A. Schutz, P. Winch, suspension of belief, Lebenswelt, philosophical stance, misconceptions
Samenvatting
The recent influx of phenomenology in sociology is deplored. The works of A. Schutz & P. Winch are examined to show the objectionable consequences of the phenomenological perspective. The phenomenological critique of sociology is that the latter uncritically accepts its own relation to society. Phenomenology's alternative is to adopt "suspension of belief" as its starting point. The consequences of this position are: (1) the object of sociology is a social reality that is constituted on the basis of subjective meaning, (2) sociological concepts originate in the Lebenswelt, (3) sociology is itself a "finite province of meaning" within the Lebenswelt. By attempting to protect themselves against all interferences from natural sciences & various ideologies, Winch & Schutz have fallen prey to serious misconceptions regarding the natural sciences & to an unjustifiable optimism in phenomenology's power to defend one against ideology. Their philosophical stance leads to a conservative sociological viewpoint. Given the phenomenological conception of the relationship between science & common sense, phenomenology is unable to contribute to the growth of sociological knowledge. A. Orianne.
