

Summaries

DON KALB

Shifting conjunctions
Politics and knowledge in the globalisation debate

This article discusses the various currents and critiques of recent globalisation theory as it has reflected and helped to produce a chain of world historical events since the end of the Cold War. It argues that globalisation theories were *emic* as well *etic* tools for the making of political positions and alliances to guide political agency in the One World created by the collapse of 'actual existing socialism'. It discusses respectively liberal, institutionalist and critical Marxist approaches. It reaffirms Karl Polanyi's vision in arguing that globalisation in its current forms should above all be seen as a political project of technocratically imposed marketisation. This imposition of markets from above is generating local, national and regional forms of popular claim-making *vis à vis* states and elites; some enlightened, some less so. In the process, a transnational class is emerging that is the prime benefactor of its outcomes as it becomes nested in an incipient transnational state structure closely intertwined with core financial and corporate interests – in other words, empire. This emergent transnational state structure serves to force local states and elites into a largely self-interested and consensual compliance with core states representing the logics of finance capital and its accumulation imperatives. I identify three systematic outcomes of this process: the ongoing proletarianisation of the world population, including the accelerated transformation of the peasantry into informal and mobile labour; the gradual de-legitimation of the post-welfare and post-developmental state; and the 'indigenisation', ethnification and parochialisation of post-citizens as a response to the formation of transnational classes and the neo-liberal global empire state as noted earlier by Jonathan Friedman.

NICO WILTERDINK

From apenkool to zielenpoot
The realization of the last Dutch spelling reform

The article presents a critical case study of a policy process whose outcome is the opposite of the original intentions. The case analysed is the last reform of Dutch orthography, introduced in 1996. While the intention was to make

spelling simpler and easier, the actual result of the reform is that the spelling of certain words has become more complicated, and less phonetic. The question of why this happened is answered on several levels. The recent reform can be seen as resulting from a long history in which Dutch spelling was subject to heated public debates, and reform movements strove for simplification in the name of progress and equality. The last of these movements arose in the 1960s (in connection with more general social movements for democratisation) but failed in 1972 when the Dutch and Flemish governments decided to postpone any reform. As a result, there was still a formally recognised 'spelling problem' to be resolved in a bureaucratic way. Subsequent commissions were established in 1985 and 1990, with the aim of making orthography 'more consistent' but also 'socially acceptable'. This proved to be impossible. First, the commissions attempted to make spelling more consistent than language itself, creating artificial rules and adding differences between written and spoken language. Secondly, the most striking modifications proposed by the last commission were not socially accepted but strongly criticised by writers and journalists. The government decided on a compromise by rejecting the radical proposals and accepting the less striking ones. This decision satisfied no one, but was implemented nevertheless. The eventual reform is to be regarded as the unforeseen, unintended and undesired outcome of a process in which different groups, each with their own interests, orientations and power resources, were involved.

LEO LUCASSEN

The importance of historical perspectives for the understanding of migration and integration in Western Europe

In this article a comparison is made of the integration process of 'large and problematic' groups in Western Europe in the past (1840–1920) and in the last half century (1950–). Applying the American debate on old and new migrants I argue that there are many similarities in the settlement process of migrants in the past and in the present. Looking at the Irish in Britain, the Italians in France and the Poles in Germany in the nineteenth century, it is clear that in all these cases integration was slow and that migrants kept together well into the second generation. Moreover, when we look at the threat felt by the indigenous population, differences with the present are also much less obvious than is often assumed. In particular, the reaction towards the Catholicism of the Irish migrants in predominantly Protestant England shows many similarities to the way Islam is portrayed nowadays. There is also an important difference, however, which is related to the changed role of the state. Owing to

the rise of the welfare state and increased controls over migration, the dynamics of migration have changed considerably. Whereas in the past the coming and going of migrants was primarily determined by the ups and downs of the labour market, after the Second World War the selection of those who came, and more importantly those who stayed, changed. These changes arose first of all from the decolonisation process and secondly from a combination of the unintended effects of the welfare state and restrictive aliens policies. Whereas colonial migrants could enter freely, independently of the labour market situation, migrants who had built up social and legal rights had few reasons to leave when the economy slowed down after 1970. The consequence was a less favourable selection of stayers, which had an extra negative influence on the integration process. A 'human capital' argument therefore seems to be more relevant in explaining the situation at the present day than a culturalist 'clash of civilizations' thesis.