

# on dialectical determination: an operational definition

G. Carchedì

One of the central problems a social scientist has to solve in analyzing a society is that of the relationship connecting its various elements. General agreement seems to exist on the two following propositions:

- 1) every instance contributes to the overall determination of society, and
- 2) every instance, in turn, is determined by the global structure.

However, this scheme, useful as it is inasmuch as it stresses the interaction among the various instances of a society, and the need to see this interaction as taking place within a definite global structure, is insufficient because it omits to mention the existence of a determinant instance and thus disregards the analysis of what type of relationship ties this instance to the other, determined instances.

In this paper I will submit a concept of dialectical determination the aim of which is first of all to discuss the nature of the determinant instance / determined instances relation and, secondly, to present this relation split up into several statements, which can be seen also as logical steps in the analysis, in order to facilitate its use in concrete inquiries. Since my aim is to intervene in the class struggle waged on the ideological plane at the present stage of capitalist development (late capitalism), all the examples used to support my argument will be taken either from the capitalist system in transition between capitalism and socialism (1).

1) The concept of dialectical determination I would like to submit can be conveniently subdivided into the following three statements. First, *the determinant instance* (e.g. the economic structure vis-à-vis the superstructure, or within the economic structure, the mode of production vis-à-vis the production process, or within the mode of production, the production relations vis-à-vis the productive forces or the distribution relations, etc.) *determines the determined instances* (superstructure, production process, productive forces, distribution relations, etc.) *in the sense that the former calls into existence the latter as a condition of its own existence.* For

example, the capitalist economic structure, being based as it is on antagonistic production relations (exploitation) generates class antagonism. Since this class antagonism would jeopardize the reproduction of the capitalist economic structure itself, a political and ideological structure is generated which limits the class struggle (2).

2) second, *the determined instances react upon (modify) the determinant instance, i.e. the determinant instance is overdetermined by the determined instances.* For example, conflicting economic interests generate class struggle not only on the economic but also on the political and ideological level. This class struggle makes it necessary to introduce production processes (the non-capitalist state activities) which are basically different from the capitalist production process. I.e. the provision of services by the state is made possible by the redistribution of surplus value among all the non-productive sectors of the economy but is the outcome of the struggle waged by the working class. The provision of these services (e.g. schools, hospitals etc.) takes place according to laws which are basically different from the laws moving the production of capitalist commodities (3). Thus, the capitalist economic structure is modified, due to the class struggle (the determined instance) in the sense that this structure is not a pure capitalist structure anymore but is the unity (a unity in domination) of several production processes and production (and distribution) relations.

As another example of determination and overdetermination we can choose a society in transition between capitalism and socialism. If we consider the case of the People's Republic of China, we see that here we have an economic structure which is not a capitalist one any longer but which is not a completely socialist one yet. Therefore, there is a constant clash within China between two basic types of ideology: the socialist one which puts politics in command, i.e. politics above production (and therefore stresses moral rather than material incentives) and the essentially capitalist one (revisionist) which gives priority to production and which therefore fosters a type of accelerated development along capitalist lines (4). Which type of development predominates at different times depends upon a series of factors the analysis of which is extremely complex. The important point, as far as overdetermination is concerned, is that the predominance of the economicist type of ideology will tend to push China's economic development in the capitalist direction, while the predominance of the socialist ideology will tend to foster a socialist type of development.

We will see in a while how the concept of overdetermination I am submitting differs from Althusser's (5). What has to be stressed at this juncture is that my concept of overdetermination implies the following three points.

2A). The determined instances have a relative autonomy vis-à-

vis the determinant instance; but it is the determinant instance which circumscribes the degree of autonomy (6). This explains why, e.g. as far as classes are concerned, the old and the new middle classes defined in terms of production relations, can give rise to similar ideologies and political practices (7). However, there are limits beyond which the ideology of the middle classes cannot go, and these limits depend upon the production relations identifying these classes. For example, the new middle class, as long as it remains such, i.e. as long as it is not completely proletarianized (8), cannot develop a full proletarian consciousness.

How are we to explain the determined instance's relative autonomy? Take, for example, the case of computer-science. Its rise and development is tied to a series of factors, not only economic but also political (e.g. the needs of the military establishment) and ideological (9), i.e. to the development of capitalism in all its aspects and not only in its economic aspects. Thus, computer science is determined, in the strict sense of the word, by the capitalist economic structure (determination in the last instance) but in reality is determined by the development of the whole system and by each of its component parts. This holds for all determined instances. The concept of dialectical determination submitted here serves to explain only the determination in the last instance, the (mediated) tie between the economic structure and each of the determined instances. This tie, this relation is never immediate because in reality each component part of society is determined by all other instances, both determinant and determined. It is this fact which explains the determined instances' relative autonomy. If there were an immediate relation (determination) between the two orders of instances there could be no autonomy at all. On the other hand, if all instances were given a status of complete autonomy, i.e. if we would deny the determinant role which reverts only to one instance, we would leave the realm of Marxism to fall into the structuralist morass.

2B). The dominant role can revert also to the determined instance and not only necessarily to the determinant instance; but it is the latter which determines which determined instance has a dominant role. Let us take, as an example, the definition of social classes. Classes are defined always in economic, in political, and in ideological terms. The economic definition of classes (in terms of production relations) is always the fundamental one but a complete definition can be given only when also the two other dimensions are considered. Thus, we define the working class, in terms of production relations, as all those agents of production who (a) do not own the means of production (b) are exploited (or economically oppressed) and (c) perform the function of labor (10). This is a purely economic definition. However, a complete definition, a definition of the proletariat -I use the two terms "working class" and "proleta-

