Sneevliet now travelled to Canton where he met Sun Yat-sen once again. On the basis of his correspondence with Abraham Joffe, Sneevliet met Sun Yat-sen three or four times weekly. Their discussions centred on the new alliance with the Soviet Union and the reorganization of the KMT. Possibly it was agreed at these meetings to convene the First National Congress of the KMT(89). One of the immediate results of these talks was Chiang Kai-shek's mission to Moscow to study Soviet conditions and to negotiate for Russia's aid(90). Sun Yat-sen had instructed his Chief-of-Staff to discuss arrangements for his trip with Sneevliet. On 5 August 1923, Chiang met Sneevliet in Shanghai. The latter advised Chiang to take Chiang T'ai-lei, Shen Tung-yi and Wang Teng-yun with them(91). It may be observed that this delegation was a good example of one of the aspects of "Sneevlietian strategy". For Chang T'ai-lei and Shen Tung-yi were members of the CCP.

Sneevliet had, by then, been working for nearly a year on the reorganization of the KMT(92), and claimed that Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-k'ai and Chiang Kai-shek had supported him wholeheartedly in his efforts(93). When, in January 1924, Sun Yat-sen received official endorsement from the First National Congress of the KMT for his policy of alliance with Soviet Russia and of admitting Chinese Communists into the KMT, this was the proof that Sneevliet's mission to China had been successfully concluded.

In June, the Third National Congress of the CCP was held in Canton(94). In accordance with Sneevliet's wishes the CCP declared that the KMT should be the central



and leading force of the national revolution. It denounced the Northern warlords and stated that the CCP's most important task was to direct the worker and the peasants(95). Sneevliet had criticized Sun's reliance on military action several times previously. According to Sneevliet, the KMT should have paid more attention to spreading political propaganda among the people(96). It was precisely in these terms that the Manifesto of the Third National Congress was presented to the KMT(97). Chang Kuo-t'ao, one of the participants of the Third Congress, recalls that Sneevliet was the main driving force behind the policy that all Communists should join the KMT. Chang actionally confirms that although the Manifesto was drafted by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, in fact it expressed Sneevliet's idea's, backed by the approval of the Comintern(98).

The Chinese Communists had thus entered the KMT, But without giving up their membership of the CCP. They had retained their own organization with its strictly centralized apparatus. They were shortly to penetrate into the innermost councils of the KMT. Thus we have seen that in less than three years the "Sneevlietian strategy" had been applied by its inventor in China, persuading the leadership of the Comintern, the KMT, the CCP and Narkomindel of the soundness of his policy. In the light of these achievements Mao Tse-tung's words about Sneevliet as an energetic and persuasive person are understandable (99). Henk Sneevliet had, to a large extent, been responsible for one of the most important decisions in the history of modern China.

## NOTEN

This article is based on a series of guest lectures delivered at several American universities during May 1970 and papers prepared for the XXII International Congress of Chinese Studies in Stockholm and the XXVIII Congress of Orientalists in Canberra.

1. See Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian strategy," xvii, 247 pages, M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1968. The translation into Chinese and publication of this study is being undertaken by the History Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. It will appear in the next three or four issues of *Shih Ch'ao*, the first of which was due out in September of this year.

2. See H. Sneevliet and Westerveld, "Toetreding van Europeanen tot de Sarekat Islam" ("Admission of Europeans as Members to the Sarekat Islam"), *Het Vrije Woord* (The Free World) (Semarang), 10 November 1916. See also Max Perthus (ed.), *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme* (For Freedom and Socialism) (Rotterdam, 1953), p. 52. Only a few copies of this book were issued for private distribution. Besides a series of articles commemorating Sneevliet and his friends, members of the outlawed Marx-Lenin-Luxemburg Front in German-occupied Holland, the book contains four valuable documents on the Chinese Revolution. These are referred to below in footnotes 4, 58, 63 and 76. See also Harold Isaacs, "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet: The Chinese Question, 1920-23," Amsterdam, 19 August 1935; published in *The China Quarterly*, No. 45 (January-March 1971), pp. 102-109.

3. J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie* (The Nationalistic Movement in the Dutch Indies) (Haarlem, 1931), pp. 65, 76.

