

Corporatism, Socialism and Development in Romania*

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The evident stability and durability of communist regimes have raised this question: what theoretical model, what political ideal guides the way in which they conduct their political lives? Constant revolutionary upheaval no longer exists in the European communist states, or even in some of the older non-European variants. Nor does the literature on mass terror and totalitarianism seem as suitable for explaining what is happening as it did thirty or forty years ago. On the other hand, communist efforts at explaining the political model they follow hardly seem more adequate since they systematically avoid any but the most superficial analysis of their own political process. (For a typical Soviet example available in English see Shahnazarov.)

The question is important for two reasons. To understand more about politics as it is evolving in communist societies is interesting for its own sake. Also, for better or for worse, the "socialist" model of development is popular in much of the Third World today, and in at least some instances, the communist path to rapid development is likely to be followed, as it has been in Cuba and Indochina. It is very well to talk about the eventual emergence of a "classless" society at some future time, but when that future arrives, what will there be? What will replace the old-fashioned capitalist class structures that largely determine the political process in the advanced non-communist states of the West and Japan?

Recent debates, particularly among British sociologists, have asked whether or not there exist emergent class structures in European communist states. Is the intelligentsia preparing to become

a class in opposition, the forerunner of eventual democratization, as Frank Parkin would have it? (Lane: 92) Or, could it be that the working class is emerging to take such a role, as Giddens has proposed? (Giddens: 250-251) David Lane (92-101) summarizes these views and finds them inappropriate. The intelligentsia is a fragmented group whose key members are in the Party and part of the ruling elites. The working class has exhibited few anti-regime tendencies except, briefly, in Poland, and has almost no possibility of organizing itself as a distinct class "for itself."

I would like to propose that a fairly obvious, and familiar political model exists which not only explains some of the direction toward which internal communist politics are moving, but which also tells us something about the future evolution of whatever "socialist" states may eventually come into being. This is "corporatism," sometimes called "fascism." In order to show this I will rely primarily on a discussion of one case, Romania under communist rule. Not only is Romania a good example because it is a smallish communist state (it is more difficult to generalize from the giant cases, the U.S.S.R. and China, since one can never be certain that it is not their big power status which distorts this or that political and economic process), but Romania has also undergone very rapid development, from a largely agrarian, to an industrial society during its thirty years of communist rule. By coincidence, Romania also had one of the clearest, most original, and most stimulating corporatist thinkers in the 1920's and 1930's, Mihail Manoilescu. (Schmitter, 1974: 102) His writings today have little or no influence in Romania, at least officially, but many of his prescriptions for an ideal corporatist society are being followed to a remarkable extent.

To start it is necessary to outline the corporatist vision of society.

Corporatism as a Working Model

Manoilescu (1934: 176) defined a corporation as:

"(...) a collective and public organization composed of all persons (physical and juridical) who together fill the same function in the nation. Its purpose is to assure the exercise of this function, in the supreme interest of the nation, by means of rules and rights imposed on its members."

Corporations, in Manoilescu's ideal future society, would be based partly on economic specialties, that is, various branches of the economy would form various corporations. But they would not be exclusively based on economics, since, "(...) any other national function, such as those pertaining to religion, education, cultural, etc. functions" would also define distinct corporations. Corporations would not be selfish pressure groups like trade unions. Rather, they would be public institutions primarily serving the national interest. (Manoilescu, 1934: 176-177) They were also supposed to be unitary, that is, single corporations would include all those fulfilling a particular function throughout the nation. Manoilescu wrote that corporations would be "totalitarian," which meant, "(...) the network of corporations covers the whole nation and leaves not one single individual national activity untouched, that is not organized in a corporation." (1934: 182)

"Totalitarian" did not mean dictatorial. Corporate bodies were to be semi-independent bodies passing voluntary agreements ("concordats") with each other and the state to insure mutual harmony. (1934: 219-220) Corporations would select their own representatives who would combine at the top in a national corporatist parliament. Each corporation's numerical weight in this assembly would be based on the importance of its national functions. (1934: 337)

Durkheim's "Preface to the Second Edition" of *The Division of Labor in Society* (1-31), a work explicitly cited by Manoilescu, had already laid out the rationale of corporatism. Integrating individuals into occupational and functional groups would reduce anomie, class conflict, and the irregularities of the market. Corporations would

provide the necessary links between the state and the isolated individuals, thus remedying the great flaw of modern society which Durkheim felt he had particularly well treated in *Suicide*.