riat" to emphasize the difference between a purely economic definition and a complete definition of this class -encompasses also the ideological (i.e. we consider as proletariat only that part of the working class which has developed a proletarian class consciousness) and the political (i.e. we consider only that part of the working class which has joined the worker's party and which joins in proletarian political practice). Thus, e.g. that part of the working class known as labor aristocracy cannot be considered as part of the proletariat, even though from the point of view of production relations it belongs to it, because its ideology and political practices are essentially petit bourgeois. In other words, in this case it is the ideological and the political which are dominant; the determinant role, on the contrary, reverts always to the economic. Moreover, it is the economic which determines which instances must be dominant. In the case of the labor aristocracies, it is the economic which assigns the dominant role to the ideological because the capitalist economic structure, in order to reproduce itself, needs to introduce within the working class several types of bourgeois ideologies (e.g. reformism). It can be useful to notice that, just as the determinant instance need not be also the dominant one, so the principal (determinant) aspect of a contradiction between two socio-economic systems, co-existing and struggling in a concrete society (i.e. om a society in transition), i.e. the contradiction between two types of production relations, need not be the dominant aspect of that contradiction. Thus, in China, where two types of production relations (the capitalist and the socialist production relations) co-exist and struggle, the principal (determinant) contradiction (or the principal aspect of the contradiction between capitalism and socialism) is the one between capitalist and socialist production relations. However, the dominant aspect of the contradiction is on the political plane. The dominant instance is the political. As C. Bettelheim says: "Le déplacement de l'aspect principal de la contradiction entre les rapports sociaux capitalistes et les rapports sociaux communistes s'effectue de façon inégale. L'instauration de la dictature du prolétariat amène un déplacement de l'aspect principal de la contradiction en faveur du prolétariat sur le plan politique et partiellement sur le plan idéologique, mais, dans une première phase, tant que le prolétariat ne domine pas au sein de chaque unité de production, ce déplacement ne s'accomplit pas ou que très partiellement dans la base économique elle-même, c'est-à-dire au niveau des rapports de production" (11).

2C). There can be either correspondence or contradiction between the determinant and determined instances. There is correspondence when the determined instance helps in the process of reproduction of the determinant instance and there is contradiction when the opposite is the case. For example, capitalist production relations determine capitalist distribution rela-

tions in the sense that the former cannot exist without the latter. Thus, the income of the working class is tendentially equal to the value of labor power. As long as this is the case, we have correspondence. A situation of contradiction arises when sectors of the working class (the labor aristocracies) get an income (for the above mentioned ideological and political reasons) higher than the value of their labor power (12). It is important not to mistake relative independence for contradiction. For example, in the nineteenth century in England, while the bourgeoisie dominated economically and politically, the dominant ideology was aristocratic in nature. From this analysis, P. Walton and A. Gamble draw the following conclusion: "which is to say that the bourgeoisie dominates at every level of practice" (13). Conclusion which, of course, destroys the claim that the superstructure is relatively autonomous. However, the fact that the dominant ideology is that of the aristocracy and that it serves the interests of the bourgeoisie, does not mean that the bourgeoisie dominates on the ideological level. Under certain conjunctural circumstances the bourgeoisie must leave the ideological domination to another class (in this case the aristocracy) in order to retain economic and political domination. In this particular case, we have both correspondence and relative independence. Correspondence because the ideological helps reproduce the capitalist production relations. Relative independence because this correspondence takes place through a type of ideology which is not capitalist but aristocratic in nature. What Walton and Gamble do here is (1) to conflate the concepts of correspondence and relative independence (2) to mistake a situation of correspondence for one of relative independence and (3) to deduce that there is, in this specific case, no relative autonomy.

3) We now come to the third point of the concept of dialectical determination: *the determinant instance sets the limits of variation to its own overdetermination*. To return to our example concerning the labor aristocracies: production relations determine distribution relations, i.e. wages are tendentially determined by the value of labor power. Some sectors of the working class (the labor aristocracies) can be paid wages higher than the value of their labor power and conceivably also wages higher than the value of the commodities produced by them (14). However, this could never be the case for the working class as a whole, i.e. the distribution of the new value produced could never go beyond certain limits set by the production relations (limits varying with the conjuncture and thus dependent upon political and ideological considerations as well), because there would be then no expropriation of surplus value, i.e. no profits, and thus no capitalist production relations.

The point on limits of variation should not be interpreted as if the determinant instance always manages to keep its own overdetermination "within limits". The contradiction between

determinant and determined instances can lead to a point where the latter becomes one of the basic causes of change in the former (of course, in this case we have an antagonistic contradiction). It is not my intention to attempt even a sketch of a theory of the limits of variation. All I can do here is to indicate a possible point of departure for such an analysis by referring to Godelier's valuable contribution (15). Godelier starts from a distinction between contradictions within a structure and contradictions between two structures. As far as the latter is concerned, Godelier examines the contradiction between production relations (determinant instance) and productive forces (determined instance). Godelier points out that, as far as the development of capitalism goes, at the beginning of this system there is correspondence between productive forces and production relations, in the sense that capitalist production relations develop a certain type of productive forces (collective worker, big business) and in turn these capitalist productive forces reinforce the capitalist production relations. At a later stage of capitalist development, however, the emphasis shifts to the contradiction between these two elements of the capitalist economic structure. Finally, the development of the productive forces will not possibly be contained any longer within the limits imposed by the capitalist production and distribution relations (objective conditions for a revolutionary change) and will thus cause a radical change in the latter. *Thus, it is the determined instances (productive forces, class struggle, etc.) which ultimately cause a transition to a different type of society.*

One fundamental criticism that can be moved to Godelier is that his approach focusses exclusively on the structural aspects of social change, thus disregarding the obvious fact that it is the agents of production who are the carriers of certain (antagonistic) social relations and who, therefore, become the agents of social changes (17). The contradictory nature of the capitalistic production relations (exploitation) is reflected in the consciousness of the working class (given certain objective and subjective conditions). When the capitalist production relations and the capitalist productive forces become contradictory, the objective conditions are created for the conscious, organized class struggle, for the struggle for the establishment of new production relations (18). While the capitalist production relations are defended by the capitalists and their allies, the new socialist production relations are fostered by the proletariat and its allies. Thus, the class struggle originates from the contradictory nature of capitalism. The only way to destroy the old production relations is a social revolution, i.e. a conscious and organized process of destruction of the capitalist system. However, in such a system, it is impossible for the socialist production relations to come to life and to develop themselves up to the point when they become dominant (as the capitalist production relations did within the feudal system). The characteristic element of the transition from capitalism to socialism is that

the socialist production relations can be established only through a revolution which gives first of all the political and ideological power to the proletariat. There is no automatic transition from capitalism to socialism at the level of the economic, contrary to the case of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, where the capitalist production relations grew spontaneously within the feudal system and anticipated the capitalist political and ideological relations. In the transition between capitalism and socialism it is the political and the ideological that get ahead of the economic, it is the determined instances (political and ideological socialist relations) which, by being the conditions for the existence of the determinant instance (the socialist economic or production, relations) reinforce the latter until when it becomes dominant.