4. *Het Vrije Woord*, 5 September 1920. Sneevliet's Sarekat Islam and Partij der Kommunisten in Indie certificate of authority, 5 September 1921; in *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme* . . . , p. 60. The original document was typed on linen to enable Sneevliet to hide it. It was issued at a time when Sneevliet was already in Shanghai and thus it should be noted that he represented the above-mentioned parties without formal authorization to do so. A translation of this document and a detailed analysis of the Second Congress of the Comintern can be found in Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian strategy," pp. 23-44, 160-61.

5. Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966). Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, edited with an introduction by C. Martin Wilbur (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). The work of Professors Schram and Wilbur first inspired me to embark upon this venture into Chinese history. I am indebted to both for their encouragement and advice in the preparation of this study.

6. J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, *De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie* (The Communist Movement in the Dutch Indies), second revised edition (Haarlem, 1935) p. 2. *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme* . . . , p. 51.

7. H. Sneevliet, *Mijn Uitzetting. Vergeefsche Verweer tegen de Eerste Politieke Externeering onder de Nieuwe Koers* (My Expulsion, Unsuccessful Defence against the First Political Expulsion under the New Policy), privately published (Semarang, n.d.). *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme* . . . , p. 59.

8. See note 4. G. Maring, "Niederländisch-Ost-Indien. Bericht für den Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale. Die sozialen Verhältnisse und die Entwicklung der revolutionären Bewegung" ("Dutch East Indies. Report for the Congress of the Communist International. The Social Conditions and the Development of the Revolutionary Movement"), *Berichte zum zweiten Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (Report to the Second Congress of the Communist International) (Hamburg, 1921), pp. 391-410. See Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian strategy," pp. 171-193 for a translation of this report. See also "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45. *Der Zweite Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale: Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August, 1920 in Moskau* (The Second Congress of the Communist International: Protocol of the Proceedings from 19 July in Petrograd and from 23 July till 7 August 1920 in Moscow) (Hamburg, 1921), p. 661.

9. K. Grafdijk, "Sneevliet's Rijke Rode Leven" ("Sneevliet's Rich Red Life"), *Het Vrije Volk* (The Free People) (Amsterdam), No. 6706 (8 April 1967).

10. *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme* . . . , p. 60.

11. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring für die Executive" ("Report of Comrade H. Maring for the Executive"). This is Sneevliet's report to the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), which he submitted after his first mission to China. The original manuscript dated Moscow, 11 July 1922, is 13 folio pages long, typed in German and contains a complete and detailed account of Sneevliet's activities in China up to May 1922 as well as his recommendations on the Chinese question to the ECCI. An English translation of the manuscript will appear in my forthcoming book on the establishment and first years of the CCP. The report also contains much valuable information on the Communist Parties of Korea, Japan and Indonesia. While in Holland in May-June 1922, Sneevliet apparently forwarded a copy of his report by ordinary mail to the ECCI in Moscow. Thanks to the efficiency of the Dutch Centrale Inlichtingendienst (Central Intelligence Agency) this manuscript is now available in the Archives of the Dutch Ministry of Justice.

12. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . . , p. 1.

13. Letter No. 124 by the "Concession Française de Shanghai Garde Municipale" to "Monsieur le Consul General de Hollande, Shanghai," 7 June 1921. G 156, No. 2349 (all "G" references are to documents in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Sneevliet arrived on the Italian Lloyd Triestino ship *Aquila* and stayed at the Oriental Hotel, Nanking Road. He called himself Andersen.

14. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," ("My Memoirs"), *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an* (Ming Pao Monthly), (Hong Kong) Vol. I, No. 6 (1966), p. 63. B. Z. Shumiatsky, "Iz istorii Komsmola i Kompartii Kitaia Pamiati odnogo iz organizatorov Komsmola i Kompartii Kitaia tov. Chang Tai-lei" ("On the Comsomol and the CCP. In memory of one of the organizers of the Comsomol and CCP, Comrade Chang Tai-lei"), *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok* (Revolutionary East), No. 4-5 (1928), p. 216.

15. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Ch'i-wu lao-jen, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ch'eng-li ch'ien-hou ti ch'ien-wen," ("Recollections of the Events Surrounding the Founding of the CCP"), *Hsin kuan-ch'a* (New Observer) (Peking), 1 July 1957. Ch'i-wu lao-jen is the pen name of Pao Hui-sheng who was one of the founding members of the CCP.

18. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . . , p. 1.

19. Ch'i-wu lao-jen, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang . . . " M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . . , p. 3.