After Durkheim, corporatist theory went much further. Mussolini, for example, claimed that it was essential for Italy to become an "integral unity including all classes and categories of persons" because, "Italy was, in fact, a proletarian nation. The entire nation, faced by impostures and imperialisms of 'bourgeois' or 'plutocratic' nations, found itself denied sustenance and place." (Gregor, 1974: 176; Mussolini, XII: 323)

Manoilescu agreed. His work on corporatism followed his protectionist, pro-industrialization book, *The Theory of Protectionism and of International Trade* (1931). This study had led him to believe that poor, agrarian nations, like Romania, or Italy, Spain, and Portugal in the 1920's, were condemned to permanent poverty unless they closed themselves off from the world capitalist market, relied on forced, autarchic industrial development, and held off the interests of the major "capitalist" powers in the process. In his book on corporatism, Manoilescu briefly reviewed his economic theories (1934: 27-33) and concluded that class based divisions had to be overcome by national solidarity in order to permit a poor nation to undergo the difficulties of economic progress carried out in this closed, autarchic way. Nationalism and corporatism were thus ideally suited and mutually progressive. He predicted that the old industrial centres of Western Europe would abandon individualistic, anarchic capitalism and its attendant divisions and alienations. Western Europe had lived by "the exploitation of the rest of the world," but it would no longer be able to do this. Consequently, "liberty has become an obsolete virtue" and would have to be replaced by "organization." (1934: 46) Eventually pressure from the outside would force even the industrial heartland of Western Europe to abandon its nineteenth century ways.

Anti-individualism, rejection of capitalist market forces, and the wish to end internal class divisions

combined with intense nationalism, a program of autarchic industrial development, and corporatist organization were the hallmarks of fascist regimes in the 1930's. (Woolf: 119-151) It is not surprising that such an ideological combination should appeal to semi-developed countries advanced enough to suffer from modern class divisions, and to aspire to higher standards of living, but also in a situation which seemed to deprive them of the opportunity to advance and catch up to the richer countries. These were the kinds of societies Immanuel Wallerstein now calls "semi-peripheral" (462-466), those whose primary aim is to catch up to the industrial core, but who understand that in order to do this, they must adopt different ways of organizing themselves, and also repel the influence and economic market power of that core. In the 1930's the eastern and southern parts of Europe, as well as the more advanced Latin American countries and Japan were in this category, and that was where fascism appealed most strongly to local elites and intellectuals. Even Germany, which should have considered itself part of the industrial core, was sufficiently beset by economic problems, intense class conflict, and a feeling of international inferiority imposed by its losses after World War I, so that a kind of "semi-peripheral" ideology triumphed there, too.

What Manoilescu failed to perceive (though some other fascist ideologues, like Codreanu, the head of the Romanian Iron Guard, understood it perfectly well) was that the whole scheme for the establishment of a corporatist society was fraudulent without a thorough, violent political and economic revolution. Old elites had to be destroyed and new societies created.

In Italy, for example, "(...) the corporative system did not limit the power of the capitalists, whereas it sanctioned the power of the trade unions: the representatives of the workers were in fact officials of the regime. The corporative institutions had been utilized by the main groups to strengthen their hold on the economy and to stabilize the collusive equilibrium achieved in the oligopolistic market." (Woolf: 161) Horizontal

(class based) organization was destroyed at the bottom, but not at the top, so that vertical (corporatist) integration by functional category remained a myth covering up tightened oligarchic rule by old elites.

