

A Typology of Value Orientations*

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1. *The study of values*

In clarifying the specific concern of this paper, it may be helpful to start with an indication of sociologists' various interests in regard to values and to give examples of some of the more recent work that has been done on these various aspects. The contributions by Rose (1), von Mering (2) and Kelman (3) are relevant to such an ordering of the field, but they are not definitive. Adapting some of the distinctions of these writers, I would suggest that sociological work on values can be classified as belonging to one or more of the following six concerns or categories:

(i.) Attention is given in almost all writings on values to the clarification of the conceptual content of the term, also in distinction of related concepts such as attitude, interest, goal, belief and ideology. The nature and function of values was made the specific concern of analyses by, amongst others, Kluckhohn (4), Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (5), and Joubert (6).

(ii.) Accepting the existence of phenomena called *values*, quite a number of social scientists have constructed lists, fields, classifications, categories or typologies of possible values. All these classifications spell out, as von Mering (7) says of his own classification, 'the possible content of the world of

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open values within which valuing takes place'. Among the better known classifications, or analytical principles used for the classification of values, are: the pattern alternatives of Parsons (8), F. Kluckhohn's variant value orientations (9), C. Kluckhohn's value emphases (10), Sorokin's culture mentalities (11), Riesman's conformity types (12), Morris's *Paths of Life* (13), Allport-Vernon-Lindsey's *Study of Values* (14), Dodd's classification (15), White's *Value Analysis* (16), Lipset's value patterns of democracies (17), Fallding's five types of values (18), and Von Mering's four value realms (19).

(iii.) The logical postulation of possible values should not be confused with the empirical identification of such values among selected populations. The great variety of research procedures and techniques developed and applied to ascertain the values really held by people is aptly demonstrated by the fact that the wellknown Comparative Study of Values in Five Cultures conducted by Harvard's Laboratory of Social Relations did not demand commitment on the part of its field workers to a single research design (20). An analysis (21) of the application in empirical research of the classifications mentioned in (ii.) above justifies the generalization that the two techniques most generally utilized are content analysis and questionnaires in which respondents have to react to value-statements or value-situations.

(iv.) In the theoretical explanation of social phenomena sociologists have repeatedly argued, and proved empirically, that values are decisive variables. All sociological interpretations correlating values with other variables in the explanation of social patterns are of course relevant here. But so is the entire Weber-Parsons-Marx-Dahrendorf (22) debate. An intriguing study subjecting this century-old theoretical question about the relative importance and functionality of values and interests to empirical research was published in 1965 by Sister Marie Augusta Neal (23).

(v.) A fifth concern of sociologists with values antedates even the values versus interests debate: it is the discussion about the influence of the sociologist's social values on his theorizing and research. If methodological sophistication has done much to bring greater clarity to this turbid area, recent publications such as Gouldner's *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (24) and Friederich's *A Sociology of Sociology* (25) may well succeed in reopening the debate.

(vi.) A last area concerning values in which sociologists are involved and in which discussion needs no revitalizing by Gouldners, is the sociologist's role in social policy and social action. For sociologists who read Afrikaans, Roode (26) has written a substantial summary of relevant viewpoints and it is of some sociological significance that the South African Sociological So-

ciety has chosen as the theme of its 1973 congress: The Professionalization of Sociology (27).

These being the areas of interest in values that sociologists have cultivated with varying degrees of productivity, the present paper boldly offers itself as a contribution to concern no. (ii.). It is a proposal for a new typology of values or as I prefer to call them, value orientations. In answer to the valid, though somewhat spoil-sporting, question of *why another classification* of value orientations, I would submit the following considerations: new typologies, like new theories and new car models cannot be rejected solely because we already have so many typologies, theories and makes of cars. Again like theories and cars, the worth of typologies must in the end be determined by their functionality — which means that a final appraisal of the proposed typology must await the presentation of empirical data. More important are the objections that some of the existing classifications of value orientations are either mere lists of items referring to value contents not generally applicable outside the population or situation for which it was designed, or presuppose a conception of value orientations which differs from my own. I have elsewhere (21) analyzed and criticized the first 9 classifications mentioned in (ii.) above. I can here but generalize: (a.) that some of these classifications relate to attitudes or interests or other behavioural components which I do not conceive of as being value orientations; (b.) that, with the exception of the Parsonian pattern-alternatives, these classifications were not derived from explicit theoretical principles; and (c.) that the majority of them are mere classifications and not typologies which I understand to be logically integrated and logically exhausting classifications.

It follows from these remarks that I must make my own conception of value orientations explicit before a typology is developed.