20. *Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fu-hai hui i le ho p'ien* (Memoirs of Ch'en Kung-po and Chou Fu-hai) (Hong Kong, 1967), p. 142. *Kung-fei huo-kuo shih shih* (Abridged Version of the Compiled Historical Materials of the Communist Rebellion in China) (Taipei, 1963), p. 10. Ch'en Kung-po, *Han Feng Chi* (Collected Writings), (n.p. Ti-fang hsing-cheng she, 1944), Vol. I, pp. 206, 207. Ch'en T'an-ch'iu, "Chung-kung t'i-i t'zu tai-piao ta-hui ti hui-i" ("Reminiscences of the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party"), *Kung-ch'an kuo-chi* (Communist International), Vol. VII, No. 4-5 (Moscow, 1936), pp. 83-88.

21. *Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fu-hai hui i le ho p'ien*, p. 142. *Kung-fei huo-kuo shih shih*, p. 10.

22. It was, I submit, at Sneevliet's insistence that the documents of the First Congress were never published. *Ch'en Kung-po Chou Fu-hai hui i le ho p'ien*, pp. 19, 142. Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, p. 82.

23. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . . , p. 3. Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, pp. 102-105. B. Z. Shumiatsky, "Iz istorii . . . , *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 4-5 (1928), pp. 218-222.

24. Ch'i-wu lao-jen, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang . . . , *Hsin-kuan-ch'a*, 1 July 1957. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . . , p. 3. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *Wo ti hui-i*, *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 6, p. 69. According to documents in

the Dutch Foreign Ministry archives, Sneevliet left the Oriental Hotel, Nanking Road, on 14 June 1921, and went to live in a boarding house at No. 32, Markham Road. Towards the end of September he went to live with the Russian family Rjazanoff at Wayside Road. At this address he remained until 10 December 1921.

25. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat-sen, enige Persoonlijke Herinneringen" ("My Association with Sun Yat-sen, some Personal Memoirs"), *Klassenstrijd* (*Class Struggle*) (Amsterdam) No. 3 (March 1926). H. Sneevliet, "Persoonlijke Indrukken van Soen Yat Sen" ("Personal Impressions of Sun Yat-sen"), *De Arbeid* (*Labour*) (Amsterdam), 28 March 1925, p. 2. *Ke-ming wen-hsien* (*Documents of the Revolution*), Vol. II (Taipei, 1954), pp. 518-519. Chiang Kai-shek, "Cheng-li wen-hua i-ch'an yü kai-chin min-tsu hsi-hsing" ("Reorganization of the Cultural Heritage and Improvement of the National Character"), *Chung-kuo i-chou* (*China Weekly*) (Taipei), No. 112, 16 June 1952.

26. Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China* (London, 1957), p. 17. H. Sneevliet, "Persoonlijke Herinneringen van Soen Yat Sen," *De Arbeid*, 28 March 1925, p. 2. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat Sen . . .," *Klassenstrijd*, March 1926.

27. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat Sen . . .," *Klassenstrijd* (March 1926). M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 10. *Ke-ming wen hsien*, Vol. II, pp. 518-520.

28. *Loc. cit.*

29. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 10.

30. H. Maring, "Uit het Verre Oosten" ("From the Far East"), 19 March 1922; in *De Tribune* (*The Tribune*) (Amsterdam), 6 May 1922, p. 1. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat Sen . . .," *Klassenstrijd*, March 1926. H. Sneevliet, "Zwerversbrieven" ("Letters of a Wanderer"), No. VI, *Het Vrije Woord* (*The Free Word*), No. 12 (10 May 1922), pp. 1, 2. Dated Shanghai, April 1922.

31. G. Maring, "Revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v iuzhnom Kitao" ("The Revolutionary Movement in South China"), *Kommunisticheskii International* (*Communist International*) (Moscow), No. 22 (1922) pp. 5803-5816. See Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian strategy," pp. 214-229, for a translation of this article.

32. H. Sneevliet, "De Chineesche General en de Chineesche Revolutie: Tsien Tsjoen Ming en Tsjang Kai Shek" ("The Chinese General and the Chinese Revolution: Ch'en Chiang-ming and Chiang Kai-shek"), *Klassenstrijd*, 1927.

33. It is doubtful if Sneevliet did, in fact, visit Wu Pei-fu. There is no evidence of this in his own writings. This account is based on Wang Ching-wei, *Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng ti wen-chi* (*Collected writings of Wang Ching-wei*) (Shanghai, n.d.), Vol. III, pp. 132-133.

34. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," pp. 10-11. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45.

35. H. Maring, "Uit het Verre Oosten," 19 March 1922, in *De Tribune*, 8 May 1922, p. 1. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," pp. 8-12.

36. According to documents in the Dutch Foreign Ministry archives, Sneevliet left Canton on 3 February 1922 on his way to Peking. He travelled via Swatow and Shanghai where he arrived on or about 7 March 1922. He stayed in Shanghai for nearly two weeks and on 19 March he left for Peking where he arrived four days later. He stayed in the Hotel des Wagon Lits and on 29 March left Peking again for Shanghai.

37. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12.

38. *Ibid.*

39. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12. For an account of who was present, see "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45, p. 104. This says only " . . . one other, a very capable Hunanese student whose name I do not remember." There were two such possible Hunanese students in the Party at that time, Ts'ai Ho-shen and Mao Tse-tung. Since Ts'ai only returned from France in June 1922, it must have been Mao who attended. S. A. Dalin, "Velikii povorot. Sun Yat Sen v 1922 g." ("The Great Turning-point. Sun Yat-sen in 1922"), in S. L. Tikhvinskii (ed.), *Sun Yat Sen 1866-1966. K stoletiu so dnia rozhdeniia, Sbornik stat'ei vospominanii i materialov* (*Sun Yat-sen 1866-1966. On the Occasion of the Centenary of his Birth. Collection of articles, reminiscences and materials*) (Moscow, 1966), p. 255. Sergei Dalin, *V rjadakh kitaiskoi revoliutsii* (*In the Ranks of the Chinese Revolution*) (Moscow, 1926). See "Iz putevykh ochrekov. Vstrecha I Maia v Guan-chzhou s Sun' Yat-senom" ("Travelling observations: Meeting on the first day of May at Canton with Sun Yat-sen"). Sergei Dalin, "Sun Yat Sen, k godovshchine smerti" ("Sun Yat-sen, Anniversary of his Death"), *Izvestiia*, 59, 1926. Chang kuo-t'ao, "Wo-ti hui-i," *Ming-pao*, Vol. I, No. 8, pp. 76-84.

40. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12.

41. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45. The decision to adopt "Sneevlietian strategy" has become one of the most debated issues in the early history of the CCP and KMT. The First Plenum has never before been reported. Events surrounding the Second Plenum are most complex and often contradictory. A Third Plenum, also unreported, took place in February 1923. In this brief account of the establishment and first years of the CCP I shall not touch upon these issues, but will do so in another paper.

42. The above-mentioned decisions were taken while Sneevliet was still in Shanghai. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 8, pp. 75-76.

43. Sneevliet left Peking on 29 March 1922 and, assuming that he travelled four days to get back to Shanghai, he returned on 2 April 1922. Thus the First Hangchow Plenum must have taken place between 2 and 23 April 1922. Letter from "De Waarnemend Consul-Generaal" to "Zijne Excellentie den Gouverneur van Nederlandsch Indie, Buitenzorg." Dated Shanghai, 27 April 1922. G/37, No. 921.

44. Letter from H. S. (H. Sneevliet) to Mrs. E. J. Sneevliet-Brouwer, teacher, Travendoel, Semarang, Java. Dated Chita, 2 September 1922. Letter F6, 4523, No. 698 G.H.A.P. (Archive of the Dutch Ministry of Colonial Affairs). "Aus der Internationale: Sitzung der Exekutive der Komintern vom 17. Juli," ("From the International: Session of the Executive of the Comintern of 17 July"), *Internationale Presse Korrespondenz* (*International Press Correspondence*), No. 145 (Berlin, 25 July 1922), pp. 929, 930. I have identified "Genosse M." in this report as Comrade Maring, alias Sneevliet.

45. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," pp. 8-10.

46. T. Kara-Murza and P. Mif, *Strategiia i taktika Komintern v Natsionalno-Kolonialnoi Revoliutsii na primere kitaya* (*Comintern Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial Revolution, for example China*) (Moscow, 1934), p. 112.

47. G. Maring, "Revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v iuzhnom Kaite," *Kommunisticheskii International*, No. 22 (1922), pp. 5803-5816. See Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian Strategy," pp. 214-229.