In societies that had previously been highly and unequally stratified, such as the semi-peripheral countries of eastern and southern Europe, the old elites were bound to resist the revolutionary implications of fascism, and to try to use fascist movements to their own ends.

In Spain, as in Italy, the revolutionary-utopian wing of fascism was used and discarded. Franco, in fact, eliminated the unruly revolutionary Falangists even before the end of the civil war. (Linz: 140-142) The supposedly fascist regime that followed repressed working class discontent for a long time, but it created neither a functioning corporatist structure, nor even the rudimentary beginnings of a "classless" society. (Linz: 175-185)

Even German Nazism, once it destroyed its radical wing in 1934 (Mommsen: 192; Friedrich: 246) failed to use its command of an effective police force and mass terror to carry out corporatist reforms very far. Instead, it dissipated its energies on the extermination of Jews, on war, and on trying to enslave the Slavs. (Mason: 191-193)

These examples could be extended to show that Salazar's Portugal, Peronist Argentina, Antonescu's Romania, and so on, failed to carry out real corporatist transformations. Some, like Antonescu, were not ideologically fascist at all, but like Franco, simple old fashioned conservative authoritarians. This ideological failure combined with the military defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945 discredited corporatist theories.

The Corporatist Organization of Communist Romania

Neither in its original Marxist form, nor in its contemporary elaborations does communist ideology sound particularly corporatist. In an official

Soviet manual G. Shahnazarov lists the various institutions that link the Communist Party and Soviet society: "Soviets and their executive representing the general interests of all sections of the society and specific interests based on territorial factors. Then, trade unions, various economic ministries, the youth and various women's organizations, the U.S.S.R. collective farm council, and others." (59) All these groups' interests are harmonized by the Party, which also deals with potential conflicts of interests between "strata" (a vague term which includes horizontal, class based distinctions, as well as professional and functional ones). (45) But the Party itself is specifically *not* supposed to be composed of formal representatives of this or that interest group. "Party membership is based not on the group principle but on the individual principle, and the Party is not the official representatives of different social groups but of people who subscribe to Marxist-Leninist doctrine (...)" (56) Thus a corporatist assembly on Manoilescu's lines would be ruled out in favor of a more direct, unitary coordinating body whose members are picked "(...) through a kind of natural selection (...) role in social production, level of political awareness, political activity, etc." (Shahnazarov: 57)

In contemporary Romania, as in the U.S.S.R., the state is guided by the Communist Party which is the unitary representative of all the people, though the "chief role is held by the working class." (Ceterchi: 613) There are, as in the U.S.S.R., various organizations (collective farmers, youths, writers, etc.) but the program for the future is an increasing homogenization of the social structure. This means, "(...) the liquidation of important differences between classes and social groups, between physical and intellectual work, between industry and agriculture, between village and city, the liquidation of antagonisms and inequalities, the realization of a community of economic, political and ideological interests of all working people." (Floares: 17)

It is not necessary to go beyond such superficial statements, or back to the Marxist classics to

find that they share, with corporatist theories, a dislike for class divisions, but for a different reason. Whereas the communist ideal is to eliminate horizontally based stratification (class differences) entirely, corporatists propose to integrate classes into functional, vertical organizations. This accounts for the communist emphasis on a more unitary party, as opposed to the corporatist assembly and the series of "concordats" between corporations predicted by Manoilescu. But in practice, how does a communist society like Romania organize itself? It is here that the resemblance to Manoilescu's ideal is more evident.