2. *The nature of value orientations*

Value orientations may be defined as conceptions of what is generally desirable in social action and relations. Such a definition allows for the distinction of (a.) *value* statements from (b.) *existential* statements such as 'I am wealthy' and (c.) *cathectic* statements such as 'I should like to be rich'. Statements such as 'Striving after wealth should be discouraged' or 'People should be encouraged to become capitalists' clearly belong to a different logical category. In both these sentences the element of desirability is ex-

plicit and dominant. This makes them statements or expressions of value orientation.

Given desirability as the primal quality of value orientations, the specification *in social action and relations* relates a value orientation in the most ordinary instance to a situation where two people are involved in a social relationship or the one (merely) reacts to the other. The specification thus confirms the essentially social nature and social implications of value orientations and also allows for a distinction between value orientations and attitudes. I would suggest that the term *attitude* be reserved for orientations which are primarily cathectic in nature, which do not necessarily or primarily affect a person's action or relations vis-à-vis others; orientations that do not primarily concern desirability in interpersonal relations. The distinction is disputable and I am well aware of the psychological intricacy of attitudes and value orientations in empirical cases. The distinctive quality of value orientations should, however, become clear when these conceptions of the desirable are given operational content in the developed typology.

It is a theoretical assumption that values are general principles, which work directly in people's decisions in, commitment to and justification of social actions and relations.

When a particular mode of action or relationship is considered by a person as desirable, it does not imply that this action or relationship is necessarily the one which he, in terms of his interests or need dispositions, wishes or desires. Also it is not assumed that he will consistently want to or be able to act according to this principle; nor that the intensity of his commitment to the directive principle is constant. It is assumed, however, that adults hold single and patterns of general directive principles that can be identified; that these principles are basic to the normative orientations and actions of the personalities concerned; and that these principles can be so specified and identified that they can be used as strategic sociological and social-psychological variables in the description and explanation of social behaviour.

Again, it is not claimed that value orientations are the most important single considerations in decisions, commitments and/or justifications in social behaviour. But value orientations are conceptualized as being the *most general* normative considerations. The qualification that value orientations only form one component of a person's total orientation to situations, suggests three different research objectives and designs: (a.) The determination of what people's value orientations in fact are; (b.) Process analysis in which

the role of value orientations in a person's total orientation, his decisions, commitments and justifications is determined; (c.) The correlation of value orientations with other variables. It should be obvious that process analysis (b.) is the most exacting of the three types of research.

The question: which value orientations are possible? is a theoretical question which has to be answered theoretically. The question: which value orientations are present in particular individuals or collectivities? is, on the contrary, an empirical question which has to be answered by empirical research. If any of the value orientations postulated in a typology developed on theoretical assumptions and logical argument, do not empirically appear in a particular universe, this does not invalidate the typology. It does, however, mean that at least part of the typology is not meaningful to the particular universe. Here again the difference but also the interdependence of logical and empirical considerations must be borne in mind.

3. Theoretical assumptions in the construction of a field of value orientations

The construction of a typology of value orientations as conceptualized above requires (a.) the explication of definite theoretical assumptions or principles relevant to the plotting of the *field* of (possible) value orientations, and (b.) a specification of the *level of abstraction* of the value orientations concerned. Our definition speaks of conceptions of what is *generally* desirable, but *generally* is of course a relative concept. The content given to *value orientations* in the previous paragraph does not by itself answer the question whether these conceptions of the desirable are formulated for application to the whole of humanity, total societies, ethnic groupings, institutional spheres or role complexes. Obviously such specification of the level of abstraction relates logically to the theoretical principles used in the construction of the field and any decision concerning (a.) above has implications for (b.) We shall, however, leave problem (b.) until the next paragraph.

The first theoretical assumption or principle used in the typology can now be explained: as value orientations are conceptions of the desirable within the total area of social action and relations, the specification of particular value orientations can be achieved by ordering this total area into subareas. A meaningful theoretical principle for such a division or differentiation is

the four system problems or basic functional categories developed by T. Parsons. Without necessarily committing ourselves to all the intricacies that Parsons has evolved around these categories, we accept that *Integration*, *Pattern Maintenance*, *Adaptation* and *Goal Achievement* are the most important and general problem complexes in the total field of social action and relations. These four complexes, then, represent the first principle in the ordering of the field and thus the categorization of value orientations. The four functional categories give us four main categories of value orientations.