From what said above, it follows that the fact that the productive forces explode the limits of variation imposed by the production relations and thus are one of the causes of a radical change in the latter, does not imply that the determinant role reverts to the productive forces. F. Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring* (19) assigns the determinant role to the productive relations. To do otherwise, would mean to fall into technological determinism (20) and to consider both the productive forces and the production process under capitalism as neutral (21).

Historically, we see that the development of the capitalist production relations (stage of formal subordination of labor to capital) precedes that of the capitalist productive forces (stage of real subordination of labor to capital). This fact, however, cannot be taken as an argument for assigning the determinant role to the production relations. Such a role must be assigned on grounds of a logical and not of an historical analysis. This remark calls for a few comments on the difference between these two types of analysis. As C.J. Arthur puts it :

"...the order of categories used to correctly analyse a given system, e.g. capitalism, may be different from the order in which they appeared in history. This raises also the whole issue of the relation between systematic and genetic analysis. It is one thing to say how the elements of a given structure condition one another: it is another thing to explain whence the elements arose and combined. Neglect of this distinction in Marxist theory may lead to technological determinism, extrapolating unwisely from such Marxian dicta as 'the handmill gives you society with the feudal lord, the steammill society with the industrial capitalist'. In this example, it should be understood that 'gives' is not an historical category but a structural one about the social relations appropriate to a given productive force. The analysis of the *change* from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production is another question altogether" (22).

Given, thus, that there is a difference between logical and historical analysis, the question arises as to the nature of the connection between them. Engels deals with this problem:

"The logical method of treatment ... is nothing else than the historical method, only divested of its historical form and disturbing fortuities ... (it) will be nothing else than the mirror image of the historical course in abstract and theoretically consistent form" (23).

In commenting the above-given quotation, Walton and Gamble point out that historical analysis would then account for the "accidents". This is true, provided that "accidents" are not considered as chance elements: if this were the case, Walton and Gamble would be right in saying that dialectics would not be of much help in analysing historical situations. "Accidents" are to be understood as those factors which account for the discrepancy, the displacement between the rhythm of development of the various instances of a concrete society considered at various conjunctural moments. These accelerations and delays are the way the relative independence of the determined instances, so far examined only from the point of view of logical analysis, manifests itself in historical analysis.

Thus, while the two types of analysis are different, and yet related to each other in the above mentioned way, they both share one basic characteristic: they both must be dialectical. This fact, in turn, throws light on the fact that there cannot be one type of analysis without the other. A logical analysis (an analysis of determination, overdetermination, correspondence and contradiction, etc. among the various instances of society) can be carried out at various levels of abstraction, while an historical analysis is always an analysis on the conjunctural level. An historical analysis, then, is the logical outcome (on the most concrete level of abstraction) of an analysis (logical) which necessarily must begin on the highest level of abstraction only to descend to more and more concrete levels. This is why there can be no historical analysis without a logical one. But the reverse is also true. Without a study of history, a logical analysis falls immediately in ideological traps such as the functionalist-structuralist view in Sociology or the "homo-economicus" in Economics.

Thus, the distinction between historic and logical analysis is a valid and a necessary one (there is no contradiction but complementarity between the two of them because both are aspects of scientific inquiry) (24), but also an insufficient one. An inquiry, once it has been carried out, must also be presented in the most suitable and convenient way. As Marx says:

"Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their



inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction" (25).

M. Nicolaus, in his Foreword to the *Grundrisse* (26) provides an excellent discussion of the "question of where to begin" and how Marx worked out this problem. Whereby Marx starts the *Grundrisse* with a discussion of material production (also as a reaction against Hegel's idealism), just as he had started *The German Ideology*, at the end of the *Grundrisse* he reaches the conclusion that the starting point must be the commodity: "(the commodity) is a beginning which is at once concrete, material, almost tangible, as well as historically specific (to capitalist production); and it contains within it (is the unity of) a key antithesis (use value v. exchange value) whose development involves all the other contradictions of this mode of production" (27).

To conclude, we must distinguish between logical and historical analysis. Moreover, once the inquiry (which depends on both types of analysis) has been completed, a distinction must be made between method of presentation and method of inquiry. The question concerning which instance plays the determinant role cannot thus be decided on account of the method of presentation or of historical analysis but only on account of a logical analysis.

Having cleared the way through some theoretical confusion, i.e. having decided on what ground the production relations must be assigned a determinant role, we can now provide some concrete examples of how productive forces are determined by production relations. Let us examine here, as an aspect of the productive forces, both the technical and the economic conditions of production. Let us first of all see how the capitalist production relations and the socialist production relations determine their respective conditions of production and after this has been done, let us see what is the effect of either correspondence or contradiction between a certain type of production relations and certain conditions of production.

The capitalist relations of production determine their own economic conditions in the sense that, for example, at the beginning of capitalism, primitive accumulation is necessary; or that there is a continuous tendency to increase the size of the enterprise. That the socialist production relations determine their own economic conditions (28) can be seen from the fact that at the beginning of socialism (the transition period) primitive accumulation, even though still necessary, plays only a secondary role. The primary role goes to the socialist development of the productive forces, i.e. to the process of political and ideological development of the masses; or from the fact that emphasis is placed on the development

of small and medium-sized enterprises. The same holds for the technical conditions of production. Capitalist production relations need fragmentation of tasks, subordination of manual to intellectual work, restricted management, etc. Socialist production relations require de-fragmentation of tasks, parity of manual and intellectual work, mass management, etc. Moreover, under capitalism the introduction of new techniques depends on their profitability; under socialism this obstacle has been removed: here new techniques are introduced when they save labor, when they make labor safer, more pleasant, etc. It should be noticed that in China the removal of this obstacle has opened up an immense field to innovations. These examples could be multiplied.

We have seen above, point 2C, that there can be either correspondence or contradiction between the determinant and the determined instance, in this case between the production relations and the productive forces. We have seen also that correspondence means fostering the reproduction of the determinant instance and that contradiction means the opposite. Let us now provide an example taken from a society in transition to socialism, Socialist China. Here, even if the socialist production relations are dominant, there exist still capitalist production relations in the sense that there relations disappear only slowly *and only when all the conditions for their existence have disappeared*. If the technical and economic conditions of production (productive forces) develop in a capitalist direction (e.g. a capitalist technical division of labor) then there is contradiction between the socialist production relations and the productive forces and, conversely, correspondence between the capitalist production relations and the productive forces. Thus, those production relations with which the development of the productive forces is in correspondence tend to be reinforced while those production relations (the socialist ones, in this example) with which the nature of the productive forces is in contradiction tend to be weakened(29).