The starting point for any examination of Romania's social and political organization is to recognize that the primary goal of the government, and the Party, is economic development and rapid industrialization. The perception of international economic forces has led to conclusions similar to those reached by Manoilescu. Closure, autarchy, and forced industrialization in order to catch up to the more advanced economies have been the Romanian Party's program since the start of the 1950's. (Montias: 195-196) Today, they remain goals under the heading of "multilateral development." Basically this means developing as many sectors as possible rather than relying on specialization which might subordinate Romania to the interests of powerful trading partners. (Communist Party Tenth Congress) It was this perceived need to advance on all economic fronts, particularly in heavy industry, which caused the dispute between Romania and the U.S.S.R. in the mid-1960's. The U.S.S.R. had long believed in "multilateral development" for itself, but in the early 60's, it tried to get Romania to specialize in certain areas in order to integrate itself more thoroughly with COMECON. (Montias: 194-213) Had Romania followed such a program, its leaders feared, it would have been consigned to permanent inferiority, just as earlier, the more agrarian countries around the rim of Western Europe had been turned into poor primary exporters by the stronger capitalist core.

The perceived danger from big powers with their own, selfish economic interests justifies, for the

Romanian Communist Party, its emphasis on national solidarity. It would be dangerous to allow internal divisions to develop even if the Party recognized the persisting existence of classes and class conflicts. The point is that in this respect, Marxist ideology is not relevant. Development means national unity against outside economic and political forces (be they "capitalist" or "socialist"), and this necessarily implies the elimination of internal divisions.

Romania has not only adopted an economic stance that would have been favored by Manoilescu, but it has also returned to a form of extreme nationalism which would have appealed to Mussolini. The old racial-historical myths about the "Daco-Roman nation" have been revived, and many of the leading literary fascist ideologues of the 1920's and 1930's, such as Octavian Goga, have been returned to their pedestals. High birth rates have been encouraged so that the "Nation" would be able to hold its own. (Schopflin) All this has been consistent with the goal of national development at any cost, and recognizes, as did Manoilescu, that nationalism can unite otherwise hostile interest groups. It can also provide a legitimating force in a society, such as Romania's, that does not yet fully accept Communist rule.

This does not yet answer questions about Romania's internal organization. We can examine it by looking at various specific sectors of the society, beginning with agriculture, which still employs about 40% of the labor force.

In its early days the Communist regime imposed a series of agrarian reforms from above, more or less on the basis of dictates by a small political elite which was consciously trying to imitate the Soviet experience. This led to certain "shortcomings" and production problems, but ultimately, by the early 1960's, agriculture was almost fully socialized. 95% of all lands were in collectives or state farms. (Cernea: 91-109) Since then, the Party has tried to rationalize agricultural production and organize it more flexibly in order to overcome many of the problems caused by collectivization.

There have been many changes, but what is of the greatest interest for the purposes of this paper is that in the 1970's a system finally emerged that treats peasants and collective farm leaders as members of a legitimate, operating corporate group. Michael Cernea, one of Romania's foremost rural sociologists has written: (27)

"But, only a short time after the completion of collectivization (in 1962) the need was felt to strengthen this functional integration with an organizational integration. In other words, to gather together local village cooperative organizations into a cooperatist union on a territorial and national scale, so that there would be created suitable conditions for the integration of cooperatist agriculture into the entire national economic planning and development process."

A whole series of councils and assemblies from the village up were created with this in mind. Though the power of these institutions remains limited, they have been used in the 1970's to try to sound out opinions and provide suggestions relevant for the formal decision making process at the top. (Cernea: 272)

Nothing could be more natural. The unitary, Party directed state recognizes that unilateral decisions from the top in complex situations often result in serious mistakes. There must be a way to provide information and opinions from the bottom. So transmitting institutions have to be created. In the kind of political system which exists in Romania, such transmission belts can only be of two types. One type is a functionally based group of corporate bodies (in this case, agricultural cooperatives) linked in successively higher steps, with regional bodies, and topped by a national organization. The other possible institutional belt is the Party, which serves this function throughout the society. But the Party itself has become an identifiable, superordinate corporation, with its own regional branches, functional divisions, bureaucracy, membership, and self-interests. In agriculture, as in other branches of the economy, the Party's direction is formally recognized (Cernea: 154-158), but this has not stopped the development of institutional links between

cooperatives and the construction of an increasingly effective alternate corporation.

