

Theoretische beschouwingen

Some problems in the concept of the „proletariat“ J. M. Cousins

The two (most available) usages of the „proletariat” are, first, the Lockwood and Goldthorpe version(s) suggested by Lockwood (1) and subsequently developed and altered in the series of articles and books connected with the „Affluent Worker” project (2). The political perspective of these works may be described as Left social-democrat. The impetus of their work derives in part from the effect on the sources of Left social-democrat electoral support of the resistance of certain potential supporters to „proletarianisation” (3) and the apparent abandonment of certain sectors of existing support of „proletarian” life styles (4) or attitudes to work (5) or both (6). Their work also contributes an attack on unsophisticated determinisms whether of the vulgar Marxist kind or of the „tellies mean Tories” kind widely advocated in the early 1960’s (7).

The second usage of the concept proletariat is, of course, that of the Marxists, and especially Marx himself. Strictly the concept of the proletariat in Marx is not one usage but a complex of inter-related usages amongst which (at least) three main autonomous elements can be detected. They are not necessarily in conflict with one another nor can they be delineated into separate phases — Marx Young and Old — or separate intellectual interests — Marx philosopher, anthropologist, economist. The first of these elements is the proletariat considered as the social expression of alienated man: that is to say man denied the full exercise of his powers; or cheated of the reward of exercising his powers; of having the reward of the exercise of his powers used against him and finally ceasing to believe in his powers (8). The second element suggests that a social group exists which must be emancipated in action and not merely in thought; its existence is used as both a moral and political challenge to the Hegelian academicians of the Germany of the 1840’s and, by an extension of the idea of alienation from a moment of conscious-

ness or spirit to a social historical reality, it accomplishes the „inversion” of the Hegelian system (9). The third element is its identification with the victims of capitalist accumulation; yet victims who at the same time express a revolutionary political possibility that can not merely be turned against the system of capitalist accumulation but also achieve the „sublation” of purely theoretical academic philosophising in political action; and by engaging in a historical confrontation with the spiritual processes of alienation bring them to an end (10). Marx’s later works (11) attempt to unite these elements by identifying the epicentre of „spiritual” alienation in the core process of capitalist production — the generation of surplus value — thus „proving” that the resolution of the philosophical problem lay in social change.

But before considering the difficulties of comparing the two concepts of the proletariat closer attention must be given to inconsistencies within the concepts themselves.

1. The Proletariat in Lockwood and Goldthorpe

This conception of the proletariat seems to suggest internal inconsistencies of four different kinds.

Firstly, it is unclear what kind of a theory they are really advancing. Is their proletariat a classificatory type based on the loadings of particular groups or individuals on a series of variables? Some such idea is implied by outlining four types of worker — middle class, deferential, proletarian and privatised — in terms of positive or negative reactions on six variables — involvement in job, interaction and identification with workmates, interaction and identification with employers, interactional status system, occupational community and occupational differentiation (12). But in the first place these variables are hard to score simply positively/negatively (or in Yes/No terms). Next, if the score is conceded to be how much rather than whether how is the how much to be arrived at? It is hard to know whether these variables are intended to be characteristics of individuals, or groups or situations. For example they refer to the degree of „interaction” within a defined group or situation which is an objective characteristic of that group or a situation; while at the same time they refer to the meaning and value given to work, relations to workmates and employers and evaluation of local status and occupational distinctions by individuals (13). If individuals are to be measured then obviously very various reactions to the same variable may emerge based on different orientations or definitions of

the situation. In which case it is the orientations rather than the variables that are the true measure of the proletariat. Do these orientations find their source or merely their reflection in these variables? The classificatory type can only be rescued from this question by the use of an explanatory model offering putatively causal linkages. Yet it is precisely this conundrum that the classification type is designed to avoid (14).

Of course it could be argued that these types are not classificatory but ideal types. Indeed other schemata of theirs (e.g. the „working class perspective” and „middle class perspective”) (15) are stated to be ideal types. But it is extremely difficult to know what an ideal type is (16). Weber offered (at least) two not merely different but radically opposite conceptions of the ideal-type. In his essay on objectivity of 1904 (17), Weber denounces the idea that „the goal of the cultural sciences . . . is to construct a closed system of concepts in which reality is synthesised in some sort of permanently and universally valid classification and from which it again can be deduced” (18). Ideal-types are logical extrapolations of the various „one-sided” academic disciplines in which research is conceived. They exist to be abandoned. They are a preparation for a more academically catholic basis of research (19). They are the very reserve of his later ideal-types (20) which are extrapolations from reality (not academic assumptions or as Weber put it in 1904 „one-sided accentuation of one or more *points of view*” (21) — my italics); and are intended to be the basis of just such a „closed system of concepts” which Weber in 1904 had called „meaningless” (22). But to return to Lockwood and Goldthorpe: while their ideal types may be, as I believe they are, excellent statements of sociological assumptions about „class” these assumptions are not abandoned in search of „an understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move” (23). They are in contrast reified and ramified into types and subtypes with the ambiguous status referred to above, so we must assume that Lockwood and Goldthorpe are operating with „Mark 2” ideal-types. It is certainly possible to construct models of rational action on their basis and to see how closely human behaviour conforms to them. But while we can by this means show human beings to be more or less „rational” we cannot show the ideal-type more or less wrong. There is no way the ideal-type can be removed from the agenda (unless, I suppose, the divergences from the stipulated course of action were so great and so continuous that the ideal-type was struck off the list as being useless — but this would be to change from the methodology of verification implied by the „Mark 2” ideal-type for the methodology of discovery implied in „Mark 1”). The purpose of being an aid to discovery of ideal type Mark 1 can be used to protect the very

different „Mark 2” from testing. It is not adequate to say „the concept (of the traditional or proletarian worker) is of course a sociological rather than a historical concept” or to be coy about where examples might be found (24). But even if it was admitted that ideal types were subject to verification it would be hard to do. Since the ideal-type is a „one-sided accentuation” it cannot be expected to be fulfilled in all particulars. That was never in its character (25).

In fact in the latest works of Lockwood and Goldthorpe references to ideal-types have ceased. The ideal-type has become a model, or to be more accurate, two models of mutually inconsistent kinds. This brings us to the second major objection to their concept of the proletariat: the inadequacy of the causal models. The proletariat they conceive to be the association of certain categories of person (or role-holders, or function-performers or yet again, and differently, people who achieve a certain (unstated) score on a number of structural variables), with the possession of certain images of society, certain sets of loyalties and engagement in certain forms of action (26).