48. "Aus der Internationale: Sitzung . . .," *Inprekorr*, No. 145 (25 July) p. 929.

49. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 9. G. Maring, "Revolutsionnoe . . .," *Kommunisticheskii International*, No. 22, pp. 5803-5816. See Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian strategy," pp. 217-219.

50. "Aus der Internationale: Sitzung . . .," *Inprekorr*, No. 145 (25 July), pp. 929, 930.

51. *Ibid.*

52. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 3.

53. "Aus der Internationale: Sitzung . . .," *Inprekorr*, No. 145, (25 July 1922), p. 930.

54. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12.

55. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45.

56. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12.

57. *Ibid.*

58. "Aus der Internationale: Sitzung . . .," *Inprekorr*, No. 145 (25 July 1922), p. 930. "It was decided to issue a letter to the Communist Parties of China and Japan. Comrade M. was entrusted with the formulation of these letters." Communist International order for the Chinese Communist Party, 18 July 1922. "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China according to the decision of the Presidium of Comintern of 18 July must remove its seat to Canton immediately after receiving this note and do all its work in close contact with Comr. PHILIPP." Comrade Philipp was one of Sneevliet's many Comintern names. The original document was typed on linen to enable Sneevliet to hide it. *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme* . . . , p. 60.

59. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45. See also Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian strategy," Chapter XIII, pp. 125-147.

60. *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang tui-yü shih-chü ti chu-chang* (*Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation*), 15 June 1922 (n.p., Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 17 June 1922).

61. *Ibid.*

62. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 8, pp. 72-82. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu* (*Letter to all Comrades of the Party*) (Shanghai, 10 December 1929), p. 2. Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, p. 89. Chang claims that the First Manifesto was mainly based on the decisions of the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East which he had attended in January 1922 in Moscow and Petrograd. Ch'en Kung-po and Ch'en Tu-hsiu support Chang in this assertion. No doubt this Congress influenced the Chinese Communists to some extent, though it should be pointed out that the First Hangchow Plenum must have played a more decisive role in this respect. Both Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-t'ao did not mention the First Hangchow Plenum in their accounts of the event. Chang even went so far as to point out: "Ma-lin went back to Moscow two weeks before I came back from Shanghai. . . . He did not suggest to Ch'en Tu-hsiu to join the KMT before he left Shanghai." At the same time, however, Chang mentions that he returned from Moscow in March 1922. This means that Chang was in Shanghai when the First Plenum took place. Sneevliet left Shanghai on 23 April 1923 and not in February-March as Chang points out. Moreover, Sneevliet's "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring für die Executive" is an official document and was written only three months after the event: Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Chang's versions were written respectively seven and 44 years later.

63. Sneevliet's appointment as correspondent for the Far East of the Communist International and International Press Correspondence, Moscow, 24 July 1922. Signed by Karl Radek. *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme* . . . , p. 60. *Kung-fei huo-kuo shih shih* (Taipei, 1963), p. 13. Letter from I. Podolsky, Shanghai, Boone-road 12, Rosta News Agency to Mrs Sneevliet, Java. Dated Shanghai, 19 August 1922. G/299, No. 2249. *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 858. *North China Herald*, 19 August 1922. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 8, p. 84. Sneevliet and Abraham Joffe left Moscow on or about 24 July 1922. On or about 4 August they arrived in Chita and five days later were in Harbin. They arrived in Peking on 12 August 1922. Joffe remained in Peking, while Sneevliet continued his travels to Shanghai. On the basis of this analysis I suggest that Chang Kuo-t'ao's assertion that the Second Hangchow Plenum took place on 8 August 1922 is wrong.

64. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao-ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu*, p. 2. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 8, p. 84.

65. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45.

66. "Aantekeningen van Maring: Tsien Toe Sioe, De oorzaken van de nederlaag van de Chineesche revolutie" ("Notes by Maring: Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the causes of the defeat of the Chinese revolution") *De Nieuwe Weg* (*The New Road*) (Amsterdam, 1930). This article contains a Dutch translation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "Kao ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu" together with a commentary by Sneevliet. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 8, pp. 83-89. See above note 41.

67. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat Sen . . .," *Klassenstrijd*, March 1926. "Notes on a conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45. H. Sneevliet, "Persoonlijke indrukken van Soen Yat Sen," *De Arbeid*, 28 March 1925, p. 2. Hu Hua, *Chung-kuo hsin min-chu-chu-i ko-ming shih* (Canton, 1951), p. 62. *Kuo-fu nien-p'u chu-kao*, Vol. II (Taipei, 1958), pp. 557-558.

68. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat Sen . . .," *Klassenstrijd*, March 1926.

69. H. Sneevliet, "De Chineesche Generaal en de Chineesche Revolutie: Tsien Tsjoen Ming en Tsjang Kai Shek," *Klassenstrijd*, 1927, p. 143. "Notes on a conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45.

70. *Tsung-li ch'üan-shu* (*Complete Writings of President Sun*), Vol. 10, Part II (Taipei, 1953), pp. 924-925. *T'an-ho kung-ch'an-tang liang-ta yao-an* (*Two Important Cases of Impeachment of the Communist Party*) (Nanking, 1927). See Sun's marginal comments on p. 5 written in December 1923. Letter to Chiang Kai-shek, 21 November 1922, in Sun Yat-sen, *Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng sheng-shou cha mo-chi* (*Original Copies of Sun Yat-sen's Handwritten Letters*) (n.p., n.d.), p. 3.

71. *Ke-ming wen-hsien*, Vol. VIII, pp. 1039-1043. Many historians have credited Sun Yat-sen as being the initiator of what I have called "Sneevlietian strategy." The source material which gave rise to this interpretation is Ch'en Tu-hsiu's *Kao ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu* of 10 December 1929. According to Ch'en, Dalin, a delegate of the Communist Youth International, had proposed a two-party alliance to Sun Yat-sen some time in July 1922. Sun would certainly have refused such an alliance and would have told Dalin that he would only allow the CCP members to enter the KMT on condition that they were to submit to the KMT and recognize



no party outside of it. It is not possible that such a meeting took place in July since at that time Sun Yat-sen was being held captive on a gunboat. I have, moreover, found a most interesting account in Russian of Dalin's meetings with Sun Yat-sen. The writer is Sergei Dalin himself. Dalin reports that his first meeting with Sun took place on 29 April 1922, and that his last took place on 12 or 14 June 1922. While I shall not elaborate here on these most interesting talks, I should like to mention Sun's request for Soviet Russian aid in the establishment of a new railway network. Dalin, it should be added, points out that in his opinion the CCP's only chance for mass action would be within the KMT. He does not mention any proposal for a two-party alliance to Sun Yat-sen. To conclude, it may be observed that Sneevliet's first meeting with Sun Yat-sen, his talks with the Central Committee of the KMT in Shanghai and the First Hangchow Plenum had all taken place before Dalin arrived on the scene. Sergei Dalin came to China as a delegate of the Communist Youth International and together with Chang Tai-lei and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai he organized the First National Congress of the Socialist Youth Corps in May 1922. It is, then, for these reasons that I reject the generally accepted thesis of Sun Yat-sen being the instigator of what I have called "Sneevlietian strategy." *Sun Yat Sen, 1866-1966* (Sbornik statei, Moscow, 1966), pp. 255-285. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12. S. A. Dalin, "Velikii povorot, Sun Yat Sen v 1922 g.," in *Sun Yat Sen 1866-1966. K stoletiu . . .*, pp. 255-85. Sergei Dalin, *V riadakh kitaiskoi revoliutsii*, (Moscow 1926), Sergei Dalin, "Sun Yat Sen, k godovshchine smerti," *Izvestiia*, 1926, No. 59. M. Maring, "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .," p. 12.

71. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet . . .," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45.

72. *Ibid.* H. Sneevliet, "Eulogy: Adolf Abrahamowitsj Joffe," *De Arbeid* (Labour) (Amsterdam), 26 November 1927, p. 1.

73. H. Sneevliet, "Het Chineesch-Russisch Conflict over den Oost-Chineesch spoorweg," ("The Sino-Russian Conflict about the Chinese Eastern Railway"), *De Nieuwe Weg*, 1929, p. 234.

74. H. Maring, *On the Subject of the Chinese Question . . .*, p. 5. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 8, p. 88. Chang notes: "Ma-lin was an important matchmaker. He not only promoted the Chinese Communist Party to join the Kuomintang, but also acted as intermediary between Sun Yat-sen and Joffe. Sun Yat-sen's meeting with Joffe was also promoted by Ma-lin."