As it is in agriculture, so it is in other domains. Industry, for example, is organized on three different levels. First is the specific enterprise. Enterprises are then grouped in one of two ways, depending on the branch of the economy. Regional aggregations exist, but so do purely functional ones (enterprises engaged in the same type of work over the entire country). The third level unites groups of enterprises into specific ministries, for example petroleum, food processing, etc. (Herseni: 142-147) In wrestling with organizational problems in industry, the Romanian Communist Party has had to treat, in a very concrete way, all the theoretical problems raised by Manoilescu and other corporatist theorists. What are the most efficient and suitable ways of combining functional sub-groups? How can flexibility and functional independence be maintained against the need for overall integration?

These kinds of problems, common to all communist economies and societies, have produced a variety of solutions. Romania, as it happens, has an unusual degree of centralization of industry, even for a communist state. (Pryor: 358) Local enterprises have little power. Rather, intermediate bodies, groups of enterprises acting as "super-enterprises" share power with the centre. (Pryor: 361) The grouping of "superenterprises" into specialized industrial ministries permits the expression of their interests at the very top.

Other branches of Romanian life are equally organized in a corporatist way. With smaller, specialized groups such as research scientists, artists, writers, and university professors this is more visibly the case than with such large groups as "agriculturalists" or "industrial workers." Smaller groups have their own links with the Party that naturally oversees their activities, but they also have a certain degree of independence. Occasionally, as with the writers' union, they come into open conflict with the Party over policy matters. (Maier)

At all levels, corporate groups **are** solidified by having their own social institutions. Particular enterprises, or groups such as the writers' union or university professors operate their own restaurants, vacation rest homes, medical services, and recreational opportunities. These vary in quality with the prestige and importance of the corporate group. Thus, the special stores, restaurants, schools, vacation homes, and medical facilities of the Party elite are the best. But at all levels, even the lowest, it is difficult, often impossible for individuals to obtain specialized services of any kind except through their corporate body. Also, every such body offers a range of services even if their quality is lower for less important groups.

Though the original intention may not have been to create potential centers of opposition, this kind of organization creates a framework for a political system very different from the homogenized ideal of the Party. As long as the Party, and to some extent the secret police retain their characteristics as superordinate corporate bodies, lower level bodies cannot emerge as powerful participants in politics. But the existence of corporate groups that are legitimized, and necessary parts of the social structure, and the continuing solidification of such bodies over time means that eventually they may exercise a more important role. Efforts to rationalize economic production in Communist countries such as Romania invariably lead to greater reliance on these bodies as functionally important sources of information and direction.

The process of change has not been, and will not be smooth. Typically, it leads to predictable conflicts. Probably the most important involves disputes between "technocrats" and Party functionaries. This is common enough throughout the Communist world, and in the case of Romania, it first broke into the open in 1957, when the Party ousted Miron Constantinescu, the representative of the group urging more rational economic planning. (Jowitt, 1971: 172-173; Chirot) In the 1960's, however, the technically competent

intelligentsia was ascendant because of the pressing need for economic progress. Then, starting in 1971, a reversal began.

In the late 1960's "bright young men" (and women) had been sent in to replace Party hacks at various critical levels of the economy. The older, generally less competent Party functionaries were loyal to the Party as a corporate group, whereas the technically competent younger personnel tended to identify with the needs of the particular sector of the economy they were involved in. Therefore, even though both groups were in the Party, their orientation to the emerging functional corporate structure was quite different from each other's. This was extremely threatening to the old elite, not only on ideological grounds, but because their very jobs and privileges risked being eliminated.