- (a) Action: Interaction \rightarrow Identification \rightarrow Solidaristic Action
- (b) Imagery: Network \rightarrow Community \rightarrow Class

Now, in the first place these causal chains change „level”. It is not obvious why necessarily a man in a wide network of friends will identify strongly with a local community of similar men and finally with all similar men wherever they may be; nor is it obvious why interaction leads to identification. Nor is it obvious why if the causal chains do operate through these levels in these ways that they run in the direction prescribed. Further, an image of society is said to be „an attempt to say something in symbolic form about experience of power and prestige” (27). But an image of society could be considered not as outcome but as an input. Obviously they have to come from somewhere but they don’t have to come from „experiences of power and prestige”, they might just as easily come from family legend (e.g. my own father’s stories about the armoured cars in Hammersmith Broadway in 1926) or being taught by an I.S. lecturer in one’s first year at University.

In the ideal-type-cum-model this problem of the relation of category and structural location to consciousness is attempted to be overcome by the sheer density of variables referred to. Abstracted from Lockwood and Goldthorpe’s work as a whole there is certainly a most impressive array. In the ideal-type situation where all are present it would certainly be extremely

perverse (though perfectly conceivable) for a man not to have the right dichotomic two-class power model of society and a propensity for industrial action. He would be employed by absentees accustomed to exercising arbitrary power; work in bad conditions; be subject to unemployment; work in a restricted labour market; be subject to sharp worker/staff status divisions; have no promotion prospects in the firm or chances of occupational mobility; be thought of as being low, dirty, etc., by the wider society; be geographically isolated; be persecuted or victimised in efforts to assert local power and dignity; be unable to belong to identify with a sub-group lower than that of the workforce as a whole; have little occupational differentiation; belong to the same unions; work long hours and work plenty of overtime; be little differentiated in housing; live in a one-class community with low rates of social and geographic mobility; have poor education and very limited entertainment based on values of gregariousness; be thought to live in a bad, low or dirty area by the wider society; have no in-community divisions of race, politics or religion etc. (28).

In a situation like this it would be perfectly plausible to argue that proletarian feelings would exist; but it might not be necessarily plausible to argue that these feelings would be reflected in action or that they would readily be transferred to a national or total-society level (rather than remain as local or regional rather than class loyalties). This is the problem of levels. Nor would it be plausible to deny that proletarian feelings could exist where none or very few of the variables were satisfied. This is the problem of conclusive causation. And since this is an ideal-type that is unlikely to be ever fully satisfied other feelings or images of society might exist even where many of the variables were satisfied. This is the problem of establishing what degree of saturation of variables is conclusive. If other images of society might exist alongside proletarian ones what would cause one image of society to be activated or applied rather than another? This is the problem of context.

At this point the two objections to the Lockwood-Goldthorpe conception of the proletariat mentioned up to now (namely its uncertain theoretical status and inadequate causal modelling) shade into a third objection or problem. Since Lockwood and Goldthorpe have advanced their ideas in debate rather than exposition a gradual change of emphasis in their approach has been concealed. The model of causation criticised above has been abandoned for another and rival one. In the beginning Lockwood envisaged class attitudes as emerging from work, market and status (largely status-at-work) situations (29). Later this broadened into an „economic, normative and relational” model (30) of causation for class feelings, i.e. a shift from

structural location causation to a mixture of structural location and value causation had occurred. In the first full scale report of the Affluent Worker project an attack on the „sociotechnical systems” explanation of work group behaviour from a Weberian position caused yet a further shift in the direction of value causation to take place with the introduction of the concept of „orientation to work” (31). The language of orientations — „solidaristic orientations” — „community oriented” is often present in the final report alongside the earlier mixed structure and value causation language (32).

In a recent unpublished paper by Goldthorpe (33), the shift to value causation or „orientations” is completed. In this paper Goldthorpe not merely abandons structure causation, he asserts that „institutions and social structure generally are nothing other than the product of action . . . the social influence of non-social conditions is always likely to be mediated through the definition of the situation of the actors concerned”. This stands in some contrast even to the steadily weakening structure content of the structure-value causation models of previous thinking (as for example where structure and value causation were linked: interaction \longrightarrow membership group \longrightarrow reference group) (34). It tends to make most of this previous thinking about the proletariat redundant. Orientations are group meanings; Goldthorpe allows for diversity of orientations; they will be differentiated in complexity and explicitness; a group’s orientations may vary over time; they may not be homogeneous (i.e. there may be rival orientations). Though admitting the problems that cause many advocates of the „action frame of reference” to retreat into neo-positivism, i.e. that orientations may be the result of constraint or socialisation thus resurrecting a vastly more sophisticated and indirect structure causation model Goldthorpe refuses to abandon value causation: men have a historical existence and a „projected” future existence which are not in any obvious or conclusive sense structure-determined.

This theoretical advance makes much of Lockwood-Goldthorpe writing on the traditional proletariat a nonsense. The „traditional” environment can thus harbour other orientations than the proletariat; the proletariat orientation can exist quite independently of the traditional environment. The causal linkages are all brought into question.

- (a) Interaction \longleftrightarrow ? \longrightarrow Identification \longleftrightarrow ? \longrightarrow Action
 (b) Network \longleftrightarrow ? \longrightarrow Community \longleftrightarrow ? \longrightarrow Class

It is a return to the Weberian position of 1904 and a methodology of dis-

covery. The consequences are extremely serious. A historical dimension is opened with which it is maybe hard to deal. Structures are made dependent on orientations, which themselves are diverse and constantly changing in weight as a basis for action. Each situation and action-context present a new problem. The basis for prediction is imperilled; the problem of coding when orientations are fused is raised. Above all causal linkage is threatened by a collapse into correlation without any explanatory drive; causation (that is „scientific causation” outside the systems of meaning and definition dependent on orientations which of course continue to provide their own „internal” explanations) shrinks into an empty, and purely statistical probability.

