

# Summaries

## Aspha Bijnaar

### *As Ye Sow, So Shall Ye Reap! Constraint and Self-constraint - Creole-Surinamese Mutual Saving and Credit Associations*

This article examines why so many Surinamese Creoles prefer to save money in an informal saving and credit arrangement called 'kasmoni'. In the literature such arrangements are referred to as Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). I discuss several explanations given for the existence of this phenomenon, which in a certain way coincide with Webers typology of human action. The data gathered during fieldwork conducted in Suriname were compared with these theoretical explanations. I distinguish different motives for saving in a kasmoni: the traditional motive, the economic motive, the nostalgic motive and a motivation of constraint. This categorization offers insight in the dynamics of kasmoni. A remarkable advantage of the kasmoni's, compared to formal institutions, turns out to be its flexibility with respect to its three main functions - saving, receiving credit and providing insurance in case of personal financial need: it offers these functions in one package so as to meet the varying needs of the participants efficiently. By contrast, its weakness lies in the very informal nature of the arrangement which makes it easy for participants to embezzle the cash - thus destroying the mutual trust required in this arrangement. My data clearly show that the participants have a strong preference for the motivation of constraint, that is to save under pressure. The final part of this article focusses on the latter motivation by using Elster's theoretical concept of 'precommitment', and the concept of 'social constraint to self-constraint' that De Swaan has derived from Elias. This proves to be a fruitful perspective which reveals how the participants in the kasmoni exert control over themselves and others in order to insure the continuity of their financial contributions.

## Mart Bax

### *Holy Mary and Medjugorje's Rocketeers The Dynamics of Ethnic Cleansing in Rural Bosnia Hercegovina*

Social scientists, and others, tend to approach 'ethnic cleansing' in terms of carefully orchestrated and implemented political policy. All eruptions of (ethnic) war violence that do not fit into this perspective they simply label 'primitive balkanism', 'age-long tribalism', 'organized crime', 'pointless', or 'mental aberration'. The present article criticizes this leader-oriented approach and illustrates in detail for a rural area in Hercegovina that local vendetta's and religious factionalism are among the major determinants of the dynamics of the 'cleansing' process in that region.

Therewith, it advocates a more systematic inquiry into the local sources of warfare in that part of ex-Yugoslavia. The article concludes with some general, theoretical observations: on de-civilization and identification and on civilizing and de-civilizing tendencies in religious formations.

## J. Goudsblom

### *The Paradox of Pacification*

Insights into the monopolization of violence developed by Norbert Elias in *The Civilizing Process* are applied to human history at large. It is argued that organized violence tends to entail the paradox of pacification because, in order to be effective, it generally requires a high degree of internal pacification. Two sorts of pacification processes are distinguished: recurrent short-term 'peace making' such as also occurs among chimpansees, and long term 'pacification' at an increasingly larger scale. The latter process, which is uniquely human, is shown to be related to stages in the monopolization of organized violence: successively by adult males, warrior elites, and states.

## Christopher Nottingham

### *An Intellectual Titan of our Modern Renaissance Havelock Ellis and the Progressive Tradition*

Havelock Ellis's reputation has been in free fall since his death in 1939. If he is now remembered it is as a writer on human sexuality and gender relationships. At best he is allowed a peripheral place in the history of progressive thought but in recent years he has attracted a good deal of hostile comment from those he would have considered his natural heirs. Feminist authors in particular have identified him as the sort of ally that women would have done well to ignore. While there is no need to set Ellis back on his former pedestal it does seem clear that current interpretations, largely through devoting insufficient attention to the historical context in which he wrote, underestimate both the value and the range of his work. The article argues that by appreciating the range of areas in which he made a contribution; preventive medicine, progressive penology, internationalism, the championing of Ibsen and Nietzsche, as well as feminism and the dissemination of knowledge of human sexuality, and by recognising the force of unifying vision which drove his endeavours, it is possible to gain not only a proper appreciation of Ellis, but a richer and more realistic view of the origins and development of the progressive tradition itself.

*Out of Habit*

*Notes toward a General Theory of Deliberate Action*

This article aims to make a contribution toward moving beyond some of the less fruitful disputes between proponents and opponents of rational action theory. A distinction is drawn between rationality or efficiency and the *pursuit* of rationality or efficiency. The latter may not necessarily produce the former. While economists have generally preferred an absolute measure of rationality - utility maximization - because of the predictive determinacy that it is thought to provide their explanatory model, I argue that the highly variable *pursuit* of rationality is a more viable criterion, even if it entails an apparent loss of determinacy. Both rational choice theorists and advocates of more normative-cultural modes of explanation have insisted on the theoretical primacy of their preferred approaches and on the derivative nature of the opposite camp's model of social action. I argue that neither claim to theoretical primacy can be sustained and that, instead, the status of a 'principle of natural order', deviations from which constitute the proper explananda, should be accorded to thoughtless *habit* or *routine*. Finally, I suggest that taking habit as the explanatory baseline and the *pursuit* of rationality or the explicit (re-)assertion of normative validity as the phenomena to be explained offers the prospect of bypassing the old disputes and getting on with the job of trying to explain when, why and to what extent either purposive rationality or normative commitment are most likely to motivate action.