The conflict eventually began to threaten the top man, Nicolae Ceausescu, who had briefly backed the reformers in 1965-1969 for the sake of efficiency. His power had always rested, however, on his control of, and loyalty from the Party organization. Many of the best educated technocrats, in fact, considered him to be an old-fashioned boor. In 1971, Ceausescu visited North Korea and evidently took inspiration from his "beloved friend" (his own words) Kim Il-sung. (Jowitt, 1974: 133-135) He returned to initiate a "little cultural revolution" that reversed the late 1960's trend. Party control over "economic managers and planners, technical experts, academic personnel, and literary intelligentsia" was reaffirmed. A number of key young technicians were demoted. (Gilberg: 76-80) Since then, a slow motion purge has occurred, and continues to work itself out. There are constant calls for "ideological mobilization" and emphasis on "ideological appeals rather than material incentives." (King: 16)

All this cannot, in the long run, change the reality of the situation. Gilberg (245-246) has pointed out that the partial return to ideological purity threatens economic growth because it attacks the very cadres who must manage an increasingly

complex, advanced economy. Growth further enlarges the size and functional role of the intelligentsia, and it becomes more difficult to sweep away discontent, especially since that discontent can be expressed (guardedly) through the corporatist, vertically organized groups into which the society is divided.

David Lane (92-93) has pointed out that it seems wrong to call the technocratic intelligentsia a potential new class that might provide opposition in Communist polities. He writes that the technocratic elite is in the Party, and hardly alienated from the system. Yet, it is undeniable that conflict between the intelligentsia and the Party has taken place, not only in Romania, but in other countries of Eastern Europe, in the U.S.S.R., and even in China. (For China, see Townsend: 303-304) Lane is correct in suggesting that the conflict is not an incipient class conflict in the normal sense, because the technocrats act as leaders of whole functionally specific sectors of the economy. That is, they are not a potential "new middle class" that might revolt against an established, "old elite". Instead they are a part of the elite that is trying to increase the economic rationality of the system. Precisely for this reason, in the long run, they are likely to have some success. They can raise complaints, not as representatives of a class seeking new privileges, but for technical reasons, as legitimate, recognized leaders of their sectors of the economy. The complaints may not be heeded, but whatever conflict occurs on these grounds retains a degree of legitimacy that an association of technocrats, banded together across industries, as a class movement, would not have.

Similarly, when intellectuals such as writers have raised protests they have done so through existing corporate bodies such as the writers' union, not through organizations that might in any way be considered class based. And because corporate bodies are such an important part of the society's organization, opposition expressed through them has been dealt with much more gently than cases of clear, old-fashioned horizontal organization such

as strikes by workers.

This is not very surprising. Corporatist types of organizations also exist in the non-Communist industrialized world. In fact, any large enterprise, a General Motors or a Mitsubishi, organizes itself internally in a similar, functional and vertical way. Large capitalist enterprises typically, and increasingly, provide many social and economic services for their members, as do Romania's corporate groups. The difference is that horizontal, class based organizations continue to exist in democratic capitalist societies, and only some parts of the society are organized as corporate sub-societies. In Romania, as in most other communist societies, everyone is integrated into a corporate structure, and horizontal, competing groups are not allowed.

Toward "Democratic" Corporatism

In Manoilescu's terminology the type of corporatist society which exists in Romania is a form of "state corporatism," that is, something imposed from above and subordinate to the state's interests. (Manoilescu, 1934: 92) The ideal which he preferred was a set of more independent bodies, and a state which ceased to impinge on their domain. (1934: 101) (Manoilescu never explained how such a transformation might take place, anymore than Marx ever explained how the socialist state would wither away.)

In Romania it is easy to foresee the day when the various corporate bodies will gain more power, and begin to assert their interests more effectively against the present supercorporation, the Party. To some extent, this is exactly what has happened in Yugoslavia. The "self-management" scheme has not given workers much power. But it has decentralized the economy and given particular enterprises considerable power. The Yugoslav Communist Party (or League) has remained the most important, powerful corporate group, but it no longer holds a monopoly of power, and open political conflict occurs between various functional, regional, and ethnic vertically organized bodies. (Broekmeyer;

Denitch)

This, in effect, is what "liberalization" means in the communist context, whether in Poland, Hungary, or even the U.S.S.R. and Romania. There will be no gradual move toward a parliamentary, party-based democracy on the Western model, but rather toward decentralization of the corporatist structure. The Party will become relatively weaker and elites in various key functionally defined sectors of the society and the economy will gain. (Korbonski: 197-198. Bauman, 1972, stresses the futility of analyzing liberalizing trends as movements toward Western types of political structures, and makes some of the same points I am stressing.)