The fourth main objection to the Lockwood-Goldthorpe concept of the proletariat is the surreptitious introduction of historical assumptions into what is supposedly a purely sociological ideal-type without historical reference by the use of the word „traditional”. The communities where one-industry one-class work-involved interacting and identifying social networks are associated with political radicalism; dichotomous power-model images of society and industrial militancy are projected into the past. It is the unstated assumption that the proletariat is disappearing that enables the assertion of normative convergence by both working and middle classes on „instrumental collectivism” and the claim that the Luton Affluent Worker is „prototypical” to be made (35). It would hardly be possible to make such claims unless the „sociological” concept of the proletariat was made historical in a way they themselves admit would be illegitimate. If the proletariat as described by them had no historical existence „convergence” and „prototypes” could not be spoken of. But Lockwood and Goldthorpe make no effort at all to provide historical evidence for the existence of the „traditional” proletariat.

Nor is contemporary case-study evidence of any help. If traditional proletariats can be shown to exist now that appears to justify the concepts of convergence and prototypicality (though properly it could hardly do so unless these traditional proletariats were shown to exist at a historical point when communities now non-traditional were so as well); on the other hand if no traditional proletariats now exist the concepts are still justified since it can be implied that the process of transition is now complete. In short sociological verification of the concept of a traditional proletariat is impossible.

A corrupting effect of this type of argument can be seen in the discussion of trade unionism in the Affluent worker project reports. Low participation in union branches, hostility to union leadership and the trade union-Labour Party links is implicitly and explicitly compared to a time where a different „traditional” pattern held sway (36).

But as their own data itself suggests the past history of these workers is not of greater union participation, loyalty and solidarity, but rather of no union membership at all. The car industry was virtually un-unionised till the late 1930's and at Vauxhalls until the early 1950's (37). No evidence is advanced to show that members' participation in territorial union branches has ever been high; or that scepticism of union leadership or its links to the Labour Party is a new phenomenon. The only evidence of higher union branch participation quoted is drawn from craft unions (where branches perform different functions than in the general unions). Significantly the craftsmen in their own sample had much higher levels of participation suggesting that variations have more to do with differences in outlook and organization between craft and non-craft unions than with any decay of „traditionalism“ (38). Comparisons between like groups at different historical periods do nothing to support the decay of traditionalism argument. Comparisons between grossly unlike groups look scarcely more promising.

In this way a sociological construct converts itself into a historical assumption which colours the whole of the evidence. All non-„traditional“ data becomes a proof of transition (39).

2. *The Proletariat in Marx*

The Marxist concept of the proletariat in contrast gives the concept of proletariat a future, rather than a past, reference. It is just this, however, that makes the theoretical status of Marx's concept of the proletariat so hard to define. As Meszaros (40) rightly points out, Marx's work cannot be regarded as a model, since it is a revolutionary criticism of reality, not a description or representation of it. But Meszaros' own characterisation of Marx's work as an „open system“ (41) (by which he means no predetermined history is posited by Marx, only a set of relationships within which history must be conducted) seems clumsy. The point is, surely, that Marx, in the tradition of Hegel, provides a new reality with a complete and either new or transformed set of expressive categories. It might seem that a reality, or at least a reality-generating perspective, cannot be tested. This is not absolutely final though (a) because one reality may, somewhat artificially, be translated into the terms of another; (b) because the study of the proletariat is not confined to the attempt at verification; (c) because by pursuing a multiple-reality policy it might be decided on pragmatic criteria which reality was most convenient, or easy to handle.

As I have tried to indicate before, there are three main elements in Marx's „system” which are relevant for the idea of the proletariat. One is the association of the Hegelian conception of man as the self-master of his own development — „Nature”: a concept which includes the self-mastery alongside the process which is its result, i.e. that man's nature is to be master of himself; and of man as the creator of his own reality — „History”: a concept which includes the capacity to create alongside the creation, i.e., that history reflects man's creatorship and not merely his „createdness” — with *labour*.

„Man is a species-being not only in the sense that he makes the community . . . his object both practically and theoretically but also (and this is simply another expression for the same thing) in the sense that he treats himself as the present, living species, as a universal and consequently free being” (42).

And by an equivalent movement of thought the constant process of the Hegelian „system” — mediation, objectification, negation — is identified with the alienation of labour. „Alienated labour (1) alienates nature from man; and (2) alienates man from himself, from his own active function, his life activity; so it alienates him from the species” (43). Thus through work man is man — the master of nature and history. The alienation of the product and the process of work not merely denatures man; these products are appropriated by others and used to intensify the situation of alienation. The world is reversed — it is man who becomes the servant of machines; man who sees himself as a man not at work (where he is human) but at home (where he is animal feeding; sleeping; procreating) (44). This proletariat is described in similar terms both in the 1844 Manuscripts and in *Capital*, Vol. I (45).

Now such an idea of the proletariat is unspecific and the concept remains a metaphorical extension of a (primarily) philosophical (or to express it à la mode „ontological-anthropological”) problem. Marx himself appears to realise this and attacked both Hegel and the Hegelians for positing man as the master of nature and history — which involved concrete realities and relationships and yet at the same time being content with a merely philosophical exposition of the problem and the advocacy of solutions solely in the realm of consciousness (46). The consequences of Marx's attack for him extend both outwards and inwards. Inwards in the sense that Marx sees the philosopher as a „worker” just like any other. To describe a purely abstract freedom while not being free oneself is a manifestation of alienated labour; to advocate a purely internal „spiritual” release for alienation in consciousness is to intensify the alienation and mystification of philosophical labour.

„For as soon as the division of labour begins, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood . . . the consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power over us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to nought our calculations is one of the chief factors in historical development” (47).

Thus it is society which purposes the restricted role of the philosopher and frustrates his work. But if society restricts philosophical production it is only society that can release it. „The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular age presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class” (48). . . . „The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (49). Here the outward and inward consequences for philosophy of Marx’s attack on criticism coincide and co-produce a new conception of the proletariat: if philosophy requires revolutionary change for the realisation of its own otherwise alienated labours, the alienation it describes is realised in concrete social relations of alienation: there is a revolutionary class. The worker’s emancipation from alienated labour and the philosopher’s emancipation from alienated labour both combine in revolution that will realise both work and philosophy.