We can now draw four important conclusions from what was said above. First there must be correspondence between the determinant and the determined instances in order for the former to reproduce itself on an enlarged scale. However, correspondence and contradiction must be understood here in qualitative, rather than in quantitative terms, i.e. in terms of their nature. For capitalism, e.g. the contradiction which emerges between the capitalist productive forces and the capitalist production relations is summarized in the formula: social nature of production, private appropriation. Second, the relation between the determinant (productive relations) and the determined instances (productive forces) can be and usually is one of both correspondence and contradiction. The question is, then, which aspect is dominant. For the capitalist stage of real subordination of labor to capital, e.g., the element of contradiction is given (as a constant aspect of the capitalist system) by the

above-mentioned formula (social nature of production, private appropriation). The element of correspondence, however, (the collective worker, the big industry, etc.) still dominates the contradictory element because the basic function of the productive forces is still that of helping in the enlarged reproduction of the system. Third, a distinction must always be made between a logical and an historical analysis. As far as the latter is concerned, relative autonomy means that the determinant and the determined instances do not have to come to life and to disappear at the same time (displacement). We have seen that the capitalist production relations come to life first, and capitalist productive forces only later. Also, the capitalist production relations tend to disappear first (in a transitional society) until the capitalist productive forces (and also the bourgeois ideology, etc.) tend to disappear later. Since the capitalist production relations have not completely disappeared yet, i.e. since the socialist production relations are not yet fully dominant in the first period of transition to socialism, and since the conditions for the existence of the capitalist production relations still exist, there is always the possibility that the capitalist production relations might gain strength if the conditions of their existence are not constantly stifled. One of the points Althusser fails to make clear in his discussion of determination is the distinction between concepts which apply to a logical (structural, in his case) analysis and concepts which apply to an historical analysis (30). Relative autonomy, e.g., is a concept which applies to both types of analysis while displacement applies only to historical analysis and domination applies only to logical analysis.

Fourth, we can now understand why a technique can never be neutral. According to Bettelheim (31) this is so because it is always the class struggle which determines the nature of the technique by imposing transformations on both the process of production and on the production relations. This is certainly so, but this is how and not why it happens. Just as there is a difference between explaining the need capital has for self-expansion (the why, i.e.  $M - M'$ ) and explaining how this happens, i.e. through which mechanism (i.e. competition), in the same manner there is a difference between explaining *how* a technique is never neutral (i.e. through class struggle) and *why* this must be so. A technique can never be neutral because its nature (as an element of productive forces) is either in correspondence or in contradiction with the dominant production relations; or, to be more precise, because its dominant element is either in correspondence or in contradiction with the dominant production relations (32).

Before proceeding to the examination of some of the characteristics of the concept of dialectical determination submitted here, it might be useful to hint at the relationship between

of small and medium-sized enterprises. The same holds for the technical conditions of production. Capitalist production relations need fragmentation of tasks, subordination of manual to intellectual work, restricted management, etc. Socialist production relations require de-fragmentation of tasks, parity of manual and intellectual work, mass management, etc. Moreover, under capitalism the introduction of new techniques depends on their profitability; under socialism this obstacle has been removed: here new techniques are introduced when they save labor, when they make labor safer, more pleasant, etc. It should be noticed that in China the removal of this obstacle has opened up an immense field to innovations. These examples could be multiplied.

We have seen above, point 2C, that there can be either correspondence or contradiction between the determinant and the determined instance, in this case between the production relations and the productive forces. We have seen also that correspondence means fostering the reproduction of the determinant instance and that contradiction means the opposite. Let us now provide an example taken from a society in transition to socialism, Socialist China. Here, even if the socialist production relations are dominant, there exist still capitalist production relations in the sense that these relations disappear only slowly *and only when all the conditions for their existence have disappeared*. If the technical and economic conditions of production (productive forces) develop in a capitalist direction (e.g. a capitalist technical division of labor) then there is contradiction between the socialist production relations and the productive forces and, conversely, correspondence between the capitalist production relations and the productive forces. Thus, those production relations with which the development of the productive forces is in correspondence tend to be reinforced while those production relations (the socialist ones, in this example) with which the nature of the productive forces is in contradiction tend to be weakened(29).

We can now draw four important conclusions from what was said above. First there must be correspondence between the determinant and the determined instances in order for the former to reproduce itself on an enlarged scale. However, correspondence and contradiction must be understood here in qualitative, rather than in quantitative terms, i.e. in terms of their nature. For capitalism, e.g. the contradiction which emerges between the capitalist productive forces and the capitalist production relations is summarized in the formula: social nature of production, private appropriation. Second, the relation between the determinant (productive relations) and the determined instances (productive forces) can be and usually is one of both correspondence and contradiction. The question is, then, which aspect is dominant. For the capitalist stage of real subordination of labor to capital, e.g., the element of contradiction is given (as a constant aspect of the capitalist system) by the

above-mentioned formula (social nature of production, private appropriation). The element of correspondence, however, (the collective worker, the big industry, etc.) still dominates the contradictory element because the basic function of the productive forces is still that of helping in the enlarged reproduction of the system. Third, a distinction must always be made between a logical and an historical analysis. As far as the latter is concerned, relative autonomy means that the determinant and the determined instances do not have to come to life and to disappear at the same time (displacement). We have seen that the capitalist production relations come to life first, and capitalist productive forces only later. Also, the capitalist production relations tend to disappear first (in a transitional society) until the capitalist productive forces (and also the bourgeois ideology, etc.) tend to disappear later. Since the capitalist production relations have not completely disappeared yet, i.e. since the socialist production relations are not yet fully dominant in the first period of transition to socialism, and since the conditions for the existence of the capitalist production relations still exist, there is always the possibility that the capitalist production relations might gain strength if the conditions of their existence are not constantly stifled. One of the points Althusser fails to make clear in his discussion of determination is the distinction between concepts which apply to a logical (structural, in his case) analysis and concepts which apply to an historical analysis (30). Relative autonomy, e.g., is a concept which applies to both types of analysis while displacement applies only to historical analysis and domination applies only to logical analysis.