75. H. Sn(eevliet), "Het netelige vraagstuk van den Chineesch Oosterspoorweg," ("The Thorny Problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway"), *De Baanbreker* (The Pioneer) (Amsterdam) No. 13, 20 July 1929, p. 1. H. Sneevliet, "Het Chineesch-Russisch Conflict over den Oost-Chineesch spoorweg," *De Nieuwe Weg*, 1929, p. 234. *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme . . .*, p. 61. Although no minutes of his talks with the Soviet leadership are available, it is known that Sneevliet had discussions with Trotsky, Stalin, Bukharin and others on the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It had been in consultation with Joffe that Sneevliet had decided to discuss this question in Moscow. It is said that Sneevliet disagreed with Stalin about the ownership of the railway. Sneevliet felt that it should be handed over to the Chinese, while Stalin insisted that Soviet Russia should keep her interests in it.

76. Sneevliet's appointment as third member of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Vladivostok. This document was written in German and signed by W. Kolarov for the secretariat of the ECCI, No. 282, Moscow, 12 January 1923. The text of this document is an extract of the protocol of the session of the ECCI presidium on 10 January 1923. Sneevliet as well as Voitinsky were asked to take part in the next conference of the CCP. A translation of this document can be found in: Dov Bing, "Revolution in China: Sneevlietian strategy," p. 212. See also *Voor Vrijheid en Socialisme . . .*, p. 60.

77. T. Kara-Murza and P. Mif, *Strategii i taktika . . .*, p. 112.

78. See above, note 76.

79. Ch'i-wu lao-jen, "Hui-i Li Ta-chao t'ung-chih," ("Recollections of Comrade Li Ta-chao") *Chung-kuo kung-jen* (Chinese Worker) (Peking), 12 May 1957, pp. 22-23. Pao Hui-sheng identifies the Comintern delegate as Borodin. He must have meant Ma-lin, for Borodin came to China in September 1923. H. Sn(eevliet), "Een Chineesch Voorbeeld" ("A Chinese Example") (7 February 1923), *De Arbeid*, 7 February 1923.

80. G. Maring, "Krovnyie episod v istorii Kitaiskogo rabocheho dvizhenie" ("A Bloody Episode in the History of the Chinese Labour Movement"), *Kommunisticheskii International* (Communist International), No. 26-27 (1923), pp. 7455-7466. The editors note that they disagree with Sneevliet's assessment on the Chinese situation. Teng Chung-hsia, *Chung-kuo chih-kung yun-tung chien-shih* (A Brief History of the Chinese Labour Movement) (Peking, 1949), pp. 25-27. Ch'i-wu lao-jen, "Erh-ch'i pa-kung hui-i" ("Recollections of the February Seventh Strike"), *Hsin-kuan-ch'a* (The New Observer) (Peking), 1 February 1957, p. 36; 16 February 1957, p. 37; March 1957, p. 37.

81. G. Maring, "Revolutionnoe dvizhenie v iuzhom Kitae," *Kommunisticheskii International*, No. 22 (1922), pp. 5803-5816. "The situation in China and Japan," *International Press Correspondence*, 28 August 1922, p. 542. G. Maring, *Bericht des Genossen H. Maring . . .*, pp. 10-12.

82. G. Maring, "Krovnyie episod v istorii Kitaiskogo rabocheho dvizhenie," *Kommunisticheskii International*, No. 26-27 (1923), p. 7462. H. Sn(eevliet), "Een Chineesch voorbeeld" (7 February 1923), *De Arbeid*, 7 February 1923. H. Sn(eevliet), "Het netelige vraagstuk van den Chineesch Oosterspoorweg," *De Baanbreker*, 20 July 1929, p. 1. (H. Sneevliet), "Roy en Tsien Toe Sioe in gevaar," ("Roy and Ch'en Tu-hsiu in danger") *De Arbeid*, 17 October 1931, p. 3. On his way back from Moscow Sneevliet had a conference with General Chang Tso-lin in Mukden. Main item on the agenda: the Chinese Eastern Railway. He returned to Peking on or about 3 February 1923.

83. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 9, p. 90. In Moscow Chang reported to Safarov, Voitinsky and Losovsky. Voitinsky was a member of the Comintern Irkutsk Bureau which had continued to support the Far Eastern Republic's preference for General Wu P'ei-fu.

84. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 9, p. 90. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45. Sneevliet mentions that after the February Seventh incident orders were issued in Peking for the arrest of Maring and Ch'en Tu-hsiu.