But why should the worker perform this role that Marx has as philosopher outlined for him as proletariat? It is the division of labour, which breaks the system of estates into a system of classes (50). Estates define *totally* the lives and existences of their members — they represent not merely the economic functions but the social, political and moral life of men, because they define not only the relationships of the estates members to each other but the various rights and duties of the various estates to one another and even to God. The division of labour separates economic functions — „the social relations of production” — from personality. Man for the first time — as philosopher and as producer — can see his powers for what they are. But with the continuous development of the division of labour, the „work” life of man shrivels and fragments. The conception of man as species-being now stands in radical contrast to man’s actual position in production as proletarian. Since man is no longer placed in the mystified relationships of estate-society to the power of the state and the law of God he can remake society by revolution at once re-establishing the power of thought, the power of production and the universal equal nature of man as species-being that the division of labour first revealed and then denied. The revolution thus depends

on a conjunction of three things: an extreme division of labour, a philosophical conception of what man's real powers are in contrast, and the means — technical, productive and organisational means — to realise these powers.

The final element in Marx's system relevant for a discussion of the proletariat was provided by the discovery that modern bourgeois economics like Hegelian dialectics centred on the role of labour. Marx argued that this system of production which depended on labour made labour its victim: (51) concrete labour being converted by the process of production into undifferentiated abstract labour; productive labour being converted by the wages system into commodity; the product of labour being converted by the exchange-system into surplus-value. Thus what began as labour to satisfy human needs ends as labour for the production of surplus-value which in turn fuels the further growth and intensification of capitalism. But this very intensification only universalises the proletariat, negates itself in increasing crises and creates the technical and organisational powers necessary for its own self supersession.

Summing up briefly the Marxist conception of the proletariat might be represented in the following way. Man has power over nature and history. This power has historically been concealed in mystifications — God, Kings, estates, etc. The division of labour vastly increases man's powers over nature by technology, etc.; and vastly increases his power over history by exposing human relationships as mutual interdependence and co-operation (species-being) not externally sanctioned and imposed hierarchies. The division of labour brings into existence a class which is both the product of the realisation of man's possibilities of production, and which lies at the centre of the production system yet which gets least reward and becomes the victim of the system whose possibilities it represents. In the proletariat the power of possibility and the negation of possibility are combined. Such a class has the motive, the means and the necessity to make a revolution.

Certain ambiguities exist in this framework. First of these is the idea of property which plays such an important part in the idea of alienated labour. Property is used in two quite different senses — the bourgeois economists conception of property as legal ownership and the Hegelian conception of property which stands in opposition to it — the conception of property as consciousness or personality „mediating” itself in the world by both making the world, and making objects of the world into an object of its will: „It (Spirit) discovers this world in the living present to be its own property; and so has taken the first step to descend from the ideal intelligible world, or rather to quicken the abstract element of the intelligible world with concrete

selfhood" (52). In Capital I these two conceptions of property exist in a sense side-by-side, in a sense fused (or confused) together: „The labour process is now a process which takes place between things . . . which have become his (the capitalist's) property" (53). Now the material means of production are literally the capitalist's property — the human means are not (even within the Marxist formulation which makes much of the reduction of the proletariat's freedom into only one freedom: to sell his labour) (54) except metaphorically. They are the capitalist's property only as objects of his will, an extension of his personality. Similarly: „these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their *expropriation* (my italics) is written . . . in letters of blood and fire" (55). Here property is identified with „guarantees of the means of existence". This formulation combines „ownership-of" with „right-to-the-use-of" as property. Property means not only possession or lack of possession but initiator or author of action and respondent or victim of that action.

Property in the Hegelian sense is essential to Marx for it establishes alienation of labour at a level deeper than that of mere absence of ownership (56). Yet it sits rather uneasily in his system: how is it conceivable (at the abstract level) that such property (or the contradictions and conflicts that go with it) can be socialised? Or, putting it another way, can property as reified creativity be exclusively identified with the proletariat and the revolution with the negation of property? And if property is not exclusively to be accompanied with ownership are not „property forms of labour" conceivable *within* capitalism that will secure for the workers' customary rights, if not legal rights, that constitute a „guarantee of existence"? Such possibilities, indeed, Marx himself seems to admit when he refers to the continued „ossified particularities" of labour (57). Thus the reification of the human power to create can hardly be necessarily, and still less exclusively, identified with the social contradiction of capital and labour.

A similar problem occurs with the universality of alienated labour. In the German Ideology it is the philosopher as well as the worker who finds his labour alienated (58). In the Poverty of Philosophy it is the bourgeois economist whose labour is „alienated" in the factual contradictions of capitalism (59). Repeatedly Marx refers to the proletarianisation of the bourgeoisie („one capitalist kills many") (60). Capital III is a sustained argument of the case that the capitalist is alienating himself from his own system (61). From first to last, from the 1844 Manuscripts assertion that the proletariat is

a class „which is not a class” (62) to his attack on a narrowly „standisch” interpretation of working class politics (63) the universality of alienated labour occurs in Marx’s thinking. Yet if, as Marx seems to suggest, alienated labour is universal how can it be exclusively identified with the proletariat (unless the proletariat itself becomes universal, which only expresses the difficulty in a new form).

The very richness of Marx’s analysis itself undermines the clarity of the causal linkages between alienated labour, the proletariat and revolution. If in the conclusive identification of alienation with the proletariat Marxism poses a problem for itself, an equal problem is posed by the conclusive identification of the proletariat with revolution. If Lockwood and Goldthorpe evolve slowly from a structure to a value concept of causation, Marx seems to evolve in the opposite direction. In the 1844 Manuscripts man revolts in order to preserve his own nature as a species being; subsequently revolt is more and more determined by one of the most powerful and least defined concepts in Marxism — „the social relations of production”. In the German Ideology and in 1859 Critique of Political Economy these social relations of production are determined by production: „The mode of production should not be regarded simply as the reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. It is already a definite form of activity of those individuals, a definite way of expressing their life, a definite mode of life. As individuals express their life, so they are” (64). „In relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production the mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life” (65). In Capital, however, a change takes place, the social relations of production are not determined by their relation to *production* but by their relation to *surplus value*:

„. . . . the concept of productive work grows narrower. Capitalist production is not merely production of commodities but something more. Essentially it is the production of surplus value. The worker does not produce for himself but for Capital. No longer does it suffice that he should simply produce. He must produce surplus-value. Only that worker is now productive who produces surplus-value for the capitalist and thus promotes the self-expansion of capital The concept of the productive worker does not merely imply a relation between work and useful labour, between the worker and the product of his labour but also a specific social relation of production, a relation one thanks to which the

worker is characterised as a direct means for promoting the self-expression of capital" (66).