Our argument for this linkage is relatively simple: value orientations being directive principles in people's social decisions, commitments and justifications, it can be accepted that these processes will be maximally activated when behaviour and relations become problematic. Put differently, it seems logical to assume that problems in social relations activate value orientations and therefore to categorize value orientations in terms of these basic problems. It is perhaps necessary to emphasize that we consciously use a *theoretical* principle for the first or horizontal structuring of the field of value orientations and that our focus on the problematic aspect of relations rather than on the content or structural aspect, distinguishes our typology from all those more conventional ones which differentiate value orientations in terms of institutional content, postulating economic, religious, kinship, educational, political and other such values. We submit that the lists of such institutional values can hardly ever be closed and that such classifications have a more limited applicability.

The content which we, for our purposes, give to the four problem complexes, can be stated as follows: *Integration* refers to problems of solidarity amongst people, problems concerning the establishment, maintenance and discontinuation of interpersonal relations. In this problem area tension and strain are occasioned by confrontations among personalities and between personalities and collectivities. *Pattern Maintenance* refers to problems of maintaining, changing and abandoning of normative patterns. In this area tension and strain come about because of the non-mechanical nature of committedness and conformity to normative patterns and the relative degree of freedom in the interpretation of these patterns. *Adaptation* refers to the problem of adaption to external conditions. Here tension and strain originate because there is no easy adjustment to environments and because man can decide to change his orientation or need dispositions, the environ-

ment, or both, to ensure a better 'fit'. *Goal achievement* is self-explanatory. Here tension and strain develop because of a break in time and/or means between what people want and what they have.

The introduction of a second theoretical assumption makes possible the 'vertical' division of the four 'horizontal' subareas. We assume, theoretically, that social engagement allows for the differentiation of four dimensions: social *Time*, social *Space*, social *Movement* and social *Involvement*. It is accepted that in decisions, commitment and – justification relevant to what is considered desirable in all four *problem areas*, value orientations relating to all four *dimensions* are necessary and that each of the areas of Integration, Pattern Maintenance, Adaptation and Goal Achievement therefore have to be subcategorized to provide for orientations relevant to social *Time*, *Space*, *Movement* and *Involvement*.

Before further explication of the four dimensions, it is convenient to state the third and last theoretical principle in the construction of the typology: the formulation of value orientations as *dichotomous choices*. Irrespective of the meaning that can be attached to the terms chosen to indicate the extreme positions, we conceptualize them as opposites and for the purposes of the application of the typology as mutually exclusive.

The substance of social *Time* as a basic dimension of social engagement is given in the possibilities of past, present or future emphases or orientations in interpersonal relations. If we take into account only two possibilities at a time (past or present, present or future) 4 dichotomies of value orientations and 8 unitary value orientations relevant to social *Time* can be distinguished:

EXCLUSIVENESS (ITa) vs. INCLUSIVENESS (ITz)

TRADITIONALISM (PTa) vs. SITUATIONISM (PTz)

ACQUIESCENCE (ATa) vs. REFORM (ATz)

SHORT-TERM-OBJECTIVES (GTa) vs. LONG-TERM-OBJECTIVES (GTz)

The dimension of social *Space* refers to the range of social engagement. Relevant to this range are decisions on the degree of committedness to collectivities, the homogeneity/heterogeneity of social solidarity, autonomy/independence of other people. Provision must also be made for projections or references to a transcendental space. Four dichotomies and 8 unitary value orientations relevant to social *Space* can be distinguished:

INDIVIDUALISM (ISa) vs. COLLECTIVISM (ISz)

PLURALISM (PSa) vs. UNIFORMITY (PSz)
TRANSCENDENTALISM (ASa) vs. SECULARISM (ASz)
INTERDEPENDENCE (GSa) vs. AUTONOMY (GSz)

The dimension of social *Movement* refers to people's mutual acceptance/non-acceptance. Transposed to the level of value orientations, this dimension demands principles or conceptions of desirability to give direction in these, essentially, sociometric choices. Four dichotomies and 8 unitary value orientations relevant to social *Movement* can be distinguished:

ASCRIPTION (IMa) vs. ACHIEVEMENT (IMz)
TOLERANCE (PMa) vs. CONFORMITY (PMz)
PARTICULARISM (AMa) vs. UNIVERSALISM (AMz)
IDEALISM (GMa) vs. PRAGMATISM (GMz)

The dimension of social *Involvement* refers to energy output or a passive/active orientation in social engagements. Four dichotomies and 8 unitary value orientations relevant to social *Involvement* are distinguished:

DISCIPLINE (II_{na}) vs. SATISFACTION-OF-SELF (II_{nz})
PERFECTIONISM (PI_{na}) vs. INDIFFERENCE (PI_{nz})
DILIGENCE (AI_{na}) vs. CAREFREENESS (AI_{nz})
PLANNING (GI_{na}) vs. LAISSEZ-FAIRE (GI_{nz})

The paradigm shows the location of 16 dichotomies and 32 unitary value orientations within the entire field, derived by the logical intersection of the four problem complexes and the four dimensions of social engagement.

