Artikelen

Wat je zaait, zal je oogsten! Dwang en zelfdwang in Creools-Surinaams onderlinges

Auteurs

  • Bijnaar,Aspha

Trefwoorden:

Credit, Saving, Informal sector, Suriname, Minority groups, Preferences, Banking

Samenvatting

As Ye Sow, So Shall Ye Reap! Constraint and Self-Constraint in Creole-Surinamese Mutual Saving and Credit Associations. Fieldwork is drawn on to examine why so many Surinamese Creoles prefer to save money in an informal saving and credit arrangement called kasmoni. Several types of motives for saving in a kasmoni are identified: traditional, economic, and constraint. This savings organization is favored because of its flexibility in providing a package of services -- savings, credit, and insurance in case of personal financial need. Its weakness lies in the informal nature of the arrangement, which makes it easy for participants to embezzle. It is shown that the participants like the motivation of constraint, putting pressure on them to save. This motivation is examined in terms of Jon Elster's (1984) theoretical concept of "recommitment" and the concept of "social constraint to self-constraint" that Abraham de Swaan (1989) derived from Norbert Elias. 23 References. Adapted from the source document.

Biografie auteur

Bijnaar,Aspha

Gepubliceerd

1998-10-01

Nummer

Sectie

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