Theorie van het collectieve handelen (II). Kritische kanttekeningen bij de theorie van Olson
Auteurs
Lulofs,J. G.
Trefwoorden:
M. Olson's The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, J. Buchanan's The Demand and Supply of Public Goods
Samenvatting
Comparison of M. Olson's & J. M. Buchanan's theories of collective action (M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass, 1965; & Buchanan, J. M., The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968). Both authors fail to distinguish clearly between market & group relations. The implications for Olson's theory are explored. Three points of criticism are: (1) Olson's theory seems contradictory as a consequence of the author's formal definition of the 'fraction' of benefits accruing to group members; (2) certain assumptions limit the generality of his theory; (3) Olson's conception of 'rationality' is not consistent. Olson's theory being a theory of the free rider more than a theory of collective action, is of more limited validity than the author assumes. Fruitful application of the theory is to be expected where groups or organizations develop market analogous behavior in producing collective goods. This part of the theory is of major importance for sociologists. Small-group behavior, particularly where the collective good consists of collective property rights, is not explained satisfactorily by Olson's theory. 3 Tables. AA.