It must be stated explicitly that we do not make any assumptions about the inter-connectedness of the respective dichotomies or unitary value orientations. Patterns of value orientations have to be determined empirically.

The definitions of value orientations (28) are formulated in strict accordance with the conceptual content given to problem complexes and dimensions of social engagement. Dictionary and conventional definitions of the terms we have chosen are not really relevant. The connotations of the terms remain dependent on the theoretical context based on the three theoretical principles.

4. Levels of abstraction in value orientations

The problem of the level of abstraction stated at the beginning of the pre-

vious paragraph, can now be given attention. The question is this: for what range of action and relations is a particular value orientation a generalized conception of what is desirable? The work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (5), and Neil Smelser (29) is not only relevant to this question but of great help. If acquaintance with these publications can be taken for granted, the following generalizations concerning the level of abstraction of the proposed typology, should be intelligible.

We view the 32 unitary value orientations as relevant to all spheres of social action, and the developed typology as applicable to all societies, irrespective of their social and cultural differences – as Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck do with regard to the value orientations that they distinguish. In terms of Smelser's levels of specificity, the proposed typology can be said to represent 'societal values'. Smelser's second level of specificity is that of institutional sectors or spheres. We are aware that T. Parsons has suggested that there is a more direct relation between particular institutional complexes and particular functions, between e.g. politics and Goal Achievement, economy and Adaptation, etc. We would, however, not advise for these correlations to be taken to extremes. Our typology is definitely applicable to a particular institutional complex but we would insist that all four problem complexes and all four dimensions of engagement remain valid and relevant, which means that to any one institutional complex all of the 32 unitary value orientations apply, or, are theoretically possible.

There can, furthermore, be no objection to any attempt to apply the developed typology to the more specific levels differentiated within the value component of action as given by Smelser. The validity and meaningfulness of the typology for collectivities of varying range (societies, communities, groups, etc.) are not problematical, at least not logically or theoretically so, if the unitary value orientations are indexed or operationalized in the form of *value statements* to which *individuals* have to react. I have developed such a test containing 64 value statements and first results have brought relative assurance on the meaningfulness of the typology as well as the practicality of using value statements in questionnaires.

Further remarks on the empirical identification or measurement of value orientations would take us beyond the intended scope of this paper. One last point is, however, in order: if the technique of reaction to value statements is used, the *content* of these statements obviously have to be adjusted to (i.) the level of specificity (society, institutional complex, etc.), (ii.) the

range of the collectivities in which individuals are questioned (society, community, group, organization), (iii.) the sociocultural patterns – it would obviously not do to have statements referring to social situations and cultural items that none or few of the respondents have experienced, and (iv.) the educational status of the respondents.

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28. *Definitions of Value Orientations*

I. *Exclusiveness - Inclusiveness* (Integration/Time)

Exclusiveness places the emphasis on the maintenance of identity, homogeneity, and solidarity established over time. Inclusiveness refers to a readiness to enter into new solidarities, a readiness to associate with people who are 'different'.

II. *Individualism - Collectivism* (Integration/Space)

Individualism indicates the placing of the interests of the individual above those of the collectivity. Collectivism indicates the placing of the interests of the collectivity above those of the individual.

III. *Ascription - Achievement* (Integration/Movement)

Ascription indicates respect for and acceptance of other people because of what they are, rather than because of what they have achieved. It means that someone's sex, age, race, ethnic group and kinship or family connections count more than his personal achievements in decisions on the degree of respect or acknowledgement accorded him or readiness to interact with him in kinship, occupational and associative roles.

Achievement indicates respect for and acceptance of other people primarily because of the positions, qualities and achievements they have attained through their own efforts, application and abilities.

IV. *Discipline - Satisfaction-of-Self* (Integration/Involvement)

Discipline indicates an emphasis on self-control and a subordination of self-satisfaction because this, when indulged, can disturb the more important group-order. Discipline would also more often approve than disapprove of the use of punishment/control/regimentation.

Satisfaction-of-Self indicates a giving of priority to own satisfaction/indulgence/expression above discipline for the sake of others.

V. *Traditionalism - Situationism* (Pattern Maintenance/Time)

Traditionalism indicates the granting of priority to old-established patterns of behaviour. It is conservative and bent on maintaining the pattern. The emphasis is always on the past. Situationism indicates a readiness to subject the applicability of patterns of behaviour to the demands set by a specific situation. It includes a preparedness to apply the principles of expedience and efficacy.

