Beloning en allocatie op een informele arbeidsdeelmarkt

Samenvatting

Wage & job competition models from L. C. Thurow's Generating Inequality: Mechanisms of Distribution in the U.S. Economy (New York: Basic Books, 1975) are tested in an informal labor market, using questionnaire date from Dutch baby-sitters (N = 167). Analysis shows that wages & allocation depend not only on productivity of jobs & workers, but also on relation signaling, used to gain trust, avoid problems, increase motivation, & stem turnover. A selection model is presented, showing how rewards help govern the labor relationship: employers with high income offer money to govern the relationship, especially with well-educated sitters; less wealthy employers use other means, eg, homogeneity & social exchange, to retain their sitter. 5 Tables, 36 References. Adapted from the source document.