In the first formulation the social relation of production is centred in the *process of production*; in the second it centres in the *process of exchange* in which surplus value is realised. A parallel evolution takes place within Marx's economic analysis. The theory of value advanced in Capital I is succeeded by a theory of growth in Capital II (67).

It is labour as a commodity in the market rather than labour as fragmented by the division of labour which is the centre of analysis in Capital. No retreat from structure causation is implied by the suggested changes: it is the recurring crisis of capitalism, the insecurity and uncertainty of capitalism that is pointed to rather than merely work under capitalism. But the links between the proletariat and revolution are made by this less direct and less confident (cf. „It is not the consciousness of men which determines their being, but rather their being which determines the consciousness“); (68) these links become less dependent on nature and more dependent on history.

This in itself points to a problem in Marx's conception of how the proletariat develops under capitalism. The proletariat is on the one hand subject to continual expansion and continual degradation. It is forced into revolt by sheer misery. In Capital the existence of a large mass of ancillary abstract labour „the reserve army labour" (69) is referred to. Other labour — nomadic followers of capitalist enterprise — is called „the light infantry of capital" (70) (e.g. railway-navvies). In the Communist Manifesto the workers are „reduced to the most simple, the most monotonous and the most easily acquired knack" (71). In the Manifesto, in German Ideology and the Poverty of Philosophy, sections of the bourgeoisie are envisaged as being expelled into the ranks of the proletariat.

But another version of the proletariat under capitalism also appears in Marx. In it the proletariat becomes not weaker but stronger, not more ancillary but more central to production under capitalism. The revolution is a shrugging off of capitalism as superfluous, not an overthrow of capitalism as an act of desperation. This view predominates in his later works (72) but it can be found earlier (e.g. „... the mass of misery, oppression, slavery and exploitation (grows); but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers and disciplined, organized and united by the mechanism of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has sprung up, and flourished along with it, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at least reach a point where they become

incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder . . . The expropriators are expropriated" (73). „Of all the instruments of production the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself" (74). Thus Marx offers no simple model for the causation of revolution. Indeed there is considerable ambiguity about just how the revolution will be carried through (75). Will the revolution be a world wide street fight on the model of 1848 or the disposal of an irrelevant financial aristocracy by an alliance of managers and skilled workers as in *Capital III* (or for that matter Veblen's „The Engineer and the Price System")? (76). The universal source of corruption can be seen as a mere „integument". The references to 1789 are displaced by biological analogies. The bourgeoisie that is pressed into the ranks of the proletariat is sometimes the small factory-owner, the independent artisan, etc.; and sometimes the „administrator" who takes over the role of „the functioning capitalist" (77) and the non-capitalist masters of production brought into being by the joint stock company.

Now it would be perfectly possible to argue that both versions of the proletariat could exist side-by-side in a historical situation but it would have to be recognised that such a diverse proletariat would be a highly disparate social force with very different interests and that only in very exceptional circumstances could it be united. A sketch of such circumstances and a massive attempt to restore the consistency of Marx's causal determination of revolution at the required philosophical, economic and political levels is provided in Althusser's concept of „over-determination" in which various levels of contradiction and contradictory social forces „fuse into a ruptural unity" (78). Nonetheless it is in the nature of such attempts that they admit the reality of what I have been referring to: an inconsistency in Marx's explication of the nature and position of the proletariat in capitalist society.

For a full exposition of this problem it would be necessary to refer in detail not merely to Marx's main theoretical works but to his history and social analysis as well (79). Numerous qualifications to the simple outline of capitalist development and numerous intermediate social formations are mentioned. But it is not this but the fact that two very different types of qualification and intermediate social formation are offered paralleling the two different conceptions of the proletariat which is most interesting. Marx suggests that the revolution can be delayed by inadequate economic development. But his reference to the smallness of the proletariat in the German Ideology (80) or the 18th Brumaire (81) can be compared to his discussion of the peasantry in the Civil War in France (82) or the Critique of the Gotha

Programme (83). In the first formulation all social groups will fall into the proletariat; in the second the peasantry remains a definite social force outside the organized working class and poses a potential obstacle to the development of Social-Democracy. Again, Marx refers to inadequacies of technical development — but the survival of outdated elements of the artisanate („manu“-fature as opposed to „machine“-fature) or a minority of former craft skills (84) can be compared to the fact that capitalism continues to preserve occupational „castes“ (85) and generates new forms of specialised labour (86) in order to commission competent servants. Marx displays a contradiction between the modern division of labour in creating specialised functions and modern industry with its indifferenced labour (87).

Though Marx condemns the failure of the proletariat to organize: workers face immense difficulties, later he rejoices in the growing success of combination. But later still Marx fears that, *as a result of successful combination*, these may become allies of rival capitalists; that a teamwork of great capitalists and their workforces against one another may replace the conflict of classes; (88) or that the allies of the capitalist may, to justify themselves, turn against their class-colleagues in the „reserve army“ (89). It was on the basis of just such an analysis of contemporary Social-Democracy that the Spartacists agitated. The political warnings Marx utters change: from stressing the error of a narrow conspiracy or engagement in Parliamentary politics from a position of weakness he stresses the structural limits of a purely „ständisch“ organisational approach to working class politics: the proletariat is in a minority and must convert other classes to its support, not rely on capitalism to do its work for it. In the first formulation the proletariat is steadily growing and there is no need to impetuously try to speed up history; in the second the working class has definite bounds which the proletariat must break out of to be successful, and avoid perhaps isolation or perhaps corporatist integration (90).

3. Comparing Proletariats

What so far has been argued is that the two theories of the proletariat here considered include both types of contents (and, as importantly, theories of causation of the contents), and considerable internal inconsistencies of content that make it hard either to identify or to examine the proletariat even from *within* the frameworks offered. It now remains to (briefly) compare the frameworks and their contents.