VI. *Pluralism - Uniformity* (Pattern Maintenance/Space)

Pluralism indicates a readiness to live with people who have other views and patterns of behaviour without attempting to standardise everything.

Uniformity indicates a stress on uniformity/homogeneity/standardisation in patterns of behaviour within defined groups.

VII. *Tolerance - Conformity* (Pattern Maintenance/Movement)

The question here is about tolerance/intolerance of 'different' patterns of behaviour of other people who in any case have to be lived with.

This differs from Pluralism - Uniformity in that the emphasis does not fall on the desirability of variety/standardisation of patterns of behaviour within particular collectivities. The stress

is on acceptance of other people and patience with them in spite of their 'otherness', or otherwise impatience and emphasis that others are acceptable only if they conform to 'our' patterns.

VIII. *Perfectionism - Indifference* (Pattern Maintenance/ Involvement)

Perfectionism - Indifference refers to differences that can exist with regard to the degree to which accepted patterns of behaviour must be complied with. It touches upon freedom of movement in one's commitment to accepted rules of conduct.

IX. *Acquiescence - Reform* (Adaptation/Time)

Acquiescence indicates readiness to rest in circumstances rather than to try to affect them in some way. Reform indicates the attitude that man can usually do something about his circumstances, that he ought to do it, and that he can thereby improve his adjustment.

X. *Transcendentalism - Secularism* (Adaptation/Space)

Transcendentalism indicates the projection of problems of adjustment to an other-worldly or supernatural space. It includes religious interpretations of problemsituations; a rejection of 'worldliness'.

Secularism indicates an acceptance and activation of the given perceived world as the only space within which can be sought and found meaningfulness.

XI. *Particularism - Universalism* (Adaptation/Movement)

Particularism implies that one's treatment of and interaction with other people is dependent upon one's particular personal relationships to them. Universalism implies that when other people fall into a specific category, one treats them all in exactly the same way and does not allow personal preferences or personal relationships outside the particular role in which the action takes place to have an influence. Universalism is connected with the ability and readiness to make role distinctions. Particularism represents a lesser inclination to keep roles separate.

XII. *Diligence - Carefreeness* (Adaptation/Involvement)

Diligence indicates a belief in action and zeal in order to ensure satisfactory adjustment. Carefreeness indicates an attitude of un-worriedness, passivity and disinclination to accept responsibility.

XIII. *Short-term Objectives - Long-term Objectives* (Goal Achievement/Time)

Short-term objectives indicates belief that it is sufficient and/or possible to plan in advance for only a limited period; that one must not expect too much of the future. Long-term objectives indicates belief in the meaningfulness of aims which lie in the distant future.

XIV. *Interdependence - Autonomy* (Goal Achievement/Space)

Interdependence recognises that objectives can be achieved only with the co-operation of others. Autonomy stresses independence in goal achievement.

XV. *Idealism - Pragmatism* (Goal Achievement/Movement)

Idealism indicates belief in ideals which are not necessarily attainable in practice. In contrast, pragmatism elevates practicability to the level of a primary requirement of all objectives.

XVI. *Planning - Laissez-faire* (Goal Achievement/Involvement)

Planning emphasises systematic advance arrangements. Laissez-faire denies that matters have to be planned in order to be successful.

Paradigm of value orientations

<i>Dimensions of social engagement</i>	<i>I</i> <i>Integration</i>	<i>P</i> <i>Pattern maintenance</i>	<i>A</i> <i>Adaptation</i>	<i>G</i> <i>Goal Achievement</i>
Social TIME T	Inclusiveness (a) vs. Exclusiveness (z) IT	Traditionalism (a) vs. Situationism (z) PT	Acquiescence (a) vs. Reform (z) AT	Short-term-objectives (a) vs. Long-term-objectives (z) GT
Social SPACE S	Individualism (a) vs. Collectivism (z) IS	Pluralism (a) vs. Uniformity (z) PS	Transcendental-ism (a) vs. Secularism (z.) A5	Interdependence (a) vs. Autonomy (z) GS
Social MOVEMENT M	Ascription (a) vs. Achievement (z) IM	Tolerance (a) vs. Conformity (z) PM	Particularism (a) vs. Universalism (z) AM	Idealism (a) vs. Pragmatism (z) GM
Social INVOLVEMENT In	Discipline (a) vs. Satisfaction-of-self (z) I In	Perfectionism (a) vs. Indifference (z) PIn	Diligence (a) vs. Carefreeness (z) AIn	Planning (a) vs. Laissez-faire (z) GIn