The Romanian Example and the Third World

In 1945, when the Communist Party took over Romania (thanks to the dictates of the U.S.S.R. which occupied the country in the last stages of World War II) it was still a weakly developed, largely agrarian society. A comparison of the proportion of the labor force in various sectors of the economy since 1950 shows how Romania has changed. (*Anuarul* 1975: 67)

Percentage of the Labor Force by Sector

	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Industry</i>	<i>Services</i>
1950	74,3%	16,5%	9,2%
1960	65,6	22,8	11,6
1970	49,3	35,1	15,6
1974	40,0	42,3	17,7

Many other indicators show the same rapid change, from a relatively backward to a relatively industrialized society. In 1948, only 21% of the population was urban; by 1974 42,7% was urban. (*Anuarul* 1975: 9) Infant mortality (in the first year) in 1938 was 179 per 1000 live births per year. By 1974 it had fallen to 35 per 1000. (*Anuarul* 1975: 22-23) In the 1930's and 1940's, Romania was hardly better off than many of today's semi-developed Third-World societies.

When there is talk of "socialist" revolution in the Third World what is implied? In terms of

ideological pronouncements, what is normally meant is a combination of nationalism, anti-capitalism, and a pro-development, industrializing policy. A. James Gregor has shown that on the whole these stands are not inconsistent with the fascist ideologies of the earlier part of the century. (1968: 1974) But if one were obliged to point to a society that has actually developed along these lines, it would be difficult to find a clearer case than Communist Romania or several other communist states. It is therefore useful to look at a case such as Romania in order to judge the possibilities for that kind of development in the Third World.

The fact that Romania has come to resemble a corporatist society, and that it is likely to move further in that direction in the future, is important, because it suggests that this will happen in other, newer socialist revolutionary states. The essential characteristics which lead to this are:

1. Destruction of the old class structure, particularly old elites;
2. Determined, forced industrialization;
3. Need to maintain national unity while also developing flexible structures capable of transmitting information about the economy upward, and orders downward.

The difference between "revolutionary" and "non-revolutionary" types of development in the Third World is that in the latter, even among cases that claim some kinship to the corporatist model, old class structures and elites are not destroyed. This limits the possibilities for the growth of a rationalized system of functionally determined, vertically based organizations. Schmitter's description of Brazil (1971), Malloy's account of the corporatist experiment in Peru, and Linz's analysis of Franco's Spain all point to the same phenomenon - half-hearted creation of corporatist structures, organizational confusion, and the simultaneous survival of, and conflict between old and new interest groups, structures and classes. Romania in the 1930's was very similar to this, at a time when corporatist theories were in vogue, and an authoritarian but weak and ineffective

monarchy tried to impose a reformed system of organization on the society. (Weber) Romania in the 1970's, or any society that has made a decisive, revolutionary break with old structures and classes, is very different. For that very reason, it can move toward genuine corporatism that much more easily than a country like Brazil.

The irony, of course, is that revolutionary states are unlikely to claim, or even admit corporatist ideology as their own. Similarly, societies which do admit links with the largely discredited corporatist past, like Brazil, or better, Portugal and Spain until recently, do so only insofar as they are searching for ideological justifications of their conservatism. This has led to the paradox that students of "revolutionary" and "socialist" development patterns have largely overlooked the one established model of political and social organization that would help them understand and predict the direction in which radical Third World societies are likely to move in the future. It has also caused considerable confusion about the nature of established communist societies.

Manoilescu was correct. The twentieth century is the century of corporatism. But he was wrong to think that the weak and fraudulent corporatist experiments of the 1920's and 1930's were significant steps in that direction. Only since the fall of most of the formally fascist states has the genuine article taken root.

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