It is an obvious first point that the traditional proletariat of Lockwood and Goldthorpe is extremely unlike the proletariat(s) in Marx. These isolated, socially stable and homogeneous communities with their strong local value systems are, as John Westergaard has been almost alone in pointing out (91) *prima facie* extremely unlikely to be the vehicles of a universal, dynamic class-consciousness. Indeed they closely correspond to Marx's conception of „estates”. On the other hand Lockwood and Goldthorpe's „new workers” — privatised, instrumental, geographically mobile, socially ambitious, little engaged in gregarious social activity, uninterested in their work except as a source of pay are much more promising as a proletariat in Marxist terms. If Marx „inverted” Hegel's dialectic Lockwood and Goldthorpe would appear to have gone a long way to invert Marx's proletariat. Somewhat innocently they even quote one of Marx's descriptions of alienated labour to describe the attitude of their „prototypical”, „new” workers to work (92). If in one view their „affluent workers” have apparently come to terms with alienation and a commodity-evaluation of their own existence that may neither always be so nor may the deepening contradictions of capitalism for ever allow them to enjoy their instrumental satisfactions. Just as Lockwood and Goldthorpe have translated Marx's proletariat in their own terms and „disproved” it so a Marxist could translate Lockwood and Goldthorpe's post-proletarian man into his terms and „disprove” that. It is a quizzical corner to be in.

Certain contents do reappear — though in different ways, in different forms — in the different theories with which we have been dealing. But these are awkward of access. One is the phenomenon of alienation which, even if variables which purport to exhaust the concept are constructed, still remains elusive. Even if we accept, say, Blauner's characterisation of alienation (93) how do we set about operationalising „normlessness” or „self estrangement”? The next is that the proletariat is, in a sense, defined by action. Proletarians *act* like proletarians. But are all and only those who act like proletarians proletarians? Is it possible, on the one hand, non-proletarians act *like*, but not *as*, proletarians or, on the other, proletarians act *like*, but not *as*, non-proletarians? Thus the presence or absence of particular actions defined as those actions proletarians do (but how?) is no clue to the presence or absence of the proletariat. If such actions are being done they may be being done by non-proletarians (e.g. falsely-conscious bourgeois). If such actions do *not* get done that is no indication that the proletariat is not present. But how does one measure or explore *a potential* for action? Lastly the proletariat has a historical existence. But the historical dimension has several problems. One

is a methodological problem concealed as a logistical one — how much history and whose history? This can only be answered by reference to a theoretical perspective which addresses the researcher to a particular part of history. But, as we have seen, the theoretical perspectives would provide very different and internally ambiguous replies. References to history are also extremely liable to be a record of objective development (e.g. „The pit opened in X a major strike occurred at Y”) that tip the whole emphasis of research toward structure-causation.

The more central problems posed by the rival conceptual traditions of the proletariat remain. For any methodology of discovery the inversion of the proletariat makes a foundation inquiry difficult. To explore on the basis of the theory of the proletariat in order either to identify a proletariat more closely — to tie in the connotation with the denotation according to the precepts of „analytic induction” (94), or, more loosely, describe a situation theoretically, hits the problem that there is no field likely to be acceptable as a good ground for the proletariat which will be acceptable, and still less likely to be roughly equally acceptable, to the perspectives on the proletariat available. Now, supposing that problem to be resolved, no satisfactory description of whatever phenomena were observed could be given in terms of the proletariat since opposite specifications exist. It would, of course, be possible to construct a completely new specification on the basis of the phenomena detected. But this might be regarded as an act of desperation. The result of research practices like these would be denotative chaos; pursued with sufficient vigour this course would destroy all the rather limited common language of social research that exists (95). Other practitioners of social science of course would not let matters go that far. They would refuse to accept that a concept of proletariat could or should be born in a conversion or conversion-recognition experience. Once the definiendum was examined and variables were extracted comparisons would be made with existing proletariats at large in the sociological vocabulary. And on the non-homogeneity of the existing concepts the new concept would founder.

Now it also follows that the examination of the various concepts of the proletariat on pragmatic criteria are subject to a similar difficulty. Since the various concepts of the proletariat have different habitats there is no habitat that offers any better grounds for the „testing” of concepts on pragmatic grounds than any other. Testing by ease-of-use condemns itself to a series of purely separate individual results unless some one or set of locations are critical, and some neutral criteria of ease-of-use are established. This is not the case with the concept of proletariat. Given the existing range of usages,

the method of pragmatic application is rarely used to discover or to test rival theories. Research centres on verification by testing either findings (or relationships) drawn from previous research or constructed by axiomatic extrapolation from base contentions. Here it is necessary to refer to the ambiguities of causation found in both conceptions of the proletariat as well as dealing with ambiguities in the character of the phenomena they purport to describe. Two basic alternatives exist:

- (a) Structure (S) — Value (V) (i.e. Proletariat-forming structure results in proletarian feelings or reactions) with its obverse
- (b) Value (V) — Structure (S)

These alternatives are complicated by the introduction of action (A). The range of possible relationships increases: $S \rightarrow V \rightarrow A$; $S \rightarrow A \rightarrow V$; $V \rightarrow S \rightarrow A$; $V \rightarrow A \rightarrow S$; $A \rightarrow S \rightarrow V$; $A \rightarrow V \rightarrow S$.

Since neither conception offers any final definition of which causal chain or set of causal chains constitutes the proletariat (or the timescale over which the causal chains might be expected to work); since we do not know whether it is proletarian structure or proletarian values or proletarian action (or what combination) which constitutes the presence or absence of the proletariat it is hardly possible to think of „testing”. Axiomatically from a set definition it might be possible to „test” but there would be no reason why the proponents of the theory should accept the result of the test: they could always argue some other element, or some other relationship of the elements was the appropriate test (96). Nor would it be possible on the basis of the theories themselves to gainsay them.

But even this is to go too far. The problem of what contents S, V and A would have to be is similarly open to dispute. And even if this could be agreed it would have to be agreed what degree of presence or absence of the various contents would be taken as indicating the presence or absence of proletarian structure, proletarian values and proletarian action. And even if we could agree on *that* we should have to have a similar agreement for each of the specified variables of the specified content of the elements. And even if we could obtain such an agreement (which seems impossible) we would have to justify the arbitrariness of our agreement for it would, of course, be a political agreement arising out of a bargaining process and not a scientific agreement. Escape by means of an axiomatic extension of a base argument would be closed by the non-co-operation of one of the potential participants in the

bargaining process; even assuming that a base argument could be found. Finally, if agreement on a test was possible the result of the test could not eliminate the theory. The result of the test is a result of a test and no more. It would be unclear whether a situation is being tested („Is there a proletariat here?") or a concept („Can a proletariat of the kind prescribed exist in the prescribed way?"). We would have to have a further series of agreements to establish how many, and what sort of, situations would have to be tested to test the concept itself.