Fourth, we can now understand why a technique can never be neutral. According to Bettelheim (31) this is so because it is always the class struggle which determines the nature of the technique by imposing transformations on both the process of production and on the production relations. This is certainly so, but this is how and not why it happens. Just as there is a difference between explaining the need capital has for self-expansion (the why, i.e.  $M - M'$ ) and explaining how this happens, i.e. through which mechanism (i.e. competition), in the same manner there is a difference between explaining *how* a technique is never neutral (i.e. through class struggle) and *why* this must be so. A technique can never be neutral because its nature (as an element of productive forces) is either in correspondence or in contradiction with the dominant production relations; or, to be more precise, because its dominant element is either in correspondence or in contradiction with the dominant production relations (32).

Before proceeding to the examination of some of the characteristics of the concept of dialectical determination submitted here, it might be useful to hint at the relationship between

this concept and the concept worked out by Althusser and his school. It should be obvious to the reader that the present discussion owes much to Althusser, Balibar, Godelier, Poulantzas, etc. But it should be also obvious that there are points of radical difference. Some of these points have already been hinted at and others will emerge shortly (33). Rather than going into a lengthy comparison between Althusser's concept of determination and mine, I will limit myself to stressing the different content given to the word overdetermination. For Althusser

"... there is not one simple economic contradiction, that between the forces and relations of production, which governs everything. There is rather a multiplicity of contradictions existing at all levels of the social formation and constituting a kind of hierarchy of effectivity within it. So, determination is never simple but always complex and multiple, and this Althusser encapsulates in the concept of overdetermination" (34).

For Althusser, then, overdetermination means complex or multiple determination in which the economic plays a primary role. In this paper, on the other hand, a distinction is made between the way the determinant instance determines the determined instances (the former calls into existence the latter as a condition of its own existence) and the way the determined instance determines the determinant instance (the former reacts upon, modifies the latter). It is only in this latter case that we can talk of overdetermination. In short, in this paper, while determination means to call into existence as a condition of its own existence, overdetermination means to react upon, to modify. The reason behind giving two different names to the relationship between the determinant and the determined instance, according to whether this relationship is considered from the point of view of the former instance (determination) or of the latter instance (overdetermination), is that Marx himself while using the same word (determination) both to indicate determination and to indicate overdetermination, gives this word two completely different meanings. The following two lengthy quotations are necessary to prove the point:

"The relations and modes of distribution thus appear merely as the obverse of the agents of production. An individual who participates in production in the form of wage labor shares in the products, in the results of production, in the form of wages. *The structure of distribution is completely determined by the structure of production.* Distribution is itself a product of production, not only in its object, in that only the results of production can be distributed, but also in its form, in that the specific kind of participation in production determines the specific forms of distribution, i.e. the pattern of participation in distribution... In the shallowest conception, distribution appears as the distribution of products, and hence as further removed from and quasi-indepen-

dant of production. But before distribution can be the distribution of products, it is (1) the distribution of the instruments of production, and (2) which is a further specification of the same relation, the distribution of the members of the society among the different kinds of production... If it is said that, since production must begin with a certain distribution of the instruments of production, it follows that *distribution* at least in this sense *precedes and forms the presupposition of production*, then the reply must be that production must indeed have *its determinants and preconditions* which form its moments" (35).

Thus, the economic structure is not a simple but a structured unit (36) in which only one element, the production relations, play the determinant role in the sense that it determines the other elements as conditions of its own existence. The determined elements, in turn, determine the determinant element but in quite a different way, as the following quotation shows clearly:

"The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity... A definite production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution, and exchange as well as *definite relations between these different moments*. Admittedly, however, *in its one-sided form*, production is itself determined by the other moments. For example, if the market, i.e. the sphere of exchange, expands, then production grown in quantity and the division between its different branches becomes deeper. A change in distribution changes production, e.g. concentration of capital, different distribution of the population between town and country, etc. Finally, the needs of consumption determine production" (37).

We can now close this paper by examining some of the characteristics of the concept of dialectical determination submitted here. First of all, *the concept submitted here encompasses both simple and dialectical determination*. To understand why this is so and what is the difference between the two types of determination, let us start from the remark that dialectical determination implies always a relationship of domination (either the determinant or the determined instance must play the dominant role) while the reverse is not true. In a relationship of determination there is always an instance to which the dominant role reverts. However, a relationship of domination does not imply a relationship of determination. To prove this point, let us consider the capitalist production process. Marx has shown (38) that (1) this process is the unity of the labor process and of the surplus value producing process, and (2) that the latter process dominates the former. Synthetically, it can be said that the capitalist production process is the unity in domination of the labor process and of the surplus value producing process. Neither one of the two aspects of the capitalist production process determines the other.

We have said that the capitalist production process is the unity in domination of the labor process and of the surplus value producing process. If we now examine the outcome of this process, i.e. the capitalist commodity, we see that it too (1) is the unity of a use value and of an exchange value, and (2) is a unity in which the exchange value dominates the use value. Thus, we can say that the capitalist commodity is the unity in domination of use value and exchange value. It can be seen that the fact that the capitalist commodity is the unity in domination of use value and exchange value is due to the fact that the capitalist production process is the unity in domination of the labor process and of the surplus value producing process. The relationship between the producing process and the product is a relationship of *simple determination*. In this kind of determination there is no reacting of the determined instance upon the determinant instance (no overdetermination) and thus no relative autonomy, no domination of one instance over the other, and no correspondence or contradiction between the determinant instance (the production process) and the determined instance (the commodity). That we are dealing with determination in this particular case can be seen from the fact that the direction of domination within the production process (the surplus value producing process dominates the labor process) determines the direction of domination within the commodity (the exchange value dominates the use value). That we are dealing with *simple* determination can be seen from the fact that a capitalist production process turning out a commodity in which the use value would dominate the exchange value is totally inconceivable. Thus, we should not make the mistake of reducing all determinations to simple (or mechanical) determinations, a mistake made both by economicists and by spontaneists when dealing with the relationship between economic structure and superstructure (or class struggle). But we should not make the opposite mistake either, that of considering all determinations as dialectical ones. Only concrete study can tell us with what type of determination we are dealing in each single case. But the important point, for the purpose of our discussion, is that we can now prove our statement to the effect that the concept of determination submitted here encompasses both simple and dialectical determination. When we must limit our analysis only to the determined instances as a condition for the existence of the determinant instance, we deal with the concept of simple determination. When we extend our analysis also to encompass the aspects of overdetermination and of the limits of variation, then we deal with dialectical determination. It follows, therefore, that economicism is not considering a relationship of determination as simple when its nature is such, but it is considering only the first aspects (determination) when also the other two aspects (overdetermination, limits of variation) should be considered.