85. Pavel Mif, *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ying-yung fen-tou ti shih-wu nien* (15 Years of the Heroic Struggle of the CCP) (Moscow, 1936), p. 25. See his remarks on The Third Congress. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 9, p. 90.

86. T. Kara-Murza and P. Mif, *Strategii i taktika . . .*, pp. 114-116. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 9, p. 92.

87. T. Kara-Murza and P. Mif, *Strategii i taktika . . .*, pp. 114-116. Dick Schaap, "Henk Sneevliet, een leven voor de rode revolutie" ("Henk Sneevliet, a Life for the Red Revolution"), *Het Vrije Volk*, 18 April 1970. Although Sneevliet had discussed some aspects of the peasant problem in his first report of July 1922, the Comintern directive of January 1923, which was based on this report, made no mention of the subject. It would appear that the "February Seventh" incident was, in fact, responsible for the increasing importance he ascribed to the Chinese peasant. On the other hand Sneevliet visited and corresponded with Mao Tse-tung in 1923 and therefore the young Mao quite possibly bears part of the responsibility.

88. Kuomintang (ed.), *Kuo-fu ch'üan-chi* (Complete Writings of Sun Yat-sen) (Taipei, 1957), Vol. II, pp. 235-238.

89. "Notes on a Conversation with H. Sneevliet," *The China Quarterly*, No. 45. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat Sen . . .," *Klassenstrijd*, March 1926. H. Sneevliet, "Persoonlijke indrukken van Soen Yat Sen," *De Arbeid*, 28 March 1925, p. 2. Writing in 1926, Sneevliet observed that the First National Congress of the KMT had been planned long before it took place in January 1924.

90. Mao Tse-tung (ed.), *Min-kuo shih-wu nien i-ch'ien chih Chiang Chieh-shih hsien-sheng* (Mr Chiang Kai-shek before 1926), Vol. VIb (Shanghai, 1936), p. 201a. Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China* (London, 1957), pp. 18-19.

91. *Ibid.*

92. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao ch'üan tang t'ung-chih shu*, p. 4.

93. H. Sneevliet, "Met en bij Soen Yat Sen . . .," *Klassenstrijd*, March 1926. H. Sneevliet, "Persoonlijke indrukken van Soen Yat Sen," *De Arbeid*, 28 March 1925, p. 2.

94. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 9, p. 92. Chang confirms that the Third National Congress was convened at the initiative of Sneevliet.

95. "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti-san-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yen" ("Manifesto of the Third National Congress of the CCP") *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, No. 30, 20 June 1923, p. 228. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Wo ti hui-i," *Ming-pao yüeh-k'an*, Vol. I, No. 10, pp. 78-79. I have strong reservations about Chang's assertion that in Ma-lin's opinion the peasantry was not important. Chang made the observation that Ma-lin did not mention them at all at the Third Congress. I have good reason to believe that Chang was mistaken, for such an assertion would be completely contradictory to the 13-point directive of May 1923, which was based on Sneevliet's recommendations. If it is true that Sneevliet did not speak out on the peasant problem, this in itself does not necessarily mean that he did not attach any importance to the subject. The truth may lie between these seemingly contradictory observations. Sneevliet possibly did not discuss the peasantry himself, but may have delegated this subject to a comrade. According to Chang the delegate who discussed the peasantry at the Congress was Mao Tse-tung. In essence Chang's observations on Mao's handling of the peasant problem closely resemble the main points raised on this issue in the 13-point directive of May 1923. This lends extra credibility to the previous observation that Mao had been partly responsible for the formulation of the agrarian programme in Sneevliet's report to the ECCI of May 1923. See also above, note 87.

96. "Aantekeningen van Maring: Tsien Toe Sioe, De oorzaken van de nederlaag der Chineesche Revolutie," *De Nieuwe Weg*, p. 82. H. Sneevliet, "De Chineesche Generaal en de Chineesche Revolutie: Tsien Tsjoen Ming en Tsjang Kai Sjek," *Klassenstrijd*, 1927, p. 143.

97. "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti-san-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yen," *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, No. 30 (20 June 1923), p. 228.

98. Chang Kuo-t'ao in an interview with Professor C. Martin Wilbur, Hong Kong, 1954. In *Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927*, edited, with introductory essays by C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How (New York, 1956), p. 87.

99. Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York, 1944), pp. 154-156.