Another attempted way out would be to combine both theories in all their complexity; and produce an enormous array of variables. But it is the virtue of the theories that they establish meaning in the scoring of variables. The scoring of variables ceases to be merely such, and becomes a theory, only *within* a theoretical framework. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. And no matter how many parts we sum we cannot make the qualitative change to saying — „that is not a bundle of X's, it is an Y". Without a theory that tells how much and how many X's are needed to constitute an „Y" all we are left with is an enumeration of scores and a record of loadings on variables. It is true that certain correlations may exist between variables over long periods but we cannot identify these variables together as an identity without a theory; or at any rate a theory that tells us how much, how many and for how long correlations have to be maintained for an assertion of an identity to be permissible.

Personally I doubt whether any objective or higher-level scientific meta-language is available to sociologists. But it is clearly impossible to imagine this army of problematics being overcome in the case of the concept of the proletariat. The Weberian synthesis of the language of final judgment, of a body of scientific assumptions and laws and the language of „*verstehen*", of the subjects themselves, of „adequacy on the level of meaning" must in my view finally break down (97). But as I have tried to point out above those who opt for the positivist or axiomatic solution are themselves not escaping from the problem. Concepts cannot start nowhere — they start in existing theories which may be of radically opposite kinds, and contain all kinds of internal inconsistency, and causative ambiguity. Indeed „meaning", as in the case of the proletariat, may be a content of the concept which restarts the problem of translation which we were trying to leave behind.

4. *A solution for the puzzle?*

Now is there any value at all in the concept of a proletariat? The very fact that theories are not science but science-in-history; that theories are forced into an incestuous, from the „scientific” standpoint, relation with practice gives a little hope. The idea of proletariat does not exist in sociological or philosophical theory, it exists in reality. It is part of vulgar vocabulary: the uses it is put to there, the meaning it has acquired for its users — this is its meaning. Since other humans are the vehicles of this meaning (and not an objective interiority of the meaning; its scientific truth) and the sociologist is also human the potential basis of understanding and explaining the meaning exist. To adopt for one moment a category of Hegel: if reality (a usage, a practice, a word, a meaning) is regarded as „the negation of the negation” (98) research possibilities of a new kind open up. The negation of the negation must be understood in a double sense. The pure being of the concept — its significance at the level of a context — free scientific reality above all actual realities is lost and „negated” in the reality of its actual use and existence in history. Yet this „loss” is also negated. The empirical meaning is not a loss of meaning. The imaginary meaning has been exchanged for an actual meaning. The second aspect of the negation is that when a meaning is used as a pure possibility, an infinity of meanings that might have been used is „negated”. Yet this loss of possibility is itself „negated” by the actual use of a particular meaning. Sociological understanding centres on a negation of this „negation of negation” by restoring the abstract possibility in reality by noting what situations and what contexts call forth one set of meanings rather than another. There can be no return, of course, to abstract possibility itself but a vast extension of possibility takes place as the full extensity and range of meanings in a group or situation at a particular time is uncovered. No special significance attaches to a particular range or extensity since these are possibilities and not a closed vocabulary of meanings — another situation might alter, reduce, extend the range of meanings. The potential for new meaning is preserved. The negation of „the negation of negation” takes place in a second sense by restoring „the essence” of the concept, not of course as its unreachable interiority, but by noting the number of different uses a concept has in situations. Once again the content of the concept remains open-ended. No definite bounds to its use are posited. Its potential for new significations of its meaning is preserved. This *might* constitute a sociological understanding. A sociological explanation would consist of asking for accounts of why particular situations resulted in an appeal to

particular concepts with a particular meaning since by observation the same situation at other times called for other concepts; and the same concept in other situations had other meanings. Having established the vocabulary of concepts and meanings employed by a group or individual that group or individual can be asked to „explain” in its vocabulary the use of its vocabulary.

Contextually then a process of analysis could be carried on that made no claim to analyticity. The recognition that there is no „knowledge” but only ways of knowing could be consistent with, in a sense, indeed, the basis of, a social science. Thus the concept of proletariat could be rescued. In like manner social science need no longer be „hung up” on the search for a theory of reality. It could become the study of practices of theories of reality. The use of various theories of the proletariat could be examined in any situation. If we could no longer aspire to offering an explanation of class, of identifying it as „caused” by structure, or value or action we could offer a series of explanations of class each one of which would describe for itself its own relation to structure, or value or action.

Two lines of opposition to such a solution of the problem of the proletariat seem obvious. One would be the argument that like all phenomenological approaches it is essentially conservative. The other is that by coding realities rather than criticising them „false consciousness” would be encouraged. In the first case no limits are placed on what meanings can be used in situations nor are limits placed on what meanings concepts can acquire. Far from being conservative such an approach is oriented to the expectation of the unexpected — to sudden alteration of the reference conventions at work in a situation and to sudden alterations of the range and mix of meanings contained within each reference convention (99). In the second place the concept of false consciousness implies that there *does* exist a reality or set of truth-values in terms of which all other realities, sets of truth value or reference conventions can be transposed. It is of course true that the approach I am outlining excludes and opposes the existence of such a set of truth values — whether it be the axiomatics of ideology or the ideology of axiomatics. But in another sense „false consciousness” is recognised and criticised. Because a range of reference conventions exist any rigid adherence to only one and a refusal to abandon it could be regarded as a false consciousness both of the actual alternatives existent-in-history and in that situation, and of the infinity of possibilities that can be conceived of as existing in history.

The realization of this potential of possibilities clearly transcends the

sociological practice of coding and observing the practice of existing realized possibilities. Thus the legitimate challenge to philosophy posed in Marx's German Ideology cannot be avoided. The theory of criticism may lead to, and be fulfilled by, the practice of change.

