A criticism of H. P. Gallagher's thesis ("Pretenties van protocol-uitspraken" [Pretentions of Protocol Sentences] Mens en maatschappij, 1975, 172-189) that the truth value of a statement could only be determined with the help of other statements. It is argued that in every empirical theory, the truth value of most propositions is determined by experimental investigation, observation, etc, ie, by human actions, & not with the help of other statements. A statement of which the truth value is determined only with the help of other statements cannot be but a logical consequence of those other statements; & it is well known that empirical sciences are not purely deductive. In empirical theories, one can discern alethic propositions (protocol sentences, hypotheses, etc), & ostensible definitions that are not alethic, & this methodological feature holds for sociology as well as for any other empirical discipline. Gallagher's distinction between protocol sentences of degree 1 & degree 2 is no distinction at all, since every protocol sentence of degree 1 is also of degree 2, & vice versa. Furthermore, a consequence of that distinction is that the conjunction of two nonalethic propositions would be an alethic proposition--a paradoxical result. According to that distinction, every empirical proposition would be either a protocol sentence or a conjunction of protocol sentences. This is obviously not true, eg, for statements involving theoretical terms. In Pretenties van protocol-uitspraken II. Antwoord aan A. H. de Wild, (Pretentions of Protocol Sentences II. Answer to A. H. de Wild) Hugh P. Gallagher (State U of Leyden, Netherlands) states several objections to Wild's criticism: (1) Empirical investigation, observation, etc are necessary conditions for determination of the truth value of a given statement, but they are not sufficient; verification requires the empirical information to be expressed into other statements--verification is a relation between sentences, not between sentences & experience. (2) To count protocol sentences as alethic propositions is unsatisfactory, because by definition any alethic proposition can turn out to be false, due to its empirical content; to function as a foundation of certainty, a protocol sentence must lose its alethic character & become immune to revision. (3) Gallagher does not distinguish between protocol statements of degrees 1 & 2, but makes a distinction between alethic propositions of degrees 1 & 2; an alethic proposition of degree 1 is any proposition that is the logical product of two or more protocol statements; an alethic proposition of degree 2 is any proposition that will be implied by two or more alethic propositions of degree 1; it is not clear why the idea that the conjunction of two nonalethic propositions is an alethic proposition would be a "paradoxical result." On the contrary, it gives the only satisfactory solution to the problem of 'ultimate verifiers'. (4) Statements involving theoretical terms have to be regarded as theoretical statements & not as empirical statements; theoretical statements do not interfere with the relationship between empirical statements & protocol statements. Modified AA.