Secondly, *dialectical determination*, as here defined, is a theory of both correspondence and contradiction among the



various instances of a society and thus *is a theory both of stability, of change within the boundaries of the existing society, and of revolutionary change.* As long as, and inasmuch as there is correspondence between the determinant and the determined instance, the latter is one of the conditions for the reproduction of the former; the extent to which it does so is directly related to a situation of complete correspondence. If, on the other hand, there is contradiction between the two elements of the relation, the determined instance becomes one of the conditions for the determinant instance's suppression. When contradictions push the determined instances beyond the limits of variation compatible with the determinant instance, then the conditions are created for a revolution within the determinant instance.

To put it differently, our notion of dialectical determination makes it possible to explain stability, change within the boundaries of an existing society, and revolution. A stable system is one in which there is correspondence between the determinant instance (the economic structure, and within it the relations of production) and the various determined instances. In this case the former instance is constantly reinforced. Overdetermination goes in the direction of reinforcement. Particularly important is of course the question whether there is correspondence or not between the production relations and the productive forces. Correspondence in this region implies also correspondence with all other determined instances in the sense that contradictions between structure and superstructure cannot arise as long as the productive forces are in correspondence with the production relations. Thus, a stable society is not one in which there is no movement but one in which the movement of all its various parts goes in the direction of strengthening the basic nature of that society (production relations). Capitalism, in the period of correspondence between productive forces and production relations, was a stable system but also a vigorously expanding one. The concept of stability, just as that of change, should be a dynamic one (39).

But this situation of correspondence is bound to come to an end. Production relations and productive forces enter in contradiction. The conditions are thus created for a contradictory relation between structure and superstructure:

"But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. comes into contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production" (40).

We have then a situation of change, which can be both change within the boundaries of the existing society (e.g. from individual to monopoly capitalism), or to put it concisely, overdetermination within the limits of variation; or revolutionary change, due to the accumulation of contradictions which makes possible for the determined instances to explode those

limits of variation (41). As E.J. Hobsbawn puts it:

"It is equally important that internal tensions may sometimes be reabsorbed into a self-stabilizing model by feeding them back as functional stabilizers, and that sometimes they cannot. Class conflict can be regulated through a sort of safety-valve... but sometimes it cannot. The state will normally legitimize the social order by controlling class conflict within a stable framework of institutions and values, ostensibly standing above and outside them... and doing so perpetuate a society which would otherwise be riven asunder by its internal tensions... Yet, there are situations when it loses this function" (42).

The concept of dialectical determination submitted above encompasses all these various possibilities.

One additional point should be made in order to avoid misunderstandings. We have talked about revolutionary change as an explosion, as the breaking of the limits of variation due to the accumulation of contradictions. In reality, if we left the matter here, we would identify the revolutionary change with its ruptural moment. (43) Not only, but we would dangerously underestimate the subjective element, the agents making the revolution (44). It is basically through the proletariat, as the organized revolutionary force, that these contradictions explode those limits, that a sudden qualitative change in the basic structure of a society takes place. And, a revolutionary change, as the change fostered by the proletariat and its vanguard, starts of course far earlier than the ruptural point and continues much longer after it.

#### NOTEN

1. For the justification of the terms "system in transition between capitalism and socialism", see the exchange of letters between P. Sweezy and C. Bettelheim in *Monthly Review*: P.M. Sweezy, "Czechoslovakia, capitalism and socialism", October, 1968; C. Bettelheim, "On the transition between capitalism and socialism", March, 1969; P.M. Sweezy, "Reply", March, 1969; C. Bettelheim, "More on the society of transition", December, 1970; P.M. Sweezy, "Reply", December, 1970.

2. We talk about limits to, and not abolition of, the class struggle. "Dire par exemple qu'il existe une classe ouvrière dans les rapports économiques, cela implique *nécessairement* une place spécifique de cette classe dans les rapports idéologiques et politiques, *même* si cette classe peut, en certain pays et en certaines périodes historiques, ne pas avoir une "conscience de classe" propre ou une organisation politique autonome. Cela veut dire que, dans ces cas, même si elle est fortement contaminée par l'idéologie bourgeoise, son existence économique se traduit par des *pratiques politico-idéologiques matérielles spécifiques*, qui percent sous son "discours" bourgeois... Tout cela, qui s'inscrit en faux contre la série d'idéologies de l'"intégration" de la classe ouvrière, veut dire finalement une chose: que point n'est besoin d'une "conscience de classe"

propre et d'une organisation politique autonome des classes en lutte pour que la lutte des classes ait lieu, dans tous les domaines de la réalité sociale". N. Poulantzas, *Les Classes sociales dans le capitalisme d'aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1974, p. 19.

3. My thesis rests upon the following points: 1) the capitalist economy is made up as far as the production process is concerned, not only by one production process (the pure, productive, capitalist production process as analyzed by Marx) but by a number, a variety of production processes; 2) these production processes are all dominated by the pure capitalist production process, the way this domination reveals itself being different for each dominated production process; 3) each production process should be analyzed at a certain level of abstraction, e.g. at the highest level of abstraction we consider only the pure capitalist production process. I provide an analysis of the production process on which the non-capitalist state activities rest in my paper "The economic identification of the state employees", to be published in a forthcoming issue of *Social Praxis*.

4. For the difference between capitalist and maoist economics, see J.G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist economic development," in *America's Asia*, New York, 1971; for the relationship between types of economic development and ideological and political struggle, see E.L. Wheelwright and B. McFarlane, *The Chinese Road to Socialism*, New York, 1970, and C. Bettelheim, *Révolution culturelle et organisation industrielle en Chine*, Maspero, 1973.

5. See L. Althusser, *For Marx*, Vintage books, 1970 and L. Althusser and E. Balibar, *Reading Capital*, London, 1970.

6. The other side of the coin is of course the relative dependence among instances. As P. Walton and A. Gamble put it "...we must avoid thinking that contradictions arise only because of uneven development between structures that otherwise are quite independent of one another". *From Alienation to Surplus Value*, London, 1972, p. 132.

7. See, e.g., N. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, London, 1973; "On Social Classes", *New Left Review*, No 78, and *Les Classes sociales dans le capitalisme d'aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1974. Poulantzas' writings are certainly an important contribution to the field. However, his treatment of the new middle class at the level of production relations seems to me to be unsatisfactory. I analyze the production relations identifying the new middle class in "On the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class" in *Economy and Society*, vol. 4, No 1, p. 1-86.