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24. D. Lockwood, 1966, *op. cit.* p. 250.
25. For a discussion of these problems see H. M. Blalock, *Theory Construction*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall 1969, esp. Chapter 3.
26. D. Lockwood, 1966, *op. cit.*
27. D. Lockwood, 1966, *op. cit.* p. 249.
28. References are scattered throughout the works mentioned in Note 2. A suggestive summary of the right setting for the „bourgeois” worker given in J. H. Goldthorpe et al. (A.W.) *op. cit.* pp. 32-33 can be reversed as a summary picture of how the setting for the „proletarian” worker is to be conceived.
29. D. Lockwood, 1958, *op. cit.*
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31. J. H. Goldthorpe et al. (IAB) *op. cit.* 1968, esp. chapters 2, 3 and 7.
32. J. H. Goldthorpe et al. (AW) *op. cit.* 1969, see especially the advocacy of „openness” against the determinism of both the neo-Marxists and industrial sociology in chapter 6.
33. „The Social Action Perspective in Industrial Sociology”.
34. D. Lockwood, 1966, *op. cit.*
35. The idea of normative convergence appears very early, D. Lockwood and J. H. Goldthorpe 1963, *op. cit.* pp. 152-3, and is associated with „instrumental collectivism”. This theme is taken up again in Goldthorpe et al. (AW) *op. cit.* 1969, chapter 6. The historical assumptions are expressed most clearly in D. Lockwood 1966, *op. cit.* — note particularly the use of tenses in the opening pages. The conception of prototypicality to be found in IAB, 1968, *op. cit.* pp. 175-178 binds these two aspects of the argument together.
36. J. H. Goldthorpe et al. IAB, *op. cit.* 1968, pp. 106-107.
37. See for example, a Solidarity Group pamphlet *The Truth about Vauxhalls*, n.d.
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 48. Bottomore and Rubel, 1956, *op. cit.* p. 79.
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 50. This outlined in Section C of *The German Ideology* (C. J. Arthur, ed., *op. cit.*).
 51. This analysis was first begun in Marx, „*The Poverty of Philosophy*”, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1955, which was written at the end of 1846 and inaugurated a series of more strictly economic works which culminated in *Capital*, *op. cit.*
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 53. *Capital I*, p. 185.
 54. „Communist Manifesto” in *Selected Works*, *op. cit.* pp. 37-41.
 55. Bottomore & Rubel, eds. 1956, *op. cit.* p. 134.
 56. See especially, EPM 1844 (C. J. Arthur, ed., *op. cit.*) pp. 106-128. Marx was obviously aware of this ambivalence of meaning: In *The German Ideology*, p. 101, he satirises Stirners refutation of Communism by accusing him of saying that men will always „have” stomach-aches. Yet his own use of property in the EPM 1844 is precisely analogous to that of Hegel, *op. cit.* pp. 502-505 who attacks the idea of the personality as encapsulated or restricted in its creative powers by „rights”: „Consciousness of right . . . even in the very process of making its claim good, experiences the loss of its own reality . . . to describe an individual as a ‚person’ is to use an expression of contempt”. Hegel views the result of man's creative effort as his „property”, as integral to his personality. But this does not justify the conventional notion of property and personal rights; indeed this view constitutes a radical critique of these notions. Marx in regarding property as „alienated labour” was developing Hegel's views and not, as he thought, rejecting them, see H. Lefebvre: *Dialectical Materialism* London, Cape 1968.
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73. *Capital I*, p. 763.
74. *Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 151.
75. See the great debate at the turn of the century which involved Lenin, Luxemburg, Kautsky and Bernstein. Or a more recent attempt to disprove Marx's Jacobinism: S. Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Cambridge, C.U.P. 1968, esp. chapters 7 and 8.
76. Thorstein Veblen: *The Engineer and the Price System*, New York, Huebsch 1921.
77. *Capital III*, p. 427.
78. L. Althusser, „Over-Determination”, *New Left Review*, 41, p. 22. Althusser suggests the Russian revolution of 1917 as an example of „ruptural unity”. In fact the Russian working-class were a minority who took power in a vacuum and maintained it only at the price of their self-destruction, see Isaac Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution*, London, O.U.P. 1967. A better example of a revolutionary ruptural unity though hardly of a kind to help Althusser's analysis might be the Nazi takeover in 1933, see D. Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967.
79. Especially „The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon”, *Selected Works* pp. 95-180.
80. *German Ideology* (C. J. Arthur, ed.) pp. 50, 80, 89.
81. *Selected Works*, p. 103.
82. *Selected Works*, pp. 296-297.
83. *Selected Works*, p. 326.
84. *Capital I*, pp. 459-480; Bottomore (ed.), *Marx's Early Writings*, p. 77.
85. Bottomore and Rubel (eds.) *op. cit.* pp. 154-155.
86. Bottomore & Rubel, (eds.) *op. cit.* p. 252.
87. E.g. *Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 125, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 338.
88. *Selected Works*, p. 76.
89. *Capital I*, p. 639.
90. This fear is clearly expressed in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*; Marx refers to the creation of separate groups among the proletariat e.g. factory managers, *Capital I*, p. 332, and workers on different machines or who run them as opposed to mind them, *Capital I*, p. 420. Marx sees that the increasing productivity of labour may mean a possible diminution

- of the number of actual workers, *Capital III*, pp. 256 and 258, and a consequent expansion of „unproductive employment of a larger and larger part of the working class”, e.g. domestic servants, Bottomore and Rubel, *op. cit.* pp. 189-190.
91. John Westergaard, „The Withering away of class: a contemporary Myth”, *Towards Socialism*, London, Fontana, 1965, pp. 77-113, esp. p. 107.
 92. John H. Goldthorpe et al. (A. W.) p. 180.
 93. R. Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom*, Chicago U.P. 1964.
 94. See F. Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology*, New York, Farrer & Reinhart, 1934.
 95. A problem admitted by Cicourel: *Method and Measurement in Sociology*, New York, Free Press, 1964, esp. chapter 1.
 96. This is a defect of operationalising sociological theory and expliciting in exact quantifiable terms, see H. L. Zetterberg: *On Theory and Verification in Sociology*. New Jersey, Bedminster, 3rd edition, 1965; D. Willer, *Scientific Sociology*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall 1967; Blalock and Blalock, *Methodology in Social Research*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968; H. M. Blalock, „The Formalisation of Sociological Theory” in McKinney and Tiryakian, *op. cit.* pp. 271-300; and H. M. Blalock, *Theory Construction*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1969.
 97. See an important paper by Michael Stant of the University of Durham, unpublished, 1971: John Rex and Peter Winch, „The Strange Fate of Weberian Sociology”.
 98. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, Vols. I and II, transl. Johnston and Struthers, London, George Allen & Unwin 1929.
 99. In a different context Marx defends the idea of the dialectic in a similar way, while condemning its conservative, Hegelian, mystified form. Afterword to Second German Edition of *Capital I*, pp. 19-20.