8. For the concept of proletarianization of the new middle class, concept which rests upon (1) the devaluation of this class' labor power and (2) the disappearance of the global function of capital, see G. Carchedi *On the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class*, op. cit., section 6.

9. See, e.g., M. Janco and D. Furjet, *Informatique et Capitalisme*, Maspero, Paris, 1972.

10. The terms "economic oppression" and "function of labor" are defined in G. Carchedi, *On the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class*, op. cit., section 3

11. C. Bettelheim, *Révolution culturelle...* op. cit. p. 108.

12. This is an example of non-antagonistic contradictions. For the diffe-

rence between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions, see Mao Tse-Tung, "On contradiction", *Four Essays on Philosophy*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1966. Failure to see the connection between production and distribution in the proper light can lead to serious theoretical mistakes, as e.g. in the case of Habermas. "For the time that Marx was writing, Habermas concedes that the subsystem of work was 'embedded' in the institutional framework. But he argues that in modern capitalism the two have become autonomous. There no longer exist any reactions on the development of the productive forces, because modern industry has discovered a new source of surplus value that is independent of the labor time of workers. This is the "scientisation of technology". This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of Habermas' argument, for as we shall show, it removes production from man as such. It suggests that the process of production can be understood without the system of distribution", P. Walton and A. Gamble, *From Alienation to Surplus Value*, op. cit. p. 46.

13. *From Alienation...* op. cit., p. 138.

14. This is what R. Davies seems to argue in "The White Working Class in South Africa", *New Left Review*, No 82, p. 40-59.

15. See M. Godelier, *Rationality and Irrationality in Economics*, London, 1972, p. 77 and ff.

16. We abstract, of course, from the subjective conditions for a revolution

17. See V.I.Lenin, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and how they fight the Social-Democrats*, Collected Works, Vol 1, Moscow, 1963. p. 159

18. In what follows, I rely heavily on M. Harnecker, *Los Conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico*, Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editores, Sixth edition, 1971, p. 150-160 and p. 224.

19. Quoted in P. Walton and A. Gamble, *From Alienation to Surplus Value*, op. cit. p. 60.

20. See M. Nicolaus, "The unknown Marx", in R. Blackburn, ed., *Ideology in Social Science*, Vintage Books edition, 1973, p. 324. Yet, H. Braverman while rightly rejecting technological determinism, assigns the "primacy" to the forces of production. See *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, Monthly Review Press, 1974, p. 19.

21. See N. Poulantzas, *Les classes sociales...*, op.cit. p. 247.

22. C.J. Arthur, *Introduction to K. Marx and F. Engels, the German Ideology*, New York, 1970, p. 33.

23. Marx-Engels, *Selected Works*, 1, p. 339, quoted in P. Walton and A. Gamble, op.cit., p. 73.

24. Thus E.P. Thompson creates a false problem when he states "I do not see class as a 'structure', not even as a 'category', but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships". See *The making of the English Working Class*, Penguin Books, 1963, p. 9.

25. K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol 1, International Publishers, New York, 1967, p.19. The mirror, however, is a very special one. It "reflects" reality with various degrees of comprehensiveness and with an increasing richness of

details, depending upon which level of abstraction is being used for the analysis.

26. Penguin Books, 1973, p. 35 and ff.

27. Ibid, p. 38.

28. All the examples used to support my argument are taken from C. Bettelheim, *Révolution Culturelle...* op. cit., passim

29. A similar point is made by A. Gorz with reference to the capitalist mode of production: "... it is the technology of the factory which imposes a certain technical division of labor, which in turn exacts a certain type of subordination, of hierarchy and of despotism... one does not see how 'collective appropriation' of the means of production carrying the imprint of *this* technology would be able to change anything in the regimen of the factory, in the 'stunnedness' and the oppression of the workers". A. Gorz, "Their Factories and our People", *Telos*, No 18, winter 1973-1974, p. 152.

30. In fact, Althusser does not even deal explicitly with the difference between the two types of analysis.

31. *Révolution Culturelle...* op. cit. p. 93.

32. Moreover, these remarks allow us to tackle the question of what is rational and what is not in a certain society or system. From the point of view of the system, the determined instances which are in contradiction with the determinant instance are irrational. A proletarian, revolutionary ideology is irrational in the context of a capitalist society. It can become again rational, from the point of view of the capitalist system, *only if subordinated to it*, e.g. only if de-natured into reformist ideology. The view that considers technology as a neutral, external factor of development tends to slip into even serious Marxist works as, e.g., *Accumulation on a World Scale*. As S. Amin himself remarks in the afterword to the second edition, p. 595, "I did not pay enough attention to this theme, for I tended to see technology as a factor external to the problem, an independent variable. Within this narrow context it is clear that the (obligatory) choice of modern industries amounts merely to copying the technology of the West of today, following the example set in their time by Japan and Russia. However, we are beginning to see that technological research follows a direction that accords with the requirements of the system, and therefore, that technique is not an external factor".

33. My differences with Althusser's scheme have only to a small extent originated from the discussion around his work. E.g. *Marxism today* has published a highly critical article by John Lewis (January, 1972, and February, 1972), a "Reply" by Althusser (October and November, 1972) and several comments on the Lewis-Althusser debate (by G. Lock, June, 1972; by J. Oakly, September, 1972; by M. Cornforth, May, 1973; by C. Gray, July 1973; by D.D. Grant, August, 1973; and by J. Wrigley, September 1973). Unfortunately, in all these articles, the whole question of the dialectical nature of determination is almost completely disregarded. The reader should also consult: N. Geras, "Althusser's Marxism: an account and assessment", *New Left Review*, January-February, 1972, No 71, p. 57-68; A. Glucksmann, "A Ventriloquist structuralism", *New Left Review*, March-April, 1972, No 72, p. 68-92; and R. Blackburn and G. Stedman (eds.) *The Unknown Dimension*,

Basic Books, 1972, p. 365-387.

34. N. Geras, op. cit., p. 71.

35. K. Marx, *Grundrisse*... op. cit., p. 95 and p. 97. Emphasis mine.

36. This often forgotten since usually the determinant role is assigned to the economic structure *tout court* rather than only to the production relations. Actually, even this formulation is not correct because, within the relations of production, only one element (the ownership element) plays the determinant role. The proof of this last statement will have to be postponed to a next paper.

37. Ibid. p. 99-100. These are only two examples but actually the *Grundrisse*, only to mention one work by Marx, is full of similar examples. Just to mention one more example, concerning overdetermination "consumption certainly reacts on production itself" (p. 283, emphasis added).

38. See G. Carchedi, *An Essay*... op. cit. chapter 1.

39. Thus, we are miles away from bourgeois economics favorite interpretations of stability both as stagnation and by a situation characterized by various "vicious circles". For this latter interpretation, see R. Nurkse, *Problems of Capital formation in underdeveloped countries*, Oxford University Press, 1967.

40. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, New York, 1970, p. 52.

41. What said above should not of course be confused with G. Myrdal's mechanical concept of "cumulative movement" as set forth in *Asian Drama*, New York, 1968, Vol. III. p. 1843 and ff.

42. *Karl Marx Contribution to Historiography* in R. Blackburn (ed.) *Ideology in Social Science*, 1973, p. 280.

43. This is one of the limits of Althusser's structuralism. See N. Geras, *Marx and the Critique of political economy*, in R. Blackburn (ed.) *Ideology in social science*, op. cit., p. 303.

44. The relation between the agents and the system is a complex one and must be left aside for the time being. As an indication of the direction in which the answer should be sought, I will only say that (1) the reproduction of the system and the reproduction of the agents are two distinct but related phenomena (2) the relation is one of determination in which the reproduction of the system plays the determinant role, and (3) it is in the determined instance, as already mentioned above, that the more immediate causes of a revolution must be sought. See G. Carchedi, "Reproduction of Social classes at the level of production relations", *Economy and Society*, Vol. 4, No 4, p. 361-417.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY.

- Althusser, L., *For Marx*, Vintage Books, 1970.
- Althusser, L., and E. Balibar, *Reading Capital*, London, 1970.
- Althusser, L., "Reply to John Lewis" (Self criticism) part 1, in *Marxism today*, October, 1972.
- Althusser, L., "Reply to John Lewis" (self criticism) part 2, in *Marxism today*, November 1972.

- Amin, S., *Accumulation on a world scale*, Monthly Review Press, 1974.
- Arthur, C.J., *Introduction to K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology*, New York, 1970.
- Bettelheim, C., "On the transition between capitalism and socialism", in *Monthly Review*, March, 1969.
- Bettelheim, C., "More on the society of transition", in *Monthly Review*, December 1970.
- Bettelheim, C., *Révolution Culturelle et Organisation Industrielle en Chine*, Maspero, Paris, 1973.
- Blackburn, R., and G. Stedman Jones, "Louis Althusser and the struggle for Marxism", in Howard D. and K.E. Klare (eds). *The unknown Dimension*, Basic Books, 1972.
- Braverman, H., *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, Monthly Review Press, 1974.
- Carchedi, G., "On the Economic identification of the new middle class", in *Economy and Society*, vol. 4, no 1.
- Carchedi, G., "The Economic identification of the state employees", to be published in *Social Praxis*.
- Carchedi, G., "Reproduction of social classes at the level of production relations", *Economy and Society*, vol. 4, no 4, p. 361-417.
- Cornforth, M., "Some comments on Louis Althusser's Reply to John Lewis", in *Marxism today*, May, 1973.
- Davies, R., "The white working class in South Africa", in *New Left Review*, no 82, November-December 1973.
- Geras, N., "Althusser's marxism: an account and assesment", in *New Left Review*, January-February, 1972, No 71.
- Geras, N., "Marx and the critique of political economy", in Blackburn R. (ed.) *Ideology in social science*, 1973.
- Gorz, A., "Their factories and our people", *Telos*, winter 1973-74. p. 150-156.
- Glucksmann, A., "A ventriloquist structuralism", in *New Left Review*, March-April 1972, No 72.
- Godelier, M., *Rationality and Irrationality in economics*. London, 1972.
- Grant, D.D., "The Althusser Debate" in *Marxism today*, August, 1973.
- Gray, G., "The Althusser Debate", in *Marxism today*, July 1973.
- Gurley, J.G., "Capitalist and maoist economic development", in *America's Asia*, New York, 1971.
- Harnecker, M., *Los Conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico*, Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editores, Sixth edition, 1971.
- Hobsbawn, E.J., "Karl Marx contribution to historiography", in Blackburn R. (ed.) *Ideology in social science*, 1973.
- Janco, M., and D. Furjot, *Informatique et Capitalisme*, Maspero, Paris, 1972.
- Lenin, V.I., *What the "friends of the people" are and how they fight the social democrats*, Collected works, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1963.
- Lewis, J., "The Althusser Case, part.1:Marxist Humanism" in *Marxism today* January, 1972.
- Lewis, J., "The Althusser case, part .2" in *Marxism today*, February 1972.
- Lock, G. "Louis Althusser: philosophy and Leninism", in *Marxism today*, June 1972.
- Mao Tse-Tung, "On contradiction", *Four essays on philosophy*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966.
- Marx, K., *Capital*, Vol. 1, International Publishers, New York, 1967.
- Marx, K., *Grundrisse*, Penguin Books, 1973.

- Marx, K., and F. Engels, *The German ideology*, New York, 1970.
- Myrdal, G., *Asian Drama*, Vol. III, New York, 1968.
- Nicolaus, M, Foreword, in Marx, K., *The Grundrisse*, Penguins Books, 1973.
- Nicolays, M., "The unknown Marx" in: Blackburn R. (ed.) *Ideology in social science*, Vintage Books, 1973.
- Nurske, R., *Problems of Capital formation in Underdeveloped Countries*, Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Oakly, J. "Marxism and Ideology, II Althusser and Ideology" in *Marxism today*, september 1972.
- Poulantzas, N., *Political power and social classes*, London, 1973.
- Poulantzas, N., "On social classes", in *New Left Review*, No 78, March-April 1973.
- Poulantzas, N., *Les classes sociales dans le capitalisme d'aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1974.
- Sweezy, P.M., "Czechoslovakia, Capitalism and socialism", in *Monthly Review*, october 1968.
- Sweezy, P.M., "Reply", in *Monthly Review*, March 1969.
- Sweezy, P.M., "Reply", in *Monthly Review*, December 1970.
- Thompson, E.P., *The making of the English working class*, Penguin Books, 1963.
- Walton, P., and A. Gamble, *From Alienation to surplus value*, London 1972.
- Wheelwright, E.L., and B. McFarlane, *The Chinese road to socialism*, New York, 1970.
- Wrigley, J., "The Althusser debate", in *Marxism today*, September 1973.